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This research focuses upon the economic 
development policy-making and planning activities of 
Chicago's Mayor Harold Washington during his first 
term in office (1983-1987). This thesis documents the 
major economic development policy initiatives of this 
administration as well as its record of achievement. 
In addition, this research describes how the mayor 
and his senior planners sought to re-orient economic 
development policies in order to provide greater 
benefits to Chicago's poor. Finally, the research 
evaluates the degree to which Mayor Washington 
succeeded in institutionalizing a progressive approach 
to local economic development planning in Chicago.
Qualitative research methods were used to collect 
data for this study. The primary source of data was a 
series of fifty-one personal interviews which were 
conducted by the investigator with community 
activists, public officials and business leaders from 
Chicago. Additional data came from an investigation 
of existing documentary evidence, particularly 
municipal reports, studies and plans. These data were
supplemented by materials taken from Chicago’s major 
daily newspaper, business press and community 
development journals.
The major foci of attention in this study are the 
major economic development policy initiatives and 
planning decisions of the Washington administration. 
Among the major policy initiatives examined by this 
study are: the Buy Chicago, Minority Purchasing, First 
Source Hiring, General Obligation Bonding, 
Downtown/Neighborhood Linkage and Citizen 
Participation Programs. Among the major economic 
development decisions reviewed by this research are: 
the Playskool Plant Closing, the Redevelopment of 
Navy Pier and the 1992 Chicago World's Fair.
This study concludes that the Washington 
administration was quite successful in transforming 
the nature of local economic development planning 
within Chicago during its first term in office. 
Policy changes made by the administration produced a 
pattern of benefits which provided much more 
assistance to poor and working class neighborhoods 
within the city and encouraged formerly excluded 
groups to participate in the local economic 
development planning process. Unfortunately, these 
changes were not fully institutionalized and did not 
continue beyond Mayor Washington's time in office.
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I. Introduction
A. Urban Policies for Economic Development
While the overall performance of the national 
economy improved during the 1980s, various forms of 
social inequality greatly intensified. Particularly 
alarming was the continued decline of many central 
cities and the resultant serious deterioration in the 
welfare of significant segments of the urban 
population. These problems were especially prevalent 
in older central cities in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic 
and Midwest regions of the country. Many of these 
cities were affected by declining residential 
populations, falling retail sales, weak commercial 
real estate markets, bank disinvestment, residential 
abandonment, deteriorating infrastructures, plant 
closings and increasing municipal debt.^ These 
economic problems were compounded in many of these
^■Anthony Downs, "The Future of Industrial 
Cities," in The New Urban Reality, edited by Paul E. 
Peterson, (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1985) 
pp. 281-294.
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cities by increasing rates of illiteracy, crime, 
homelessness, substance abuse,unemployment and 
poverty.^ Contributing to these difficulties were the 
Reagan administration's reductions in Federal spending 
for social programs.^
Given these problems one might have expected a 
dramatic political response, reminiscent of the New 
Deal era, aimed at redirecting local, state and 
national economic policies. However, citizen reaction 
to these problems was weak and slow to materialize in 
most places. The absence of such political activity 
in the context of such pressing economic problems is a 
profound historical question which many scholars have 
examined. Some attributed this lack of effective 
community response to racial, ethnic, generational and 
territorial divisions existing within urban
^Edward M. Meyers, Rebuilding America's Cities: 
A Policy Analysis of the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
(Cambridge: Ballenger Publishing Company, 1986) pp.
31-46.
^Richard P. Nathan and Fred C. Doolittle and 
Associates, The Consequences of Cuts: The Effects of 
the Reagan Domestic Program on State and Local 
Governments (Princeton: Princeton Urban and Regional 
Research Center, 1983), p. 92.
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communities which made successful class-based 
organizing on economic issues difficult. Others 
explained the absence of significant organizing 
efforts on the basis of the historic separation which 
existed in American political consciousness between 
community and economic issues.^ Still others viewed 
the apparent apathy of urban residents as a 
reasonable response to the control which community 
business elites exercised over local political agenda 
setting in cities.^ Finally, dramatic reductions in 
funding for community organizing by the Community 
Services Administration, Law Enforcement Assistance 
Agency and the VISTA Program were seen by many as
^Ira Katznelson, City Trenches: Urban Politics 
and Patterning of Class in the United States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 194.
^Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two 
Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 70 
(December 1962): 947-952.
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having seriously hampered local grassroots efforts to 
promote alternative approaches to urban economic 
development.®
This lack of response was not uniform across the 
country or within individual cities. As economic 
conditions continued to decline in many American 
cities, networks of community activists and city-wide 
coalitions of citizen groups began to form which 
challenged traditional approaches to local economic 
development policy-making. These coalitions brought 
together activists from civic, tenant, neighborhood, 
religious, civil rights, women’s, senior citizen and 
labor organizations to oppose the downtown 
orientation, retail and commercial emphasis and the
^A significant body of literature exists on the 
origins and development of community organizing in 
America. An excellent source on the early history of 
this movement is Janice Perlman’s article, 
"Grassrooting the System," Social Policy, 
September/October 1976, Volume 7, No. 2 which covers 
the period up to 1975. Harry C. Boyte's book, The 
Backyard Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1982) describes the rapid growth of the 
American community organizing movement and the 
development of various state-wide and national 
organizing networks during the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Two recent books which describe the expansion 
of specific national community organizations in the 
context of national political trends in the 1980s are 
Harry C. Boyte, Heather Booth, and Steve Max’s book, 
Citizen Action and the New American Populism 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) and Gary 
Delgado’s book, Organizing the Movement: The Roots and 
Growth of Acorn (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1986.
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exclusionary nature of most local economic development 
planning. On occasion, these coalitions successfully 
mobilized to oppose major downtown development 
projects supported by business representatives and 
local officials.
The growth of these city-wide coalitions opposed 
to traditional approaches to local economic 
development planning was significant because they 
unified important urban political constituencies which 
had not worked together before. The efforts leading 
to the organization of such groups in support of 
alternative approaches to local economic development 
policy-making appeared to have overcome some of the 
territorial, ethnic, and racial barriers which 
Katznelson argued had prevented the formation of a 
militant working class movement in this country. In 
transcending what he describes as the "system of city 
trenches," these organizational efforts may have 
represented a critical turning point in the politics 
of urban development.
However, the organizing efforts of these 
grassroots coalitions tended not to be dominant in the 
local economic development planning processes of most 
American cities. More the rule was domination by 
groups of local bankers, builders, developers,
6
editors, realtors, retailers and insurance executives 
who remained committed to policies aimed at 
encouraging the continued growth of downtown business 
areas. Aided by sympathetic public officials and 
union leaders representing the building trades, these 
networks supported local development policies which 
promoted private sector investment in central business 
districts through various forms of municipal subsidy. 
Organized into what Molotch called "pro-growth 
coalitions," these organizations exerted a strong 
influence over the local economic development 
policies of most American cities throughout the early 
1980s.^ Nevertheless, the emergence of a strong 
oppositional movement of community groups committed to 
alternative approaches to local economic development 
planning called into question the assumed hegemony of 
"pro-growth coalitions" in the arena of urban policy­
making .
B. The Chicago Case
The economic problems facing Chicago in 1982 were 
typical of those confronting many other central cities 
in the United States. Despite dramatic growth in the 
city's service sector and significant expansion of its
^Harvey Molotch, "The City As Growth Machine," 
American Journal of Sociology, Volume 82, No. 2, 
September 1976, p. 314.
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central business district, Chicago continued to 
experience industrial job losses, ongoing bank 
disinvestment in residential areas, intensified 
suburban competition for retail shoppers and 
commercial tenants, an aging municipal infrastructure, 
a growing municipal debt and high rates of 
unemployment, homelessness and poverty.® These 
factors served to focus considerable attention on the 
local economic development strategies and programs of 
the City of Chicago.
As disparities between economic conditions in 
Chicago's central business district, known as "The 
Loop," and its older residential areas became more 
pronounced throughout the 1970s, conflict over the 
direction of local economic development policy 
escalated. Increasingly, community groups mobilized 
in opposition to the city's local economic development 
policies and programs. As the 1982 Democratic Party 
primary approached, a city-wide coalition of community 
groups called The Chicago Workshop for Economic 
Development (CWED) organized to make local economic 
development policy and planning major issues in the 
mayoral campaign. Encouraged by the growth of such
®Make No Little Plans: Jobs For Metropolitan
Chicago, (Chicago: The Commercial Club of Chicago,1984), pp. 11-20.
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oppositional movements, two candidates stepped forward 
to challenge Jane M. Byrne in the primary. They were 
Illinois State’s Attorney Richard M. Daley and U.S. 
Representative Harold Washington. Both challengers 
made their attack upon the economic development 
policies and practices of the Byrne administration 
focal points in their campaigns.
Throughout the primary, Daley and Washington 
raised a number of fundamental questions regarding the 
economic development policies and practices of the 
Byrne administration. They criticized Byrne for 
concentrating Chicago’s economic development 
resources within the central business district at the 
expense of the city’s older residential neighborhoods. 
They questioned Byrne’s emphasis upon retail and 
commercial office projects and lack of commitment to 
small business development and industrial retention 
efforts. They charged Byrne with showing political 
favoritism in the selection of developers for major 
downtown urban renewal projects. They attacked Byrne 
for providing unnecessary municipal subsidies to 
politically-connected developers for projects which 
would have proceeded without city assistance. They 
ridiculed Byrne for failing to involve citizens, in 
meaningful ways, in the city’s local economic
9
development planning processes. In addition, 
Washington assailed Byrne for not aggressively 
pursuing affirmative action policies in the areas of 
municipal hiring, purchasing and contracting. After 
defeating Byrne and Daley in the Democratic Party 
primary, Harold Washington proceeded to beat his 
Republican challenger, Illinois State Representative 
Bernard 0. Epton, in the city's general election.
During the campaign, Washington made his 
commitment to changing in a fundamental way Chicago's 
local economic development policies and plans one of 
the centerpieces of his election platform. Drawing 
heavily from the economic development program of The 
Chicago Workshop for Economic Development, Washington 
crafted the Jobs for Chicagoans and Neighborhood 
sections of his key campaign document, referred to as 
The Washington Papers. In this 52-page policy paper, 
Washington committed his administration to two 
important economic development policy objectives. 
First, he called for policies aimed at dramatically 
expanding employment and entrepreneurial opportunities 
for Chicago's poorest citizens. Second, he advocated 
the establishment of a highly participatory approach 
to local economic development policy-making and 
planning.
10
Throughout the campaign, Washington proposed a 
number of specific policies aimed at achieving the 
redistribution objective of his platform. He 
advocated making job creation for Chicago's long-term 
unemployed and displaced workers the primary goal of 
his economic development policies. He called for 
increased funding for small business development and 
industrial retention efforts designed to create jobs 
for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. He argued for 
greater municipal investment in older residential 
areas of the city to promote a more balanced pattern 
of growth. He supported the establishment of 
aggressive affirmative action goals aimed at expanding 
business opportunities for minorities and women. 
Finally, he urged additional funding for community- 
based and locally-controlled development corporations 
to enhance their ability to plan, finance and execute 
major development projects.^
^Excellent summaries of Harold Washington's 
economic development platform appear in Robert Mier, 
Kari J. Moe and Irene Sherr, "Strategic Planning and 
the Pursuit of Reform, Economic Development and 
Equity," Journal of the American Planning Association, 
Volume 52, No. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 299-309; John 
McCarron "Is Chicago Ready For Reform?" Planning, 
Volume 50, No. 9 (September 1984), p. 9; and Gregory 
Squires, Larry Bennett, Kathleen McCourt and Philip 
Nyden, Chicago: Race, Class and the Response to
Decline, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press),
1987.
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Washington also offered a number of proposals 
during his campaign aimed at achieving the citizen 
participation objective of his platform. He proposed 
the development of a local freedom of information 
program to insure all residents easy access to 
critical documents related to government plans and 
programs. He committed his administration to 
revamping the municipal budget process to provide 
citizens with meaningful input on local spending 
priorities. He suggested the establishment of a city­
wide network of neighborhood councils to give 
residents a voice on major land use decisions 
affecting their neighborhoods.
The Washington administration’s commitments to 
redistributive development policies and participatory 
planning processes were controversial and noteworthy 
for no one locally thought they could be successfully 
implemented.^ indeed, dramatic reforms of this type 
had never been attempted before in a major American 
city and the preponderance of social science and 
policy studies argued the futility of such efforts.
These factors make the study of the reform 
efforts of the Washington administration in the 
economic development arena an important subject for 10
10’McCarron, op cit.
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urban scholars. This research should provide rich 
insights into the process of organizational change 
and innovation in large-scale municipal bureaucracies. 
Such knowledge will be of interest not only to 
scholars but to community activists and progressive 
public officials who are committed to achieving 
similar goals in other cities.
C. Presentation of the Central Research 
Question
This thesis seeks to determine if, in fact, the 
Washington administration succeeded in replacing the 
traditional approach of the Byrne administration to 
local economic development with the populist approach 
implied in his platform. But, critical methodological 
problem posed by this research, which has been 
confronted by many scholars, is the question of how 
one recognizes fundamental reform within a public 
bureaucracy. For the purposes of this analysis, two 
separate dimensions are used to define four distinct 
models of local economic development planning. The 
first dimension identifies the dominant policy 
orientation of the local development planning agency. 
Drawing upon Peterson’s work, policies are described 
as "developmental" or "redistributional" based upon
13
the goals they seek to achieve. Developmental 
policies aim at enhancing the competitive position of 
a local community, vis a vis other cities, by lowering 
business costs through municipal subsidies. Examples 
of developmental policies are municipal subsidies for 
land assemblage and acquisition, below market rate 
financing for building rehabilitation and 
construction, local tax abatements and credits, zoning 
bonuses for business, training grants to partially 
reimburse employers for wages paid to new workers, 
reduced utility rates for business and industrial 
revenue bonds. Redistributional policies focus local 
assistance on programs organized to assist 
economically marginalized segments and sectors of the 
community in order to improve their social status. 
Examples of redistributional policies are residential
jrent control, payroll taxes, property tax 
classification systems, business services taxes, 
levies on professional services, high business 
licensing and user fees, premium utility rates for 
large energy users, local hiring ordinances, and 
minority contracting requirements as well as various 
types of linkage programs.
Upaul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 41-52.
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The second dimension identifies the scope of 
citizen participation in local economic development 
planning. Using Arnstein's^ and Pateman’s ^  work, 
local economic development planning processes are 
described as "elitist" or "participatory." Elitist 
planning processes limit participation in development 
policy-making to a small number of institutional 
leaders representing major political constituencies 
within the community. Participatory planning 
processes expand involvement in development policy­
making to include a broad cross-section of grassroots 
community leaders and interested citizens who are not 
affiliated with established groups.
Together these two dimensions are used to create 
a four-category typology into which the local 
economic development planning approach of any 
community can be placed. Within this framework, 
Traditional Models of local economic development 
planning feature developmental policies and elitist 
planning processes. Liberal Models of local economic 
development planning are based upon developmental
■*-^ Sherry B. Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen 
Participation," Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, 35:4 (July), pp. 216-224.
l^Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic 
Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
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policies and participatory planning practices. 
Corporatist Models of local economic development 
planning are distinguished by their redistributive 
policies and elitist planning processes. Populist 
Models of local economic development planning are 
based upon redistributive policies and participatory 
planning processes. Figure 1.1 which appears on the 
following page presents a summary of this typology. 
This diagram helps us understand what constitutes a 
significant innovation or reform within local city 
government. From our perspective, fundamental change 
features a shift from developmental to redistributive 
policies and from elitist to participatory planning 
processes. Within our diagram, such change would be 
represented by a movement from a Traditional Model 
(upper left hand box) to a Populist Model (lower right 
hand box) of local economic development planning.
Based upon the diagram, the central hypothesis of 
this thesis can now be more clearly stated. The 
Washington administration during its first term in 
office shifted economic development planning in 
Chicago from a Traditional to a Populist Model. This 
involved replacing Jane Byrne’s Traditional Model of 
local economic development, which was characterized 
by an emphasis upon developmental policies that
16
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subsidized private investment and a commitment to 
elitist planning processes that excluded a wide range 
of community leaders from participation in development 
policy-making, with a Populist Model of local economic 
development, which promoted redistributive policies to 
assist the poor and participatory planning processes 
aimed at expanding citizen participation in policy­
making. Using data from the following case study, 
this thesis seeks to determine if the Washington 
administration successfully transformed local economic 
development planning during its first term in office 
from a Traditional to a Populist Model within the 
framework presented above.
The views of scholars regarding the possibilities 
for fundamental change of this type in the local 
economic development planning practices of a single 
community like Chicago have differed dramatically. 
Most scholars have said cities cannot implement 
redistributive development policies and participatory 
planning processes. Many have argued that change in 
local economic development practices of the scope 
proposed by Washington during his 1983 mayoral 
campaign was impossible due to the overwhelming 
control which the local Democratic machine exerted 
Over the municipal bureaucracy in Chicago.
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Washington's proposals to target economic development 
assistance to the poor would be opposed by the machine 
because they would limit the resources available to 
benefit its members and supporters through contracts, 
development agreements, franchises, grants, jobs and 
tax subsidies. Washington's efforts to broaden 
citizen participation in local economic development 
planning would also be resisted by the machine because 
they would threaten to undermine the role of the ward 
leader and party committeeman as broker of local 
government benefits. For these reasons, the machine 
would oppose Washington's reforms in the economic 
development planning area.
Milton K. Rakove, a political scientist, noted 
the unusual degree of influence which the Chicago 
machine exerted over local government in the following 
manner.
While the city of Chicago shares many of the 
problems of all American big cities, it is 
unique in its extant political system.
Alone of all the big cities, Chicago has 
resisted reform of its political machine, 
rejectedmerit system employment in its 
government bureaucracy,retained the time 
tested political relationship of political 
bosses to needy constituents, maintained and 
strengthened centralized political power 
instead of diffusing that power to the 
bureaucracy and local community organiza-
19
tions and been controlled by men whose 
ambitions have differed significantly from 
their counterparts in other big cities in 
America.^
Rakove’s views regarding the degree of control 
which the machine exerted over local government policy 
were reaffirmed by John McCarron in 1984 based upon 
his study of local economic development planning in 
Chicago.
Planning here has traditionally been a weak 
sister of the political apparatus. Daniel 
Burnham’s 1909 'Plan of Chicago’ may have 
saved the lakefront from becoming a grimy 
industrial strip, but his successors have 
been meek fellows, summoned on occasion to 
bless deals cut in private between 
politicians and developers. ’Chicago ain’t 
ready for reform', was the way one ward 
healer put it and he might have added, ’or 
for planning, either.
According to this argument, while reform might be 
possible in other urban communities where the power of 
the political machine was less pronounced, meaningful 
change was not possible in Chicago where the machine's 
influence remained intact.
The work of Robert Michels provides another 
perspective on why the reform efforts of the
■^Milton l . Rakove, Don’t Make No Waves, Don’t 
Back No Losers: An Insiders Analysis of the Daley
Machine (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, *15
1985). p. 13.
15John McCarron, "Is Chicago Ready for Reform?" 
Planning, Volume 50, Number 9, September 1984, p. 9.
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Washington administration were unlikely to result in 
fundamental change in the municipal government of 
Chicago. According to Michels, reform movements 
require skillful organization if they are to 
successfully challenge the political power of 
entrenched elites. One of the necessities of such 
organization is the establishment of a cadre of full­
time leaders who focus upon building the institutional 
power and effectiveness of the group. The experience 
these individuals gain over time as leaders provides 
them with specialized organizational knowledge and 
skills which increase their influence and prestige 
within the group. Michels observed a strong tendency 
among such leaders to abandon their reform efforts in 
order to engage in activities aimed at solidifying 
their power base within the group and the larger 
community. He called this tendency the "iron law of 
oligarchy" and described it in the following manner.
By a universally applicable social law, 
every organ of the collectivity, brought 
into existence through the need for the 
division of labor, creates for itself, as 
soon as it becomes consolidated, interests 
particular to itself. The existence of 
these special interests involves a necessary 
conflict with the interests of the 
collectivity. Nay, more, social strata 
fulfilling peculiar functions tend to become 
isolated, to produce organs fitted for the
21
defense of their own peculiar interests.
In the long run they tend to undergo
transformation into distinct classes.^
While reform movements are possible, in Michels view, 
they quickly become anti-democratic in nature and 
obstacles to further social change. Adherents to 
Michels’ "iron law of oligarchy" would question the 
capacity of the leadership of the Washington 
administration to implement its reform agenda. They 
would expect these leaders to abandon their reform 
goals in order to engage in activities aimed at 
building their community power base so as to become 
Chicago’s new machine.
Marris and Rein provide another argument against 
the likelihood of municipal reform in America.U 
According to these scholars, reformers seeking to 
champion the rights of the economically and 
politically disenfranchised confront, in the United 
States, a pluralist political system which expects 
government to serve as an impartial arbiter of the 
competing claims of various community groups. Upon
^ R o b e r t  Michels, Political Parties: A
Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Democracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), p. 389.
-*-^ Peter Marris and Martin Rein, Dilemmas of 
Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the 
United States (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 
224-238.
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assuming office, municipal reformers are forced to 
choose between their advocacy role as agents of social 
change and their mediation role as members of the 
local state. Those seeking to remain in office are 
compelled by the values inherent in America’s 
pluralist political culture to embrace their role as 
mediator by abandoning their advocacy role. As a 
result of the contradictory demands placed upon 
elected municipal reformers by their movement 
organizer and community mediator roles it becomes very 
difficult for such civic leaders to advance 
effectively progressive agendas.
Peterson bases his argument against the 
likelihood of progressive reform of local economic 
development policies on the limited nature of the 
political power which cities possess. Unable to 
control imports or impose tariffs, cities must 
concentrate, according to Peterson, on strengthening 
their export base. This goal is achieved by improving 
the competitive advantage of local firms in the 
production and distribution areas through indirect and 
direct municipal subsidies and infrastructure 
improvements. Peterson urged the enactment of 
"development policies" by cities which he defined as 
"those local programs which enhance the economic
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position of the community in its competition with 
others.Furthermore, he cautioned cities against 
establishing "redistributional policies" targeted to 
assist the poor. Such policies, he suggested, would 
undermine the competitive position of a community by 
increasing its local business costs relative to other 
communities.
Because they are open systems, local 
governments are particularly sensitive to 
external changes. To maintain their local 
economic health, they must maintain a local 
efficiency that leaves little scope for 
egalitarian concerns. These limits on local 
government, which have already been 
elaborated at length, require that local 
government concentrate on development as 
against redistributive objectives.
According to this view, while municipal reformers like
Washington may wish to pursue a progressive agenda
aimed at improving the socioeconomic status of the
poor, they will be discouraged from doing so by the
competitive nature of urban economics and the limited
political power of cities.
A review of the previous literature may lead one
to agree with most mainstream social scientists who
argue that significant change in local government
policy-making is unlikely, short-lived or impossible
l®Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 41.
■^Peterson, p. 64.
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to achieve. However, another view exists which argues 
persuasively in favor of the possibilities for genuine 
reform within bureaucratic organizations. According 
to Alvin Gouldner, mainstream social scientists, like 
Michels have exaggerated the conservative tendencies 
of reform organizations by focusing upon certain 
organizational needs which emerge as unintended 
consequences of the pursuit of institutional goals and 
objectives.
The needs in question are organizational, 
not individual, and include: the security of 
the organization as a whole in relation to 
the social forces in its environment? the 
stability of the lines of authority and 
communication; the stability of informal 
relations within the organization; the 
continuity of policy and of the sources of 
its determination; a homogeneity of outlook 
with respect to the means and role of the organization.20
By emphasizing the structural factors which shape 
behavior mainstream social scientists have, according 
to Gouldner, presented a rigid picture of formal 
organizations.
The attention which these scholars have devoted 
to studying oligarchical tendencies within reform 
organizations has caused them to routinely overlook
20^1vin W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and 
the Theory of Bureaucracy," in The Politics of the 
Federal Bureaucracy, edited by Alan Altshuler, (New 
York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1968), pp. 13-14.
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evidence of powerful democratization forces which 
exist within these groups. These social scientists 
frequently fail to observe or dramatically 
underemphasize the diversity, creativity, innovation, 
experimentation and consensus-building which are 
richly represented within reform organizations. By 
focusing upon the needs which organizations have for 
clarity of purpose, structure, method, power, 
authority and communication, mainstream social 
scientists have failed to adequately consider other 
needs which contemporary organizations have. Among 
these are a certain diversity of outlook necessary to 
provide organizations with the flexibility required 
to respond to ever changing environmental conditions 
as well as the voluntary endorsement of 
organizational goals and objectives by group members.
This disregard for the liberating aspects of 
reform organizations is not ascribed by Gouldner to a 
careful analysis of empirical data from organizations 
but to the influence of a particular "metaphysical 
pathos" which casts doubt upon the very possibility 
for democratic organization in society. Influenced by 
Weber’s views on bureaucracy, these scholars accept 
the inevitability of oligarchy within formal 
organizations.
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. . . a commitment to a theory often occurs 
by a process other than the one which its 
proponents believe and it is usually more 
consequential then they realize. A 
commitment to a theory may be made because 
the theory is congruent with the mood or 
deep-lying sentiments of its adherents, 
rather than merely because it has been 
cerebrally inspected and found valid. This 
is as true for the rigorous prose of social 
science as it is for the more lucid metaphor 
of creative literature, for each has its own 
silent appeal and its own metaphysical 
pathos.21
As a result of a metaphysical pathos of pessimism and 
fatalism associated with Weberian views on 
organization, most contemporary social scientists fail 
to appreciate the creative, innovative and 
participatory aspects of reform organizations.
William F. Whyte has also observed this tendency 
among social scientists to ignore evidence of change 
and innovation within formal organizations. While 
Gouldner ascribed this problem to a certain 
metaphysical pathos, Whyte ascribed it to the use of 
an inappropriate model of research and theory building 
by social scientists. According to Whyte, social 
scientists have become dependent upon a model of 
research borrowed from the natural sciences which 
features the formulation of highly structured research 
designs based upon existing theory that are developed
21Gouldner, p. 7.
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prior to entering the field where formal hypothesis 
testing occurs by means of experimentation. While 
this approach may be appropriate for the natural 
sciences where the properties of research objects are 
somewhat fixed, theory is relatively advanced and 
control during experiments is near complete, this is 
not so in the social sciences where the properties of 
research objects are constantly changing, theory is 
less advanced and where the success of an 
investigator's research is heavily dependent upon the 
cooperation of human subjects.
Social scientists concerned about generating 
reliable and valid results which are broadly 
generalizable have concentrated on systematically 
collecting data on conventional approaches to social 
problems based upon comparable sets of cases. This 
approach has yielded a wealth of information about 
what Whyte describes as "standard" models or 
approaches to human problem-solving but limited 
insights into alternative approaches which might 
exist.
If we confine our studies to cases where the 
principal actors are defining their problems 
in similar ways and attempting similar 
solutions, with similar results, we can only
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speculate as to what would happen if the 
actors defined the problems differently and 
took different lines of action.
Whyte urges social scientists to spend less time
investigating conventional approaches to human
problem-solving in order to identify, describe and
analyze alternative approaches to human-problem
solving which he calls social inventions. Of
particular importance, according to Whyte, is the
careful analysis of the underlying social principles
which make the social invention under study effective
in its own context.
The concerns which Gouldner and Whyte raised 
regarding the tendency of social scientists to ignore 
evidence of the democratic aspects of bureaucratic 
organization as well as organizational reform efforts 
have encouraged other researchers to pursue such 
efforts. The research described below, as well as 
this thesis, focuses upon providing in-depth 
descriptions of social inventions carried out by local 
communities in the economic development policy area.
Other scholars, citing examples of communities 
which have successfully instituted progressive
^^William Foote Whyte, "Social Inventions for 
Solving Human Problems: American Sociological
Association, 1981 Presidential Address," American 
Sociological Review, 1982, Volume 47 (February: 1-13).
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economic development policies, argue persuasively that 
municipal reform is possible to achieve in a single 
community. Based upon research done in Berkeley, 
Cleveland, and Hartford in the 1970s and Burlington 
and Santa Monica in the 1980s, Pierre Clavel described 
the establishment of redistributive development 
policies and participatory planning processes in these 
communities. According to Clavel, these five 
communities instituted a variety of policies aimed at 
creating new economic and political benefits for 
current city residents while expanding opportunities 
for citizen participation in local development policy­
making. Concerned about the increasing concentration 
of political and economic power within their 
communities as well as the exclusionary nature of 
local economic development decision-making, Clavel 
says,
These governments have tended to encourage 
participation and were willing to experiment 
with property rights in the interest of the 
majority of the population.^3
Within these communities, deteriorating economic
conditions, the presence of a strong oppositional
neighborhood movement and growing interest in
23pierre clavel, The Progressive City: Planning
and Participation, 1969-1984 (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1986), p. XII.
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planning, inside and outside of government, created 
conditions, according to Clavel, that were conducive 
to the establishment of a progressive political 
movement which supported targeted assistance to the 
poor, progressive tax schemes, cooperative forms of 
economic organization, aggressive regulation of 
business, experimental approaches to property rights 
and citizen participation in planning.
Using a somewhat broader definition of 
"progressive" in 1986, Derek Shearer included the 
eight small to medium cities of Baltimore, Burlington, 
Davis, Portland, St. Paul, San Antonio, Santa Monica 
and Seattle as well as the larger cities of Boston and 
Chicago in his list of progressive communities.^ 
Such communities were distinguished, according to 
Shearer, by their strong commitment to policies aimed 
at promoting balanced patterns of growth, citizen 
participation in policy-making and the design of urban 
environments at a human scale. Critical to the 
success of such policies were efforts to strengthen 
neighborhood organization, humanize the design of 
central business districts, decentralize commercial 
development and municipal services, and promote
Z^Derek Shearer, "In Search of the Progressive 
City: Urban Innovation in the United States," Seminar 
Transcript, Cornell University, March 18, 1986, p. 5.
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indigenous business and industry. These policy 
initiatives were important, says Shearer, not only as 
examples of local innovation but as a possible basis 
for the development of a progressive national urban 
policy.
Based upon his research in Cleveland in the late
1970s, Todd Swanstrom argued that cities possess the
capacity to enact progressive reforms, such as
redistributional local economic development policies.
This potential is based upon the city's ability to tax
the advanced corporate sector of the economy which
seeks locations in the central city. Their need to
capture the agglomeration benefits of a central city
location can be exploited to generate new revenues to
support redistributive programs aimed at assisting the
poor. New taxes on business services can be
justified, says Swanstrom, based upon the contribution
which public investments make towards creating the
economic advantages of downtown locations.
The entire synergistic environment is made 
possible, in large part, by the public 
sector, especially through the system of 
roads and mass transit. Since it is partly 
publicly created, part of this value should
32
go back to the public sector, where it could 
be used to reduce some of the tremendous 
inequities in urban development.^5
He argues, as does John Mollenkopf, that skillful
civic leaders are needed to serve as public
entrepreneurs to engage in necessary long-term
planning and bargaining with developers and investors
to produce such results.^6 Upon analyzing the recent
reform efforts of Kucinich in Cleveland and Flynn in
Boston, Swanstrom concluded that the economic vitality
of the central business districts of these cities made
the pursuit of redistributive economic development
policies possible. It was, however, the political
skills of Raymond Flynn, Boston's mayor, which enabled
the city to enact a series of reform efforts,
including a linkage policy, minority contracting
program and a resident hiring ordinance.^7
2^Todd Swanstrom, The Crisis of Growth Politics; 
Cleveland, Kucinich and the Challenge of Urban 
Populism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1985), p. 237.
^  John Mollenkopf, The Contested City 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 4.
2?Todd Swanstrom, "Urban Populism, Uneven 
Development and the Space For Reform," in Business 
Elites and Urban Development: Case Studies and
Critical Perspectives edited by Scott E. Cummings, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 
142.
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D. Identifying Cases of Progressive Reform
Research by Clavel, Shearer and Swanstrom lends 
support to the argument that it is possible, under 
certain circumstances, to institute redistributive 
development policies and participatory planning 
processes in an individual city like Chicago. Their 
research suggests that a local community can move from 
a Traditional to a Populist Model of local economic 
development planning. While the diagram presented 
earlier in this chapter presents a conceptual map of 
such a change, it does not provide us with an 
understanding of the process by which this change 
takes place. This knowledge is critical if we are to 
be able to respond to the criticism of most social 
scientists who will say that there were no significant 
differences in the local economic development 
practices of the Byrne and Washington administrations.
How do we solve this problem? How do we
determine, with some degree of confidence, if a
particular set of reforms represent fundamental
change in the local economic development practices of 
a given community. Andre Gorz attempted to address 
this problem through his notion of a "non-reformist
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r e f o r m . A c c o r d i n g  to Gorz, any change which was 
justified on the basis of human need rather than 
capital accumulation, transferred power to politically 
marginalized groups and generated questions regarding 
the legitimacy of capitalism qualified as a "non­
reformist reform". While this concept is 
heuristically appealing, those who have used this 
concept have found it very difficult to 
operationalize.29 while Soifert was able to address 
the program rationale of Gorz, he had great difficulty 
in evaluating changes in the balance of power and 
political consciousness which these reforms effected.
This thesis uses concepts from the institutional 
school of organizational theory to deal with the 
methodological problem of formulating a workable 
criteria for identifying cases of genuine reform.30 
This research draws upon Philip Selznick's work on 
"institutionalization" to address the methodological
28Andre Gorz, A Strategy for Labor; A Radical 
Perspective (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 6-8.
29For example, see Steven Soifer, "The Burlington 
Community Land Trust: A Non-Reformist Reform?" a paper 
presented at the New York Political Science 
Association's Annual Meeting, April 29-30, 1988, pp.
8- 11 .
^Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A
Critical Essay (New York: Random House, 1986), pp.
157-177.
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problem of establishing an operational criteria for
identifying examples of reform. According to
Selznick, institutionalization describes the process
by which the leadership of an organization helps build
the commitment of group members to the goals,
objectives, methods and world view of their
institutions. This leadership provides direction to
this process by means of the critical decisions it
makes to insure the survival of the organization in
the face of internal conflict and external pressure.
The positive effects of the leadership’s decisions
upon the survival of the group and the social needs of
its members encourage subordinates to condition their
reactions to problem situations thereby creating a
unique organizational approach to decision-making.
When this approach becomes valued, in and of itself,
by participants in the organization, the process of
institutionalization is said to have set in.
Once this process has begun the organization is
viewed as having developed a distinctive character
which can only be changed at the risk of great
institutional instability.
As an organization acquires a self, a 
distinctive identity, it becomes an 
institution. This involves the taking on of 
values, ways of acting and believing that 
are deemed important for their own sake.
From then on self-maintenance becomes more
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than organizational survival, it becomes a 
struggle to preserve the uniqueness of the 
group in the face of new problems and altered circumstances.^
This process of institutionalization results in 
dramatic changes within the organization in four 
critical areas. First, a clear statement of the
organization’s overall mission and role within the 
community is developed. In setting institutional 
goals, the leadership of the organization must be 
responsive to the needs, capacities and ambitions of 
group members as well as the demands placed upon the 
institution by powerful external forces. In defining 
the role of the institution, the leadership of the 
organization must choose the primary method by which 
it will attempt to achieve its goals in light of the 
specialized competencies of its own institution as 
well as that of its competitors.
Second, a series of critical choices are made to 
achieve what Selznick describes as "the institutional 
embodiment of purpose."^ a decision must be made as 
to whose interests within the community the 
organization will attempt to serve. Following this
^Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration; 
A Sociological Interpretation (Evanston: Row, Peterson 
and Company, 1957), p. 21.
32Selznick, p. 90.
37
choice regarding the "social base" of the
organization, a core staff must be recruited and
trained which is deeply committed to the values of the
organization. Finally, a new organizational design
and set of operating procedures must be formulated
which will focus resources and attention on those
activities which are most critical to achieving the
organization's goals. These decisions will
contribute, according to Selznick, to the development
of a social structure which is uniquely designed to
meet the needs of the organization.
When we say that policy is built into the 
social structureof an organization, we mean 
that official aims and methods are 
spontaneously protected and advanced. The 
aspirations of individuals and groups are so 
stimulated and controlled, and so ordered in 
their mutual relations, as to produce the 
desired balance of forces.^3
Third, specialized policy and planning units 
dedicated to the elaboration and defense of 
organizational values are created. These units, says 
Selznick, must be protected from the daily demands of 
routine administration to enable them to focus upon 
developing and promoting plans, policies and 
procedures aimed at advancing the goals and objectives 
of the organization. This is particularly important
^^Selznick, p. 100.
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for reform organizations whose agendas frequently 
threaten the power of established community elites. 
Decisions regarding the location of such units 
committed to what Edelman described as symbolic 
politics within the formal organization are 
c r u c i a l . These policy units must be located within 
the organizational hierarchy close enough to the 
leadership to be inspired by them, but not in a 
prominent enough position to become the visible 
targets of outside attacks.
Fourth, mechanisms are devised to structure, 
order and mediate internal conflict among competing 
constituency groups. This requires the organization 
to balance the often conflicting demands of democratic 
decision-making and efficient public administration. 
Selznick describes this challenge in the following 
manner.
It must win the consent of constituency 
units, in order to maximize voluntary 
cooperation, and therefore must permit 
emergent interest blocs a wide degree of 
representation. At the same time, in order 
to hold the helm, it must see that a 
balance of power appropriate to the 
fulfillment of key commitments will be 
maintained.^  ®
^Murray Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics 
(Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1985), pp. 
1-21.
35Selznick, pp. 63-64.
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E. Summary
Thus, this thesis asks two questions: 1) Did
Harold Washington's administration, in fact, initiate 
dramatic new departures from the Traditional Model of 
local economic development planning by instituting 
redistributive policies and participatory processes; 
and 2 ) did his administration succeed in 
institutionalizing the Populist Model of local 
development planning in the terms discussed by 
Selznick? Evidence of significant progress by the 
Washington administration in establishing a new 
definition and role, encouraging the embodiment of 
purpose, creating an autonomous elite to protect 
precarious values and devising mechanisms for the 
mediation of internal conflict will be used to 
determine whether or not its initiatives in the local 
economic development area constituted genuine reform. 
Advances in each of these four organizational areas 
will be used as the criteria by which the populist 
credentials of the Washington administration will be 
evaluated.
The following case study presents a detailed 
description of the local economic development 
policies, plans, programs and activities of the Byrne 
and Washington administrations. This research
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examines the local economic development planning 
activities of the Byrne administration during its 
single term in office (1979-1983) and the Washington 
administration during its first term in office (1983- 
1987). Specifically, it discusses the major economic 
development policy statements and public records of 
the Mayor's Office and the city's major development- 
related agencies, including the Mayor's Office of 
Employment and Training (MET), and the Departments of 
Economic Development (DED), Planning and Housing 
during these two administrations. The thesis does not 
examine the impact of Mayor Washington's local 
economic development policies on the economy of the 
city. This would have required a much longer period 
of study and far greater resources than were 
available. The primary sources of data on the local 
economic development policies of the Byrne 
administration were public documents and newspaper 
articles supplemented by personal interviews. The 
primary sources of data on the economic development 
policies of the Washington administration were 
personal interviews, public documents, newspaper 
articles and participant observation.
This research was made possible through the 
cooperation of the Mayor's Office and the Departments
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of Economic Development, Planning and Housing. 
Special assistance was provided by Mr. Robert Mier, 
former Commissioner of the Department of Economic 
Development, and Mr. Robert Giloth, former Deputy 
Commissioner of the Department of Economic Development 
for the City of Chicago. I am very grateful to the 
many Chicago officials, businessmen, planners, 
reporters, and community leaders who I had the 
opportunity to interview for this research. Their 
detailed knowledge of the Chicago and deep commitment 
to its future deeply impressed me. I wish to thank 
all of these individuals for their assistance and hope 
this work assists them, in some small way, in their 
ongoing efforts to improve the quality of governance 
and liveability of their city.
II. The Byrne Administration 1979-1983
A. The Byrne Victory in the 1979 Mayoral 
Election
Most analysts pointed to a set of surface issues
to explain Jane Byrne's victory over incumbent mayor,
Michael Bilandic in the 1979 Democratic party primary.
Typical of such analysis was the following offered by
Samuel K. Gove and Louis H. Masotti.
The machine was defeated in the February 
1979 primary by the persistent campaign of 
feisty Jane Byrne, aided and abetted by a 
record snowfall, the insensitivity and 
arrogance of City Hall politicians, and an 
aroused and angry public.^
Among the factors most frequently discussed as 
contributing to Bilandic's loss to Byrne was his 
administration's mismanagement of the city's winter 
snow emergencies during which time 90 inches of snow 
fell upon the city. Also mentioned were the recurring 
rumors of official misconduct and corruption in City 
Hall which plagued his administration. In addition, 
the consistent criticism by civil rights leaders of 
his insensitivity to the problems of the black 
community was viewed as having weakened his support 
among minority and liberal white voters. Finally, the
-^Samuel K. Gove and Louis H. Masotti, editors, 
After Daley: Chicago Politics in Transition.
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1982), p. X.
42
43
Bilandic re-election campaign, despite its abundant 
resources, was seen by most as being poorly organized.
However, more critical to Bilandic's loss than 
these factors was the dramatic decline in the Chicago 
Democratic Organization's ability to turn out the 
vote. An important factor contributing to the 
machine's loss of political power was a significant 
narrowing of its political base among white ethnic 
voters who were leaving the city for the suburbs. 
Another contributing factor was the increasing 
alienation of black voters from the party due to its 
discriminatory practices. In addition, the Shakman 
court decrees which placed severe restrictions upon 
local political patronage undermined the machine's 
ability to mobilize for the election. Finally, the 
growing influence of the city's independent 
neighborhood organizing movement reduced support for 
local party clubs.
Running on a reform platform, which she described 
as populist, Jane M. Byrne promised to end municipal 
patronage, improve governmental efficiency, secure 
collective bargaining agreements for municipal unions 
working without contracts, expand citizen 
participation in policy-making and increase funding 
for neighborhood preservation programs in Chicago's
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older residential areas. Sidney Lens summarized 
Byrne’s victory statement on the night of her primary 
win over Bilandic in the following way.
In the euphoria of the moment, she promised 
a number of good things: to repair and
rebuild the neighborhoods; to fire the 
incumbent police chief, James O'Grady, and 
replace him with someone outside of the 
ranks; to bargain collectively with unions 
of police, firefighters and city workers.^
By attracting significant support among civil 
rights groups, women's organizations, government 
reform associations and public employee unions, Byrne
built an electoral coalition that defeated Bilandic
and the machine by more than 15,000 votes in the 
mayoral primary. With the support of this electoral 
coalition and the backing of the majority of 
Democratic committeemen and ward leaders, Byrne 
captured more than 82% of the votes in the general 
election. In doing so, she produced the second 
highest plurality of any mayoral candidate since 1939 
and secured a larger share of the general election 
vote than Richard J. Daley did during any of his six 
successful campaigns.^
^Sidney Lens, "New Winds in Chicago," 
Progressive, June, 1979, Volume 43, Number 6, pp. 9-10.
^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Black Vote Crucial In 
Chicago's Upset," New York Times, March 2, 1979,
Section A, p. 3.
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In winning the Democratic primary, Jane M. Byrne 
successfully exploited two of the machine's most 
serious political problems, namely, racial conflict in 
the party and conflicting attitudes toward political 
patronage and graft. Historically, the Chicago 
Democratic Organization depended heavily upon the 
loyal support of inner city white ethnic and black 
voters to elect its slate of candidates. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, however, the self-interests of these two 
constituencies increasingly came into direct conflict. 
White ethnic voters looked to the party to provide 
needed jobs for their community and to endorse 
policies supportive of racial segregation in housing, 
employment and education. The party sought to meet 
these demands in order to retain its white ethnic base 
in the face of continuing "white flight" to the 
suburbs. At the same time, leaders of the black 
community, influenced by their participation in the 
civil rights movement, sought to secure what they 
considered a "fair share" of municipal jobs and 
contracts through their participation in the party. 
In addition, they increasingly demanded support for 
policies aimed at increasing educational and housing 
opportunities within the city for blacks which 
frequently meant supporting their demands to integrate
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previously white ethnic residential areas and 
institutions.
This situation was further complicated by the 
growth of Chicago's black population. The political 
problem which this created for the Chicago Democratic 
Organization was clearly stated by Kathleen Kemp and 
Robert Lineberry.
The 1980 census should show the city with a 
black-Latino majority. Maintaining white 
dominant-black subordinate power relations 
in a black dominant-white subordinate 
numerical reality is a signal challenge to 
any big-city political organization, 
Chicago's included.^
Still, the Chicago Democratic Organization sought to 
retain its power by struggling to balance these 
contradictory demands.
The party was heavily dependent upon its control 
of local political patronage in the form of jobs, 
contracts and grants to maintain the loyalty of these 
two political constituencies. However, its use of 
these resources for this purpose threatened to cause 
the exodus from the party of many reform-minded middle 
class voters. Many of these individuals had been
^Kathleen A. Kemp and Robert L. Lineberry, "The 
Last of the Great Urban Machines and the Last of the 
Great Urban Mayors," in After Daley: Chicago Politics 
in Transition, edited by Louis H. Masotti and Samuel 
K. Gove, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press), 
1982, p. 2.
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influenced by the reform ideas of the liberal wing of 
the Democratic party in the period following 
Watergate. These voters tended to view patronage and 
graft as essentially immoral practices which 
undermine democratic values and add to the cost of 
government. While small in number, these individuals 
were politically active, and their loyalty to the 
Chicago Democratic Organization was critical to its 
continued success.
By appealing to the sense of outrage which blacks 
felt toward the party and the reform minded instincts 
of middle class voters, Jane M. Byrne was able to 
build an electoral coalition which defeated the 
machine and permitted her to become mayor.
B. Early Actions and Decisions of the Byrne 
Administration
Great uncertainty existed after the election as 
to the kind of mayor Jane M. Byrne would be. After 
serving as Richard J. Daley's Commissioner of Consumer 
Sales, Weights and Measures and Co-chairing the Cook 
County Democratic Organization with the mayor, most 
party regulars expected Byrne to follow policies 
similar to those of previous democratic 
administrations. Veteran Chicago Alderman Roman 
Pucinski described Jane Byrne in the following manner
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after the election.
Contrary to popular belief [sic]. She is a 
product of the Democratic machine. She is 
not a starry-eyed, fuzzy-minded independent 
who wants to come through Chicago on a white 
charger. She's a practical leader. If she 
smoked cigars, she would not be a great deal different from the committeemen.^
Reformers, on the other hand, looked to Byrne to
implement her reform platform by establishing a
progressive administration. Shortly after her
election columnist David Moberg wrote,
Her programs--which she describes as 
'populist'--are likely to favor the 
neighborhoods and lead to both more 
progressive and more equally distributed 
city services in everything from health to 
street cleaning, reversing to some extent 
the favoritism to a few wards and to the 
central business district.^
Louis H. Masotti and Samuel K. Gove, long-time 
observers of the Chicago political scene, argued that 
Byrne had three options open to her following her 
successful election bid. First, she could adopt a 
genuine reform agenda and seek to build a progressive 
base of grassroots support. Second, she could attempt 
to institutionalize her electoral base and proceed to
^Douglas E. Kneeland, "Mrs. Byrne Seeks to Heal 
Rift With Democratic Organization," New York Times, 
March 3, 1979, p. 10.
^David Moberg, "Heads May Roll, But Machine 
Gears May Still Mesh," In These Times, March 14-20, 
1979, p. 3.
build her own political machine. Third, she could 
settle her differences with the leadership of the 
machine and maintain the status quo.^ Her first 
public acts following her election gave both party 
regulars and reformers reasons to be hopeful about the 
new administration.
The members of the Chicago Democratic 
Organization were encouraged by a number of steps 
taken by the mayor shortly after she assumed office. 
First, she permitted the existing leadership of the 
Chicago Democratic Organization to select the 
individuals to fill key chairmanships in the Chicago 
City Council, insuring their continued control of this 
body. The mayor took no action to insure for her 
supporters or other Independents leadership positions 
within the City Council. This greatly limited Byrne’s 
capacity to advance a reform agenda through the City 
Council.
Second, despite her campaign pledges to do so, 
she failed to dismantle the city’s patronage system. 
In fact, she chaired a City Council meeting at which 
an ordinance was passed which promised to return
25,000 jobs to the city's patronage system. According 
to a January 15, 1981 New York Times story,
^Masotti and Gove, p. XI.
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Mayor Byrne, who presided over the Council 
meeting, insisted at a news conference that 
she was 'neither aware of the ordinance’ 
before it was introduced nor had she been 
given 'sufficient time to review it.' But 
she added that she had no intention of 
vetoing it.®
Third, she dropped her opposition to a proposed 
downtown addition to the city subway system,
construction of a municipal stadium, and redevelopment 
of the North Loop Urban Renewal Area which the 
business community supported and members of the 
Chicago Democratic Organization hoped to profit from 
through control of related development agreements, 
zoning variances, municipal contracts and 
construction jobs. A Business Week article described 
Byrne's changing views on downtown development in the
following manner.
In view of Byrne's emphasis on Chicago 
neighborhoods, businessmen also were 
convinced she might abandon redevelopment 
projects in the central business district. 
Instead, the mayor is supporting a plan that 
she criticized during her campaign to 
revitalize a deteriorating downtown 
district. She recently obtained a $50 
million loan to acquire and clear a site of 
a $135 million Hilton Hotel. 'She's taking 
a broad, balanced look at the city's 
problems,' says Continental's Perkins. 'She
realizes that Chicago must have a healthy
®Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Chicago Council Votes 
to Restore Patronage System to 25,000 Jobs," New York 
Times, January 15, 1981, p. 8.
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core and the kind of jobs it creates, but 
also that healthy neighborhoods are vital to a stable community.^
Byrne's shift in position represented a significant 
departure from her campaign promise to promote 
policies aimed at encouraging a balanced pattern of 
growth within the city.
Fourth, she withdrew her support for a proposal 
to establish strong neighborhood planning councils 
which would give city residents a voice on important 
land use and development decisions. As a result, 
power over these public policy issues remained 
centralized in the City Council, Department of 
Planning and the Mayor's Office.
Fifth, she displayed a willingness to work 
closely with machine Councilmen Vrdolyak and Burke, 
whom she had referred to during her campaign as 
members of an "evil cabal of men" who were ruining the 
city. In addition to cooperating with the leadership 
of the Chicago Democratic Organization, she supported 
Alderman Vrdolyak's successful bid to become the 
Chairman of the Cook County Democratic Organization. 
She also endorsed Alderman Burke's unsuccessful 
attempt to defeat Richard M. Daley, the late mayor's 9
9 "Her Honor Flirts With Business," Business 
Week, December 10, 1979, pp. 61-66.
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son, in an election for Illinois State’s Attorney.
On the other hand, reformers were encouraged by 
other actions of the mayor which they felt indicated 
her commitment to progressive local government. 
First, she formed a Transition Team, comprised of 
respected public administrators, recognized academics, 
and long-time municipal reformers, to plan for her new 
administration. Observers were impressed by the 
quality of the leaders she involved in this process as 
well as the diversity of constituencies they 
represented.
Second, she made a series of appointments which 
were very well received by those committed to reform. 
Among these were Martin Oberman’s selection as a 
consultant to work on a collective bargaining 
ordinance for the city. This proposed local ordinance 
would have established a framework through which the 
city could enter into collective bargaining agreements 
with its municipal unions. Historically, the city’s 
employees worked without contracts on the basis of 
informal agreements made by their leaders and the 
mayor. While these understandings had resulted in 
uniformly high wage settlements they did not provide 
city workers with the full range of job security 
benefits which a collective bargaining agreement would
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establish. Mayor Byrne also selected Leon Despres, a 
former alderman, to serve as City Council 
Parliamentarian in hopes of creating a more open and 
democratic process within this body. In addition, 
Mayor Byrne selected Donald Haider, a well known 
professor of public finance, to head the city's Office 
of Management and Budget.
Third, she took a number of initiatives in the 
legislative area. Byrne held individual meetings with 
Independents in the City Council to discuss ways of 
building legislative support for municipal reform. In 
addition, she successfully opposed efforts by the City 
Council to pass an ordinance providing extended job 
protection to the City's embattled Police 
Superintendent, James O'Grady. Furthermore, she 
secured the passage by the City Council of an 
ordinance establishing a moratorium on condominium 
conversions by a 39-5 vote less than two weeks after 
the Council had overwhelmingly defeated the measure.
Fourth, she conducted a thorough examination of 
the city's financial condition and made public serious 
problems facing the city's operating, capital and 
education budgets. In doing so, she revealed how the 
city had, in the past, manipulated expenses in order 
to create the appearance of a balanced budget.
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Following up on these revelations, the mayor announced 
a series of steps to address Chicago's serious 
financial problems.
C. Economic Development Policy-making and 
Planning in the Byrne Administration
During the 1979 democratic mayoral primary Jane 
Byrne ran on a pro-neighborhood platform which 
stressed the needs of the city's older residential 
areas. She spoke of the importance of promoting a 
more balanced pattern of growth within the city, 
expanding citizen participation in development 
decision-making and increasing funding for 
neighborhood-based economic development and affordable 
housing programs.
The mayor proposed several initiatives aimed at 
achieving these overall economic development goals. 
She argued for reduced public support for downtown 
development and increased investment by the city in 
older residential areas. In addition, she called for 
the establishment of a strong system of neighborhood 
planning councils through which power over important 
land use and development decisions could be 
decentralized. Furthermore, she proposed the 
establishment of several new neighborhood 
stabilization efforts to assist ailing communities,
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including a commercial facade improvement and small
business micro-loan program.
Shortly after assuming office, the mayor appeared
to change her views on downtown development. She
abandoned her opposition to further municipal subsidy
of large-scale downtown projects by supporting a
proposed extension of the city subway downtown,
construction of a new municipal baseball stadium and
massive redevelopment of the North Loop Urban Renewal
Area as a luxury residential and upscale commercial
district. In addition, she submitted a $50 million
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) application to
the Federal government to acquire and prepare the
site for a new downtown Hilton Hotel. In doing so,
she spoke of the important contribution which ongoing
development of the central business district would
make to the vitality of Chicago's neighborhoods as
well as all communities within the region.
John McCarron, a local journalist, described the
reaction of Chicago's neighborhood leaders to these
actions of the mayor in the following way.
Neighborhood leaders watched in anger as 
Byrne obtained UDAG money for downtown 
enterprises in questionable need, such as an 
addition to the Chicago Board of Trade. One 
year she diverted a third of the city' s 
community development funds to pay for 
overdue snow removal bills. A major 
planning function was yanked from the
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Chicago Rehabilitation network, an umbrella 
group for community-based rehabilitation, 
and the work turned over to patronacre 
workers in the city’s housing department.^
The mayor also changed her position regarding the
establishment of a strong system of neighborhood
planning councils to review major land use and
development decisions. Upon her election, Mayor Byrne
awarded a $600,000 contract to the Chicago-based
consulting firm of John A. Melaniphy Associates for
the dual purpose of conducting a needs assessment of
the city's 77 community areas and a feasibility study
of various approaches to community planning. The firm
produced a 600 page report describing neighborhood
conditions throughout the city and presented a variety
of alternative methods of establishing effective
neighborhood planning councils. Mayor Byrne
suppressed the release of the report and withdrew her
support for the establishment of strong neighborhood
planning councils with significant decision-making
powers.
John Melaniphy explained the mayor's actions by 
noting the serious threat which strong neighborhood 
planning bodies presented to the traditional power of 
the local Democratic Committeemen whose influence had,
-^Ojohn McCarron, "Is Chicago Ready For Reform?" 
Planning, Volume 50, Number 9, September 1984, p. 9.
57
in part, been based upon their perceived ability to 
protect neighborhood interests. Fully empowered 
neighborhood planning councils, as initially proposed 
by Jane Byrne, would have substituted private deal- 
making by party officials with participatory decision­
making by community residents as the primary method 
for determining community priorities, plans and 
programs. If fully implemented, the neighborhood 
planning councils could have replaced local party 
organizations as the primary vehicle for the 
resolution of community problems and concerns. 
According John Melaniphy,
It's a political threat, Daley would never 
have it because he figured that what you 
ended up doing was establishing another 
hierarchy outside of the political 
hierarchy, which was dangerous. I think 
Jane Byrne came to the same conclusion as we 
neared the end of our study. With her 
election coming up, she buried it because 
she was afraid her enemies would use it 
against her.H
Joel Werth, a project manager on the Melaniphy 
neighborhood study and former Washington 
administration official, revealed strong criticisms 
which community leaders had of the approach taken by 
Byrne to the needs assessment and feasibility study.
HInterview with John Melaniphy, Senior Partner, 
John A. Melaniphy Associates, October 14, 1984, 
Chicago, Illinois.
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The report itself and the concept of doing 
the neighborhood needs analysis, in the way 
we had structured it, was heavily criticized 
by community-based organizations as being 
the typical top-down approach to 
identifying needs where you hire a 
consultant and the consultant tries to find 
out what is happening in the community.
While we did hundreds of interviews, it was 
still the mayor hiring an outside consultant 
to address community issues rather than the 
kind of grassroots empowering process of 
collaboration which community groups hoped 
for.12
In the end, the Byrne administration established 
eleven neighborhood planning districts to provide 
businesses and residents with input on land use and 
development decisions. However, these bodies were 
inadequately staffed, advisory in nature, and were 
generally consulted very late in the city’s formal 
planning process. As a result, these citizen review 
committees had very little, if any, impact upon major 
planning decisions within the city. In fact, it is 
impossible to identify a single planning issue during 
the Byrne administration the outcome of which was 
affected by these bodies.
Mayor Byrne’s record in strengthening the city’s 
neighborhood stabilization programs was also somewhat 
mixed. On the positive side, she initiated a new
12Interview with Joel Werth, former Planning 
Director, Department of Housing, City of Chicago, 
October 15, 1984, Chicago, Illinois,
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commercial facade improvement program to enhance the 
appearance of the city's neighborhood shopping 
districts. She also established a small business loan 
program to assist new start-up ventures. Furthermore, 
she increased funding for the city's neighborhood 
technical assistance program which helped organize 
area merchant associations and assisted small 
businesses with development financing. On the 
negative side, the mayor repeatedly used Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) monies appropriated for 
low and moderate income communities to pay for ongoing 
municipal operating expenses. In addition, she failed 
to reduce the proportion of capital improvement monies 
spent in the downtown area in order to increase 
funding to meet the infrastructure needs of Chicago's 
older residential and industrial areas.
The Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Plan, the 
administration's major planning document which was 
issued in 1982, failed to present policies or programs 
geared to advancing Byrne's reform agenda.^ This 
comprehensive plan, which included a ten year capital 
spending budget, stressed the importance of continued
l^City of Chicago, Chicago 1992 Comprehensive 
Plan: Goals and Policies and Ten-Year Capital 
Development Strategy, Department of Planning, October 1982.
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downtown development to accommodate the city's 
expanding financial services industry, increased the 
emphasis given to the establishment of new high-tech 
firms, and called for more programs aimed at 
bolstering Chicago's role as a tourism and convention 
center. While mentioning the need to preserve 
community institutions, expand affordable housing, 
improve educational quality, revitalize neighborhood 
infrastructure and maintain open spaces, the plan 
offered few programs to achieve these objectives. In 
addition, the capital spending budget which was 
included in the plan continued the city's historic 
emphasis on projects located in the central business 
district and at O'Hare International Airport. In 
presenting the Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Plan, the 
administration acknowledged its failure to consult 
business and community leaders in its formulation; 
however, it pledged to do so prior to the plan's final 
implementation.
Jane Byrne's funding of downtown development 
projects, abandonment of neighborhood planning 
councils, ambivalent support for neighborhood 
stabilization programs and production of a downtown- 
oriented comprehensive plan lacking major 
redistributional programs disappointed many of her
reform-minded supporters. Many came to view her 
policies as indistinguishable from those of the 
machine candidate she defeated.
Differing explanations emerged to explain why 
Byrne abandoned her reform commitments after the 
election. Some, like Milton L. Rakove, argued that 
Byrne could not satisfy the conflicting demands of the 
electoral coalition, made up of blacks, public 
employee union members and reform-minded whites, 
which elected her and, therefore, withdrew to the 
familiar policies and practices of the machine. 
Others, like Samuel K. Gove, suggested that Byrne 
realized that she needed the cooperation of the 
bureaucracy and support of the City Council which the 
Chicago Democratic Organization controlled and, 
therefore, sought an accommodation with them. Others, 
like Gregory D. Squires, argued that Byrne's reform 
credentials were always suspect and that she never 
really represented an alternative to the machine at 
all.
While reasonable cases can be made to support 
each of these viewpoints, another important factor 
contributing to Mayor Byrne's shift to more 
conservative policies after her election was the power 
of the city's financial community. When Byrne took
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office, the city and its school district were facing 
serious budget deficits. Efforts by her, at that 
time, to implement major redistributional programs 
could have been responded to by the banks with threats 
to withhold desperately-needed short-term financing. 
Financial institutions in both Cleveland and New York 
City had already demonstrated their willingness to use 
their financial power to insure policies supportive of 
business. Rakove describes Byrne's shift in approach 
in the following way.
Faced with the reality of the power 
structure in Chicago, and probably aware of 
the tenuous character of the coalition that 
elected her, Byrne moved, not in any new 
direction, but rather toward the old, solid 
ground she was familiar with as a city hall 
politician and bureaucrat.^
D. The Growth of Mayor Byrne's Opposition
The electoral coalition that elected Jane Byrne 
in 1979 consisted of blacks, members of public 
employee unions and reform-minded whites, particularly 
those involved in Chicago's neighborhood organizing 
movement. The defeat in 1980 of the majority of the 
candidates which Mayor Byrne supported for local 
office indicated a serious weakening of her popular 
support. By the midpoint in her administration, the 
mayor appeared to have alienated significant elements
14Gove, p. 231.
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of the electoral coalition which had swept her into 
office.
Black voters, 63% of whom had voted for Mayor
Byrne in 1979, were particularly angry with her
response to their concerns. Black leaders felt the
mayor had failed to meet her commitment to provide
their community with a "fair share" of municipal jobs
and contracts. In fact, Byrne offered her own ten-
point affirmative action plan only after having been
confronted with a proposed City Council ordinance
which would have established ambitious affirmative
action goals for the city. However, after presenting
her own plan the mayor did little to implement this
program during her first term in office. A New York
Times article made this point in the following manner.
In addition, Byrne promised to strike down 
the patronage system dominated by 11th ward 
jobholders in order to provide more and 
better jobs to the black community. 
Instead, after her election, she began to 
dominate rather than dismantle the system. 
Moreover, there was no change in the quality 
or quantity of patronage jobs available to 
blacks.15
The mayor also bypassed two highly qualified 
black candidates in filling sensitive top-level 1
1^Bill and Lori Granger, Lords of the Last 
Machine, (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 111.
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positions in her administration.16 After promising to 
appoint a Police Superintendent from outside the ranks 
of the Chicago Police Department, Byrne selected a 
local law enforcement official, who was white, named 
Richard Brzeczek to fill the post. In doing so, she 
passed over a highly regarded black Deputy Police 
Superintendent, whom she had appointed as Acting 
Superintendent, named Samuel W. Nolan. Likewise, in 
filling the position of Superintendent of Schools, 
Byrne failed to appoint a well-respected black Deputy 
School Superintendent named Manford Byrd and instead 
appointed Byrd's white assistant, Angeline Caruso, to 
the position.
The tough stands she adopted in negotiating 
contracts with the city's transit workers, 
firefighters and teachers unions resulted in strikes 
by all three labor organizations. Black leaders 
asserted that their community, due to its heavy 
dependence upon these three important municipal 
services, was particularly disadvantaged by these 
walkouts. Blacks made up the majority of the transit 
union's members as well as the transit system's 
ridership. As a result, the black community's income
^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Top Appointments Draw 
Black Dissatisfaction." New York Times, August 22, 
1982, Section IV, p. 5.
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was reduced due to lost wages and its residents were 
inconvenienced by the loss of transit service. While 
the majority of Chicago's teachers were white, more 
than 85% of the public schools' students were black or 
Latino. These students missed days of instruction and 
many families had to pay for child care in households 
in which the parent(s) worked full-time. , While most 
Chicago firefighters were white, the only two lives 
lost in fires during their walkout were black.
Black leaders were also angry by the approach 
which the mayor took to balancing the municipal 
budget. Byrne reduced social services, increased the 
transit fares by $.10 and raised the city sales tax by 
1%. In raising the sales tax, she opposed efforts by 
City Council Independents to exclude food and medicine 
purchases from this increase. These steps were loudly 
criticized by black leaders, who argued that social 
service reductions and regressive fiscal policies 
would have a strongly negative impact upon the poor in 
their communities.^
Her actions to restore white control over the 
Chicago Housing Authority by filling three recently 
added seats on the board with whites were bitterly
17Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Chicago Blacks Say 
Byrne Broke Pledge on City Jobs," New York Times, 
March 2, 1980, p. 20.
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opposed by the black community. Likewise, her efforts 
to restore the white majority on the Chicago Board of 
Education by replacing two black members with white 
members known for their anti-busing views were also 
harshly criticized. These reactions by the black 
community were understandable given the fact that 85% 
of the families living in public housing were black 
and 80% of children attending public schools were 
black or Latino. Civil rights activists also blamed 
the mayor for being barred from attending a Chicago 
City Council hearing which discussed the Chicago 
Housing Authority appointments.
The mayor's treatment of black Alderman Allan 
Streeter, whom she had appointed to a vacant City 
Council seat, was also criticized by black leaders. 
After publicly opposing the mayor’s white appointments 
to the Board of Education, Alderman Streeter became 
the victim of a vicious campaign by the mayor to 
discredit him. First, Byrne visited the alderman's 
district, declared it "filthy," and ordered the firing 
of the area's top three sanitation officials, all of 
whom were black.1® Second, she asked the Illinois 
State's Attorney's Office to investigate Alderman
-^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Support of Blacks for 
Chicago's Mayor Appears to be Eroding," New York 
Times, July 15, 1982, Section B, p. 4.
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Streeter's conduct as a poverty program administrator 
prior to joining the City Council? she then informed 
members of the press that Streeter was under 
investigation. Finally, Byrne arranged to have 
another candidate oppose Streeter in the next 
Democratic party primary, which required him to expend 
additional amounts of time and money to retain his 
seat.
Finally, the mayor sought to reduce minority 
political power in 1980 by remaping the city's 
electoral districts so as to lower the number of black 
and Latino representatives. With the help of Alderman 
Thomas Carey, Chairman of the Committee on Committees 
and Rules, and former Alderman Thomas Keane, a map was 
produced that reduced the number of black majority 
wards by four and eliminated several Latino majority 
wards by including them in predominantly white 
wards.^
Byrne's treatment of the black community was 
compared, by many civil rights leaders, to that of 
Richard J. Daley. During Daley's tenure as mayor, he 
froze black patronage at low levels, refused to 
address fair housing issues raised by Dr. Martin
■^Dempsey J. Travis, An Autobiography of Black 
Politics, (Chicago: Urban Research Press, Inc., 1987), 
pp. 537-542.
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Luther King Jr., ordered police to "shoot to kill"
looters during riots following Dr. King's death,
slated Illinois State's Attorney Hanrahan for re-
election following his role in the killing of Black
Panther Party leader Fred Hampton, and unsuccessfully
opposed black Congressman Medcalfe for re-election
after he accused the Chicago Police Department of
brutality towards blacks. In response to Byrne's
insensitive response to black concerns, her support
among black voters declined dramatically. A January
12, 1983 New York Times article, by Nathaniel
Sheppard, made this point in the following way.
Although there have been no recent polls to 
indicate the Mayor's current standing among 
blacks, the feeling of many students of 
politics is that she has done too much 
damage to her reputation to turn sentiments 
around by primary day.^O
The leadership, and the rank and file of the 
city's major public employee unions were also 
disenchanted with Mayor Byrne. Her collective 
bargaining positions had forced three of the city's 
largest municipal unions to go on strike. In 
addition, the mayor had permitted the passage of a
City Council measure which sought to return 25,000
city jobs to the patronage system. Furthermore, the
^Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr. , "Mayor Byrne andBlacks." New York Times, January 12, 1983, p. 13.
69
mayor frequently attacked city workers in the press 
for being lazy and incompetent. Finally, the mayorfs 
repeated reorganization of municipal agencies had 
generated a great deal of anxiety in the municipal 
workforce. A U.S. News and World Report article 
describe Byrne’s first years in office in the 
following manner.
During her first three years in office, 
Byrne’s popularity sagged under her 
reputation as an irascible administrator who 
fired employees by whim, increased taxes and 
spent lavishly.21
Reform-minded supporters of the mayor, 
particularly those involved in the city’s neighborhood 
organizing movement, were also disappointed by the 
mayor’s performance in office. They were frustrated 
by her failures to institute good government reforms 
and to promote a more balanced pattern of growth in 
the city. As a reformer, Byrne was criticized for her 
unwillingness to dismantle the patronage system, curb 
the power of the machine and dismiss officials of 
questionable ethics as well as for her nepotism in 
hiring. As a neighborhood advocate, she was 
challenged for her support for continued downtown 
investment, abandonment of community planning councils
21"Chicago’s Bare Knuckle Race For Mayor," U.S. 
News and World Report, February 21, 1980, p. 59.
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and failure to more adequately support community based 
organizations. As a result of these actions, 
significant numbers of reform-minded liberals and 
indigenous community leaders withdrew their support 
from the mayor.
Byrne's loss of support from among the leadership 
of Chicago's neighborhood organizing movement was 
particularly important because the influence of these 
organizations had grown significantly since the early 
1960s. At that time, most community organizations 
were established through local religious institutions, 
were staffed by part-time clergy organizers and 
focused upon narrowly defined municipal and social 
service issues which they addressed by attacking city 
hall. Heavily influenced by the civil rights, welfare 
rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s, community 
organizations in the 1970s and 1980s began to unite 
people from different neighborhoods as part of city­
wide organizations aimed at addressing larger social 
issues, such as utility rate structures, tax reform, 
comparable worth and plant closings.
In the early 1970s, Chicago witnessed the 
establishment of its first city-wide citizen action 
groups when Citizens Against Pollution (CAP) and the 
Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) were formed.
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These groups brought together neighborhood leaders
from throughout Chicago to address issues too large
for individual neighborhood organizations to handle.
Janice E. Perlman described the early successes of the
CAP organization in the following way.
In Chicago, a group called CAP successfully 
thwarted Mayor Daley and his powerful 
political machine by stopping the 
construction of the massive Crosstown 
Corridor Expressway which would have 
d e s t r o y e d  n u m e r o u s  m u l t i - r a c i a l  
neighborhoods from the inner city to the 
suburbs. It also is getting tax 
reassessment for industrial and residential 
properties and is forcing banks and savings 
and loan associations to make loans in the neighborhoods where investors live.22
The success of these groups in impacting upon
larger social issues encouraged the formation of
numerous other city-wide community organizations in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Among these groups
were the Northwest Federation, the Southwest Parish
Federation, the Union of Neighborhood Organizations
(UNO), and the Save Our Neighborhood/Save our City
Coalition (SON/SOCC). These organizations addressed
city-wide issues, challenged leaders to develop more
sophisticated analyses of community problems, united
citizen and labor organizations, developed electoral
22Janice E. Perlman, "Grassrooting the System," 
Social Policy, September/October 1976, Volume 7, 
Number 2, p. 6.
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campaigns, projected broader social visions and were
staffed by full-time professional organizers. Leaders
of these organizations were usually trained at one of
Chicago's many community organizing schools, such as
the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), the National
Training and Information Center (NTIC) or the Midwest
Academy. In addition, many of these new community
organizations established community development and
affordable housing projects in order to encourage
community-controlled development. By the early 1980s,
this network had grown in size and influence within
the city, as elsewhere, and represented an important
base of political support. According to Frank Cizon,
Executive Director of Trust Inc.,
Chicago has probably the strongest, most 
sophisticated, most elaborate form of 
community organization in the entire 
country. They are doing really good things 
in the neighborhoods and they want a voice 
in not just implementation of what someone 
else planned but in the planning itself, in 
the decision-making itself, and in the kinds 
of directions which the city is taking.23
Mayor Byrne's loss of significant support among the
leadership of such groups represented a serious
challenge to her re-election bid.
Mayor Byrne's political problems intensified in
^Interview with Frank Cizon, Executive 
Director, Trust Inc., November 15, 1984, Chicago,
Illinois.
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1980 when 200 Chicago civil rights organizations 
formed an umbrella group to monitor racism in the 
city. The coalition, which included such groups such 
as Operation PUSH, The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), 
People Organized For Welfare and Education Rights 
(POWER), and the Urban League, pledged to file suits 
opposing discriminatory practices, introduce 
legislation to permit the mayor's recall by 
referendum and initiate a massive voter registration 
drive in the black community. In joining the 
movement, Reverend Jessie Jackson stated, "We have 
been closed out of every important decision in the 
city." In commenting on Mayor Byrne's tenure as 
mayor, U. S. Representative Harold Washington 
described the mayor as "psychologically incapable of 
running the city."24
Responding to the continued failure of the Byrne 
administration to address important black concerns, 
this group organized the People's Coalition to Boycott 
ChicagoFest in 1982 for the purpose of organizing a 
black merchant and consumer boycott of the city's 
major, week-long cultural event. Accompanying the 
successful boycott was a major voter registration
^^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Blacks In Chicago 
Mobilize on Racism." New York Times, February 17, 
1980, p. 27.
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drive in the black community which added 100,000 new 
voters to the election rolls. A New York Times 
article described the effect of the boycott in the 
following manner,
Attendance and receipts at ChicagoFest were 
down appreciably from the previous year and 
the major voter registration effort that 
accompanied the boycott signed up 125,000 to200,000 new black voters.^5
In the Fall of 1982 the coalition intensified its
registration effort in the black community and was
joined by progressive community organizations
representing whites. With the assistance of the
city’s four black radio stations, a $50,000 donation
from a black businessman and the efforts of scores of
civil rights groups, the campaign brought the number
of new black voters to 250,000. A New York Times
article described the campaign in the following way,
Registration tables were set up in churches, 
fast-food franchises, grocery stores, 
unemployment offices, and public assistance 
centers.^6
As a result of this effort, more than 40% of those 
eligible to vote in the 1983 mayoral primary were 
black.
^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Mayor Byrne and 
Blacks." New York Times, p. 3.
^Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., "Blacks In Chicago 
Press Voting Drive." New York times, January 26, 1988, 
p. 13.
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Gregory D. Squires described the energy of the 
expanded Fall campaign, which included the 
participation of white community organizations, in the 
following way,
They passed the word, staffed the 
registration tables, and seemed to have 
taken seriously the prospect of using the 
upcoming mayoral election to upset the 
machine’s applecart. The seeds of the 
regular Democrats indifference to black and 
most neighborhood interests were at last bearing fruit.^7
The voters organized by this grassroots campaign 
of the city’s civil rights and community organizations 
represented a significant base of opposition to the 
Byrne administration, if it could be mobilized!
^Gregory d . Squires, Larry Bennett, Kathleen 
McCourt and Philip Nyden, Chicago: Race, Class and
Response to Urban Decline. (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press), 1987, p. 87.
Ill. The Washington Campaign and the Transition
Process
A. Economic Conditions Prior to the Washington 
Election
While Chicago was still referred to by many in 
1983 as the "city that works," its economy had, in 
fact, been experiencing serious problems since the 
mid-1940s. Among these problems were a significant 
decline in its manufacturing base, serious losses in 
its retail sector, substantial suburban competition 
for commercial office tenants, ongoing encroachment by 
the trucking industry into its railroad and shipping 
businesses, new entrants into the commodities market 
and a declining population. These economic problems 
left Chicago with a growing number of abandoned 
industrial properties, a surplus of unused railroad 
and shipping facilities, an increasing vacancy rate 
for commercial space, an aging infrastructure and a 
mounting municipal debt. These problems made it 
increasingly difficult for the city to adequately 
respond to the growing social service needs of its low 
income residents.
Among the most severe problems faced by the 
regional economy in the early 1980s was the dramatic
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decline of its industrial sector. According to a 
study completed by Professor Wim Wiewel of the 
University of Illinois at Chicago, manufacturing 
employment fell in the Chicago region by more than
125,000 jobs, a loss of 18%, in the period between 
1947 and 1962.  ^ After a modest rise in manufacturing 
employment between 1967 and 1982, regional 
manufacturing employment dropped by an additional 
250,000, an overall decline of 46%, in the period 
between 1967 and 1982. The City of Chicago was 
particularly affected by the loss of industrial firms 
during this period. According to Chicago Tribune 
urban affairs writer, Richard C. Longworth, the City 
of Chicago lost more than 2,000 of its 8,000 
manufacturing firms between 1970 and 1985.  ^ According 
to Wiewel, manufacturers left the city due to the high 
costs of operating in multi-story loft buildings, high 
local property taxes (Cook County, for example, taxed 
its industrial properties at 40% of their assessed 
value while nearby DuPage and Lake Counties taxed such 1
1Wim Wiewel, The State of the Economy and 
Economic Development in the Chicago Metropolitan 
Region (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago,
1986), p. 2.
^Richard c. Longworth, "Boom Times: High Tech and 
the Reforged Steel Town," Chicago Tribune, February 
17, 1986, Section A, p. 8.
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properties at 33% of their assessed value.), 
deteriorating infrastructure, a less well-trained 
workforce, as well as a variety of social problems, 
including a high crime rate, a poor educational 
system and widespread municipal corruption.
The Chicago region’s job performance record 
trailed that of the nation in other major business 
sectors as well. This is apparent from the data 
presented in Table 3.1 which compares the job 
performance of the Chicago region to that of the 
nation for six major business sectors for the period 
from 1960 to 1982.3
Table: 3.1
Chicago Job Performance Compared to the Nation
1960-1982
Sector_________________________Chicago____________U. S.
Services +92% +158%
Finance, Insurance, Real Est. +64% +104%
Government +67% + 89%
Wholesale, Retail Trade +41% + 80%
Trans./Util./Construction -10% + 30%
Manufacturing -20% + 12%
^Robert Wiedrich, Make No Little Plans: Jobs for
Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago: The Commercial Club of
Chicago, 1984), p. 11.
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According to the Commercial Club report, if the 
Chicago regional economy had performed as well as that 
of the nation during this period, area employment 
would have increased by 239,000. While this figure 
represented only 8% of Metropolitan Chicago's 1980 
workforce, it was roughly equivalent to the number of 
Chicago residents who were unemployed at that time.
The Chicago region's job generation record also 
compared poorly to the thirteen other major 
metropolitan areas which the Commercial Club studied. 
In fact, it out-performed only New York and Cleveland, 
both of which faced municipal bankruptcies during this 
period. Table 3.2 which appears on the following page 
compares Chicago's job creation performance to that of 
other major metropolitan areas for the period between 
1960 and 1982.4
4Wiedrich, p. 12.
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Table 3.2
ChicagoTs Job Creation Performance 
Compared to Other Metropolitan Areas
Metropolitan Area
1960-1982
% Change in Employment
Houston +246%
Atlanta +172%
Dallas-Ft. Worth +147%
Minn.-St. Paul + 90%
L.A .-Long Beach + 63%
Indianapolis + 53%
Milwaukee + 38%
Boston + 37%
St. Louis + 33%
Detroit + 30%
Philadelphia + 26%
Chicago + 24%
Cleveland + 21%
New York + 0%
Based upon its study of the regional economy, The
Commercial Club of Chicago described the health of
the area economy in the following manner.
Metropolitan Chicago has been losing its 
share of the national job market. 
Enterprises of all types are moving 
overseas, to the Sunbelt or to nearby states
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because of the perception that the business 
climate in Illinois and the metropolitan 
area is not favorable. It has become increasingly evident that, if something is 
not done soon to reverse the area's 
declining fortunes, one of the world's most 
desirable places in which to live and do 
business could become seriously impaired.®
Throughout the post-war period, the employment 
and economic conditions in the Chicago metropolitan 
region were much more favorable than those within the 
City of Chicago. While the suburban communities in 
the Chicago area experienced a 13.0% decline in 
manufacturing employment between 1972 and 1983, 
Chicago's manufacturing employment fell by 40.7%.® 
While the number of manufacturing firms in suburban 
Chicago increased by 21.9%, the number fell by 27.7% 
within the city.* 7 8 While suburban non-manufacturing 
employment increased by 48.1%, Chicago's non­
manufacturing employment fell by 5.0%.® Richard C. 
Longworth of the Chicago Tribune described the 
performance of the city's economy since 1970 by 
saying,
®Wiedrich, p. 6.
®Wiewel, p. 11.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
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What happened to Chicago is a loss of one 
quarter of its factories and almost 250,000 
manufacturing jobs. Service sector 
employment increased, but not enough to take 
up the manufacturing slack. As a result the 
city's purchasing power, the amount of money 
its people have to spend has gone down, 
leading to the loss of 20,000 stores and the 
collapse of whole neighborhoods into a Third 
World stage. With fewer people, jobs, and 
businesses the city has less tax money to 
improve and revitalize itself.^
This concern about the state of the municipal
economy was echoed in the "Chicago Works Together":
1984 Development Plan which was issued by the City of
Chicago's Department of Economic Development.
The seriousness of Chicago's economic 
circumstances, suggested by the following 
statistics, demand that local government 
meet the needs of Chicagoans with innovative 
and concerted public action. In 1983, 
almost 218,000 Chicagoans, two-thirds of 
whom are women, were unemployed and looking 
for work. Chicago suffered a net loss of 
123,500 jobs between 1972 and 1981? youth 
have been particularly hard hit by 
unemployment. There are currently at least 
33,800 unemployed youth in Chicago, almost 
60% of whom are minority. Demolition, 
deterioration, and arson have claimed an 
estimated 60,000 housing units over the past 
10 years.
The particular economic problems facing the 
city's poor were highlighted by a university study
^Richard C. Longworth, "The Global Economy: 
America Losing Footing in Uphill Fight," Chicago 
Tribune, February 17, 1986, Section 1, p. 8.
l^City of Chicago. Department of Economic 
Development. 1984. "Chicago Works Together": 1984
Development Plan.
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completed in 1984, which revealed that more than one 
third of all Chicago families in 1983 faced economic 
hardships requiring them to forego such necessities as 
food, housing and medical care at least once during 
the year.11
Adding to the city’s problems was the flight of 
its middle class to the suburbs. The city experienced 
a significant loss of middle income families during 
the period between 1960 and 1980. A recent Chicago 
Tribune article described this problem in the 
following manner.
Chicago suffered a 'staggering' net loss of 
201,568 middle income families between 1960 
and 1980, according to a study released 
Sunday. The families were significantly 
white, but the study also found that 
significant numbers of middle-class black 
and Hispanic households left the city.1 2
The study stated that these people moved out, 'for 
fear their investment in their homes was in jeopardy,' 
due to the increasing numbers of low-income minority 
residents moving into their neighborhoods. The loss 
of these families and their resources reduced the
11Stanley Ziemba, "Good News Hasn't Reached Poor: 
Improved Economy Fails to Trickle Down Enough to Help 
A Third of the City," Chicago Tribune, September 21, 
1986, Section 2, p. 1.
12Stanley Ziemba, "How City's Middle Class Headed 
Out," Chicago Tribune, February 24, 1986, Section 5, 
pp. 1-5.
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ability of the city to support the services needed by 
its growing numbers of poor residents. As a result of 
these trends, Chicago United, a local civic group, 
found that,
By 1981 over 40% of general revenue for the 
city came from intergovernmental aid. 
Nearly one out of three Chicagoans in 1982 
received some form of federal assistance. ^
Regardless of whose analysis of the regional
economy one accepts, it is quite clear that the City
of Chicago faced serious economic challenges on the
eve of its 1983 mayoral election. These economic
problems were, at that time, described by business
leader Barry F. Sullivan in the following manner.
The need for such a thorough review is 
perhaps best demonstrated by the recent data 
detailing Chicago’s economic health over the 
last decade. The common denominator for 
nearly all indices is one word- decline.^
This situation served to make local economic
development policy a key issue area in the election.
In the Democratic primary, challengers Richard M.
Daley Jr. and Harold Washington continually railed
against the "trickle down" economic policies of
President Reagan on the national level and Mayor Jane
•^Barry F. Sullivan, Economic Development: A
Proposal For the Economic Development Commission, 
(Chicago: Chicago United, 1984), Preface.
•^Sullivan, Preface.
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M. Byrne on the local level. Both argued that they 
would provide better stewardship over the local 
economy than the incumbent. Each candidate ran 
against Byrne's economic development policies, 
programs and record. They accused her administration 
of having confused development policies, a poor 
implementation record and biased purchasing and 
contracting procedures. Daley and Washington also 
argued that the incumbent's policies and programs were 
insensitive to the needs of the city's neighborhoods.
B. The 1983 Chicago Mayoral Election
The 1983 Democratic primary pitted incumbent 
Mayor Jane M. Byrne against Illinois State's Attorney 
Richard M. Daley and U.S. Representative Harold 
Washington. Most political observers viewed the 
primary as a two way race between party regulars Byrne 
and Daley. Washington, a reform candidate, was not 
seen as a strong candidate despite his 1977 primary 
performance in which he captured 5 wards and 11% of 
the vote in a poorly financed and late starting 
campaign.
The lack of serious attention given to the 
Washington campaign may be explained by the failure of 
many commentators to have observed the growing 
electoral strength of Chicago's black voters. Since
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1940 the racial composition of Chicago's voting age 
population had shifted dramatically. The predominance 
of whites among the voting age population had all but 
vanished by the 1980s. This trend is clearly evident 
in Table 3.3 which presents the changing racial 
composition of the Chicago voting age population for 
the period from 1949 to 1980.
Table 3.3
Racial Composition of Chicago's Voting Age Population
1940- 198015
Election
Year
White
Voters*
Black
Voters* % White % Black
1940 2,205 191 86.6 7.9
1950 2,230 345 79.7 13.3
1960 1,850 471 71.7 20.2
1970 1,513 576 63.1 27.1
1980 946 758 48.3 34.7
(Note * denotes thousands of voters.)
The structural changes in the composition of the 
local electorate revealed by this table illustrated
•^Paul Kleppner, Chicago Divided: The Making of a 
Black Mayor. (DeKalb, 1985), p. 67.
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the growing potential for political power which the 
black community in Chicago had acquired in the early 
1980s. In recent years, this potential for political 
power had been transformed into actual influence 
through increased registrations and higher turnouts 
among black voters. This is revealed by the data 
presented in Table 3.4 which appears on the following 
page which compares white, black and Latino voter 
registrations and turnouts between 1975 and 1983. 
Between 1979 and 1982 black voter registration 
increased by over 127,000, bringing black voter 
strength to 647,000.^  During the same period white 
voter registration increased an insignificant 1,656. 
According to a Chicago Tribune article by Mitchell 
Locin, Chicago voter registrations increased by
250,000 in 1982 and 1983 with more than 150,000 of 
these new voters being black.U
Beginning in 1980, black leaders and community 
activists made serious plans to initiate widespread 
voter registration activities in order to increase 
black political influence in the city. These 
organizational activities received a great deal more *1
l^Kleppner, p. 148.
^Mitchell Locin, "Mayor, Byrne Split on 
Division," Chicago Tribune, February 14, 1987, Section
1, p. 5.
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support in 1981 and 1982 from black political leaders
as a result of what they perceived as attacks on the
black community by the Reagan administration. In
addition, many civil rights leaders were outraged by a
number of Jane Byrne’s actions, which were described
in Chapter II, that they interpreted as being anti-
black. Byrne’s actions angered the leaders of the
black community and propelled them into action. Led
by the black churches, more than 200 minority
organizations joined together in a massive voter
registration drive, the theme of which black radio
stations repeated throughout the primary season, "Come
Alive, October 5." These organizations also worked
together to organize a protest against Mayor Byrne's
12 day ethnic festival called ChicagoFest. According
to columnist Mitchell Locin,
Byrne's actions and patronizing attitudes 
toward the black community sowed the seeds 
of the political revolution that came to 
fruition in 1983.^
As the primary approached, Washington gained the 
support of various neighborhood-based community 
organizing networks from throughout the city. With 
the assistance of the skilled organizers from these 19
19Mitchell Locin, "Petitions Stirring Up Black 
Vote," Chicago Tribune, August 28, 1986, Section 1,
pp. 1,16.
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community organizations Washington’s campaign was able
to mobilize political support in neighborhoods outside
of Washington's traditional black electoral base. The
support of The Chicago Workshop for Economic
Development (CWED) was particularly helpful because it
had developed a rather detailed platform for a
progressive approach to local economic development in
Chicago. Washington was so impressed by CWED's
economic development position papers that he had
several of his long-time supporters meet with the
group in order to formulate the economic development
sections of his major campaign document, the
Washington Papers. Robert Mier, Washington’s
Commissioner of Economic Development described this
process in the following manner.
The Mayor put together a committee to look 
at his economic development policy which was 
broadened from the community-oriented and 
academic-oriented actors who put together 
the CWED economic development platform.
They brought in some business people, from 
large and small business, minority 
entrepreneurs, and civic people. The change 
was really one to be more sensitive to small 
business problems and opportunities. That 
platform--once adopted was his basis for 
campaigning and his pledge as to what he 
would do in the economic development area when he was elected. 0
^Interview with Robert Mier and Arturo Vasquez, 
former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, 
Department of Economic Development, City of Chicago, 
July 23, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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OWED's involvement in the campaign went beyond
providing substantive input on the Washington campaign
platform. Most CWED activists became deeply involved
in the campaign effort. Kari J. Moe, a CWED activist,
was appointed the Issues Coordinator for the campaign.
In a hotly fought primary, 424,146 people voted
for Harold Washington, 388,259 people voted for Jane
Byrne, and 344,720 people voted for Richard Daley.
Washington captured 36% of the vote while Byrne
received 34% of the vote and Daley 30% of the vote.
During the last weeks of the campaign, race became a
key issue in the election. This reality was driven
home by a widely circulated news story which reported
the following remarks by Alderman Edward Vrdolyak to
Democratic precinct workers during a Northwest side
rally during the last week of the contest.
Don’t kid yourself, it's a racial thing.
I'm calling on you to save your city, to 
save your precinct. We’re fighting to keep 
this city the way it is. 21
Few political observers expected the March 
election between Harold Washington and Republican 
nominee Bernard 0. Epton to be much of a contest. 
During the years when Richard J. Daley had been mayor 
and Cook County Democratic leader he had managed to
21-Dirk Johnson, "Chicago Re-elects Washington as 
Mayor," New York Times, April 8, 1986, Section A, p. 20.
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all but eliminate the local Republican Party as an
electoral force. Yet, Harold Washington won the
election by less than 50,000 votes. While 668,176
individuals voted for Washington, 619,926 individuals
cast ballots for Epton. On a percentage basis,
Washington captured only 51.8% of the votes as
compared to Epton's 48.2%.* 22 Race became the major
theme in the general election as many Democratic
leaders and voters left the party to donate money,
volunteer time and cast ballots for the white
candidate, Republican Bernard Epton. The Epton
campaign sought to capitalize on the prevailing racial
fears by printing buttons, posters and bumper stickers
which simply said, "Epton, Before It's Too Late."
According to political scientist Paul Green,
A city that had not had a Republican mayor 
in 52 years became embroiled in a racial 
struggle that saw many white Democrats shift 
to Republican Bernard Epton."22
Green then proceeded to describe the not so subtle
efforts of significant elements of the Chicago
Democratic Organization to elect Republican Epton, the
white challenger, rather than support their own
party's black standard bearer.
22Green, p. 124.
22Green, p. 48.
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In the end, no more than six white 
committeemen publicly supported Washington, 
while eight openly opposed him, and most 
others quietly aided Epton's cause. 
Democratic precinct workers on the Northwest 
and Southwest Sides were 'all out for 
Epton,' according to one whose committeeman 
was nominally for Washington. The 
Democratic nominee received no major 
financial support from any of the Democratic 
organizations in the white wards, while 
money flowed to Epton from close friends, 
business associates, and law partners of 
several Democratic committeemen.
Despite the lack of support from the party 
machinery, Harold Washington won the election by 
capturing almost all of the black, half of the Latino, 
and enough of the Lakeshore middle class vote to edge 
out Epton in the general election. Political reporter 
Ben Bradlee, Jr., who covered the 1983 election, 
described the Washington victory in the following 
manner.
The election of Harold Washington as mayor 
of the City of Chicago in 1983 may be viewed 
as the culmination of black dissatisfaction 
with the Chicago Democratic machine that had 
been building for years.^5
C. The Washington Administration Assumes Office 
Harold Washington's election as mayor of the City 
of Chicago on April 12, 1983 demonstrated the
^Kleppner, pp. 196-197.
2^Ben Bradlee Jr., "Chicago Still 'City That 
Works': But Wounds Remain From the Mayor's 1983
Campaign Battle with the Party Machine," Boston Globe, 
June 9, 1985, Section A, pp. 1,3.
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existence of a significant level of support for reform 
politics within the city. Harold Washington was 
elected on a platform calling for open government, 
citizen participation, an end to patronage, 
affirmative action, increased job opportunities for 
Chicagoans, and a new commitment to the future of 
neighborhoods. This program was clearly stated in his 
key campaign document, called the Washington Papers. 
This program was shaped through a participatory 
process involving input from 150 individuals 
representing 75 church, labor, minority and community 
groups.27
Upon his election and prior to assuming office, 
the Mayor-elect organized a Transition Team which 
involved 250 individuals from over 200 separate 
organizations. This group was asked to examine 
current municipal policies and programs in order to 
make recommendations to the Mayor aimed at achieving 
the policy objectives presented in the Washington 
Papers. Each newly appointed department head was 
expected to develop a strategic plan geared towards 
implementing the major recommendations of the
2^Mier, p. 299.
22City of Chicago. Department of Economic 
Development. 1984. "Chicago Works Together": 1984
Chicago Development Plan. City of Chicago, p. 2.
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Transition Team R e p o r t . A s  he prepared to assume 
office the mayor continued the participatory and 
collaborative approach to policy-making and planning 
which had marked his campaign. Elspeth Revere, 
Executive Director of the Woodstock Institute, 
described the Transition Team process in the following 
way.
There was a very, very good transition 
process that wasundertaken right after the 
mayor was elected and before he took over 
the office. It was a process where lots and 
lots of people from all sectors worked upon 
plans to advise the new administration in 
particular areas. . . We staffed the 
housing transition planning effort and that 
was an effort which involved 70 or 80 people 
on a variety of committees. There were 
people from the community, there were 
developers, there were all the people who 
had any interest in the housing area. It 
was one of the first times all these 
different sectors had worked together. . .
It was really an open process with a lot of 
participation and it really brought people 
to the table who hadn't talked much before 
and was a real good step at developing 
consensus.^9
The mayor-elect took another important step 
towards achieving the reform goals of his campaign by 
settling, prior to assuming office, a longstanding
^Washington Transition Committee, 1983. Towards 
a Prosperous, Compassionate and Efficient Chicago. 
(Chicago: Washington Transition Team).
^Interview with Elspeth Revere, Executive 
Director, The Woodstock Institute, July 26, 1986, 
Chicago, Illinois.
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suit against the city related to political patronage. 
By agreeing to limit the number of his political 
appointees to 900, a figure representing approximately 
2.2% of the city’s workforce, Washington resolved the 
Shakman complaint against the city. In doing so, he 
made an important contribution towards ending the 
city’s seventy-five year practice of political 
patronage. Harold Washington viewed this as one of
the major accomplishments of his administration and 
described it, during his 1987 campaign, in the 
following way.
We opened up City Hall, we ended patronage, 
and, I submit to you, patronage is dead. I 
buried it. In its place, we have
organized labor and a system of collectivebargaining.30
The mayor-elect also appointed well-known 
community activists to key positions within his new 
administration. This was particularly true of his 
appointments in the Department of Economic 
Development. The Mayor appointed University of 
Illinois at Chicago Professor Robert Mier as 
Commissioner of this key department. Mier had spent 
more than ten years working with community development 
organizations through the University of Illinois’s
30Michael Galvin and Mitchell Locin, "83 Spirit 
Rekindles by Mayor," Chicago Tribune, February 17, 
1987, Section 1, pp. 1-2.
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Center for Urban Economic Development and was well 
respected by both good government reformers and 
progressive community activists. In addition, the 
Mayor appointed Arturo Vasquez and Kari J. Moe as 
Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner within 
this agency. Vasquez, a long-time community activist, 
along with Moe had been deeply involved in The Chicago 
Workshop For Economic Development (CWED) which had 
been organizing on the local and state level against 
enterprise zones legislation and in favor of more 
progressive approaches to local economic development. 
Finally, the Mayor appointed Robert Giloth, the former 
director of the 18th Street Development Corporation, a 
local development corporation and technical assistance 
provider located within the Bohemian and Mexican 
community of Pilsen, as Deputy Commissioner for 
Research and Policy Analysis. Washington also 
appointed community activists to important policy 
positions in other city departments as well. For 
example, he appointed Elizabeth Hollander, an 
experienced good government advocate, as Commissioner 
of the Department of Planning and Howard Stanback, a 
radical economist, as Deputy Director of the Mayor's 
Office of Employment and Training.
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Shortly after assuming office in April of 1983, 
the mayor formed a Development Subcabinet to further 
refine and implement the economic development agenda 
he had presented in the Transition Team Report. This 
committee included representatives from the Mayor's 
Offices of City Development, Budget and Management, 
Employment and Training, Law, and Inquiry and 
Information; and from the Departments of Economic 
Development, Housing, City Planning, Public Works, and 
Aviation. This planning group was formed in order to 
address problems caused by the decentralized and 
uncoordinated nature of Chicago development planning. 
Soon after assuming office, Mayor Jane Byrne had 
divided planning responsibilities among three 
agencies. Many felt she did this to prevent anyone 
from acquiring the kind of power that long-time 
Chicago planner, Lewis Hill, had acquired in the Daley 
administration. Byrne made the Department of City 
Planning responsible for all planning activities 
within the central business district, known as the 
Loop, as well as all zoning matters city-wide. 
Outside of the Loop she gave the Department of Housing 
city-wide responsibility for housing and community 
development matters. In 1982, she established the 
Department of Economic Development and made it
99
responsible for job retention and expansion, as well
as neighborhood planning outside of the downtown.
The mayor expected his newly formed Development
Subcabinet to develop an integrated approach to this
important policy area. As a result, he hoped more
projects would be initiated and executed in a timely
manner. Pat Dowell, a planner with the Department of
City Planning, described the role of the Development
Subcabinet in the following manner.
Prior to his administration, we really 
didn' t have a development plan nor did all 
development departments work together to 
make decisions about the future of the city.
Mayor Washington created, at a very high 
level, a coordinating committee for 
development departments to look at all 
development decisions of which economic 
development is one.^
Washington's strategic approach to local
development planning differed dramatically from that
of his predecessors. Richard C. Longworth, of the
Chicago Tribune, described the planning process under
Mayor Richard J. Daley Jr. in these words.
There was a tremendous amount of 
cooperation, in this case meaning that Daley 
would call businessmen up and say, 'I'm 
going to do this stuff- that sort of thing.
You are going to pay for it. You are going 
to lend me the money to do this and, in 
return, you are going to make a lot of money
31Interview with Pat Dowell, Senior Planner, 
Department of City Planning, City of Chicago, July 24, 
1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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off of it. ’ They would say, ’Yes boss, ' 
cause that would sound just fine to them, and that’s how it happened.32
John Melaniphy, a former planning consultant to 
the Byrne administration, compared the planning 
processes of her administration with those of Harold 
Washington by saying,
I think the previous administration reacted 
to individuals who had deals. . . It was a
short-term approach, I guess is the best 
way to paraphrase it. It was a short-term 
approach to utilizing money and space that 
was available. It was politically 
motivated. Often the best project didn’t 
get funded. The one where the individual 
was most well-connected saw the bread. I 
would say that one of the differences today 
is that Rob Mier has attempted to establish 
a program that is not immediate ’let’s solve 
all the problems today, ' but looks at the 
longer-range situations and solutions and 
has worked more with the community than any of his predecessors.33
In the Spring of 1984, Mayor Washington asked his 
Development Subcabinet to develop a policy plan that 
would articulate the new administration’s economic 
development philosophy and present its program. The 
Development Subcabinet began this process by asking 
its staff to review the economic development 
components of both the Washington Papers and the
32jnterview with Richard C. Longworth, Urban 
Affairs Writer, Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1986,
Chicago Illinois.
33interview with John Melaniphy, Senior Partner, 
Melaniphy Associates, Inc., March24,1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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Transition Team Report. According to a recent article
in the Journal of the American Planning Association by
Robert Mier, Kari J. Moe and Irene Sherr,
The commissioners reviewed the briefing 
document and, during a lengthy consensus- 
building process distilled its long list of 
objectives into thirteen priority 
obj ectives.^4
The Development Subcabinet, with staff support, then 
proceeded to reorganize these objectives into five 
broad goals and a series of related policies as part 
of the "Chicago Works Together": 1984 Chicago
Development Plan.
^Robert Mier, Kari J. Moe and Irene Sherr, 
"Strategic Planning and the Pursuit of Reform, 
Economic Development and Equity," Journal of the 
American Planning Association Volume 52, Number 3, 
(Summer 1986), pp. 299-309.
IV. Mayor Washington*s Development Agenda and Early
Decisions
A. The "Chicago Works Together": 1984
Development Plan
The Washington administration released the 
"Chicago Works Together": 1984 Chicago Development
Plan in May of 1984. It committed the new 
administration to achieving the following tangible 
outcomes during it’s next twelve months in office; the 
retention and/or creation of 10,000 permanent jobs for 
Chicagoans; the training of 12,000 residents in 
employment skill areas in order to enable them to 
secure full-time work; the rehabilitation and/or 
construction of 6,000 new affordable housing units for 
low and moderate income families; an increase in 
purchasing from local Chicago vendors by the City of 
Chicago from 40% to 60% (Of these municipal purchases 
of goods and services, the administration required 
that 25% be from minority or women-owned enterprises); 
and, a commitment from the city to working with the 
private sector in order to expand local purchasing by 
more than $250 million.
These specific development targets were to be 
pursued in order to achieve the five primary economic 
development goals of the Washington administration.
102
First, the administration sought to increase job
opportunities for current Chicago residents. The
Chicago Works Together Plan stated,
Therefore, all investments by the city-- 
loans, grants, or purchases--will be 
evaluated according to the number of jobs 
they can potentially retain or create."!
The plan featured five broad policies aimed at
achieving this goal. Among these policies were:
targeted business development, local preference in
hiring, expanded job training, infrastructure
investment, and aggressive pursuit of affirmative
action. The most dramatic of these proposals was the
suggestion that the city should use its investment
leverage to encourage employers to accept employee
referrals from among the unemployed made by the
Mayor’s Office of Employment and Training (MET). The
goal of directing 25% of all city purchasing dollars
to minority and women-owned firms was also viewed as
significant. As of 1984, the City of Chicago
generated almost $400 million in contracts for
municipal services and activities related to the
operation of O ’Hare International Airport.
Second, the city stated its strong intention to
103
^City of Chicago. Department of Economic 
Development. 1984. "Chicago Works Together": 1984
Chicago Development Plan. City of Chicago, p. 4.
104
pursue economic development programs aimed at 
encouraging the development of a pattern of "balanced 
growth" within the city. The administration stated 
its desire to promote new economic opportunities in 
Chicago's residential neighborhoods rather than 
concentrating public investment primarily in the 
downtown area. They sought to do so through a series 
of policies focused on: the achievement of a downtown 
and neighborhood balance; increased public/private 
partnerships; and the development of a more equitable 
tax structure and a strengthened tax base. Among the 
most interesting of these policies was the inclusion 
of a linked development initiative in the plan. By 
means of this policy, the administration hoped to 
insure neighborhood residents a fair share of downtown 
development benefits. Under various linked 
development formulae, downtown developers of 
commercial space are taxed in order to generate 
revenues to support neighborhood housing and community 
development activities. Typically, such impact fees 
are argued for on the basis that downtown office 
projects increase residential rents because they draw 
employees from outside of the city who then need to be 
housed. According to the Urban Land Institute, as of 
the end of 1984 six communities, including San
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Francisco, California, Boston, Massachusetts, Santa 
Monica, California, Seattle, Washington, Miami, 
Florida, and Princeton and Princeton Township, New 
Jersey had enacted such local ordinances.^
Third, the administration committed itself to 
aiding neighborhoods through new forms of 
public/private partnerships and coordinated 
investments. The administration planned to achieve 
this goal by expanding public participation in 
planning, formulating linked development strategies, 
and expanding the city’s housing supply. Its most 
noteworthy initiative in this policy area was the 
administration’s proposal to decentralize the 
delivery of vital municipal services through the use 
of a network of community-based organizations known as 
delegate agencies. The administration’s willingness 
to commit itself to the construction of a specified 
number of new subsidized housing units was also seen 
as a bold step.
Fourth, the plan featured a strong commitment to 
expanding citizen participation in the local 
development planning and policy-making process. The
^Douglas Porter, "The Linkage Issue: 
Introduction and Summary of Discussion," in Downtown 
Linkages, edited by Douglas Porter and Geraldine 
Bachman, (Washington, D.C., 1985), p. 4.
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plan stated the administration's commitment to 
increasing citizen access to information and 
expanding opportunities for participation in decision­
making processes. Particularly noteworthy was the 
administration's implementation of a local freedom of 
information program which committed city officials to 
releasing most governmental documents to members of 
the public upon request.
Fifth, the plan stated the administration's 
intention to build an effective regional, state, and 
national legislative agenda and program aimed at 
securing reasonable levels of intergovernmental aid 
for housing, employment, community development and 
social service programs in Chicago. Table 4.1 which 
appears on the following pages summarizes the 1984 
development plan's goals and major policy initiatives.
The Chicago Works together Plan was viewed as 
unique by many of the professional planners whom I 
interviewed. David Mosena of the Department of 
Planning felt the plan represented a major 
breakthrough in local economic development planning 
due to its focus upon job creation for current 
residents, its specific job creation, employment 
training and housing construction goals, its strong 
emphasis upon neighborhood concerns, and the
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collaborative effort among various city departments 
and agencies which it represented.^ While many 
planners highlighted the specific nature of the 
program goals which were included in the 1984 
development plan, what appeared to be most striking 
about the document was its commitment to 
redistributive policies and participatory planning 
processes. These goals differed dramatically from 
those presented in the Byrne administration’s Chicago 
1992 Comprehensive Plan which spoke of the importance 
of encouraging ongoing development within the central 
business district, promoting high technology 
enterprise and enhancing Chicago’s role as a tourism 
and convention center.^
The Washington administration’s development plan 
and the Byrne administration's comprehensive plan 
differed in a number of other ways as well. First, 
whereas the Washington plan committed the new 
administration to very specific performance goals in 
the areas of employment, training and housing, the 
Byrne plan did not do so. Second, the time horizons
^Interview with David Mosena, Department of 
Planning, City of Chicago, June 25, 1986, Chicago,
Illinois.
5City of Chicago, Department of Planning. 1982. 
"Chicago 1992 Plan," City of Chicago.
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of the two plans were dramatically different. While 
the Washington plan was organized on the basis of a 
one-year timeframe, the Byrne plan, on the other hand, 
was based upon a ten-year timeframe. Third, the 
Washington plan placed great importance upon the needs 
of neighborhoods in contrast to the Byrne plan which 
focused most of its attention on Chicago’s downtown. 
Finally, the Washington plan was based upon three 
prior policy documents, namely, the CWED Economic 
Development Platform, the Washington Papers, and the 
Transition Team Reports, which were developed through 
a highly participatory process. The Byrne plan was 
the result of a staff- directed and "in-house" 
executed planning process which did not feature 
extensive citizen participation.
Planning professionals and community leaders 
tended to view the development plan in very positive 
ways. In general, they felt the plan had a number of 
positive effects upon development decision-making 
within the city. First, the plan served to establish 
the city as a thoughtful actor in the local economy by 
presenting a clear analysis of the local economy and a 
variety of proposals to strengthen it. Second, the 
plan placed the needs of Chicago's residential 
neighborhoods near the top of the city's development
Ill
agenda by focusing a number of program initiatives 
upon the needs of these areas. Third, the 
collaborative nature of the staffing patterns used to 
formulate the plan helped to build needed support for 
the plan within the municipal bureaucracy. While the 
Department of Economic Development was the lead agency 
in the formulation of the plan, commissioners and 
professionals from six city departments and various 
mayoral offices were involved in its development. In 
addition, numerous interagency working groups were 
established, at various levels within the municipal 
hierarchy, to formulate specific components of the 
plan and to monitor its implementation. Several of 
the planners I spoke with mentioned the important 
contribution which these committees made towards 
educating city professionals about Washington's reform 
agenda and encouraging their active support for the 
effort. Finally, the specific nature of the plan's 
goals provided the administration with an excellent 
tool for monitoring the progress being made towards 
achieving these outcomes.
Summarizing the effect of the 1984 development 
plan upon the Department of Planning, Pat Dowell, a 
Senior Planner, stated,
I would say the development plan, along with
the city's Management By Objectives Plan,
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has forced the department to be much more 
realistic in the pursuit of its goals- to be 
more focused in their approach to 
development in the city.®
Chuck Thurow, a former consultant to the city who is 
now working as a planner in the Department of 
Planning, reflected upon the 1984 development plan in 
the following way,
Coming from a planning background, I 
remember all those years in planning school 
when everyone was saying that comprehensive 
planning was outmoded--you needed policy 
planning. The Chicago Works Together Plan 
is probably the leading model of what the 
academy has always said planning should be 
about.'
The 1984 development plan was not, however, 
without its critics. The majority of City Council 
members, many members of the business community and 
some community leaders criticized the plan. Many 
individuals felt the plan's goals were overly vague 
and the proposed program initiatives insufficiently 
developed. This view is best represented by the 
following comments by Bill Higginson, a staff member 
for Chicago United, a government reform group, "As a 
policy-oriented document focused upon macro policy
^Interview with Pat Dowell, Senior Planner, 
Department of Planning, City of Chicago, July 24, 
1986, Chicago, Illinois.
7Interview with Chuck Thurow, Senior Planner, 
Department of Planning, City of Chicago, July 26, 
1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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issues, it's simply apple pie and motherhood."®
Many individuals also criticized the emphasis 
which the plan placed upon job retention and 
generation goals. They argued that attention should 
be placed, instead, upon improving the investment 
climate for business in order to encourage economic 
expansion. If successful, some argued, such an 
approach would result in higher employment levels. 
They felt that the city's employment-related goals and 
policies, especially the "first source" hiring and the 
minority purchasing policies, would result in higher 
costs for business. They were certain that this would 
result in a deterioration of the local business 
climate and economic contraction. June LaVelle, 
manager of the city's most successful industrial 
incubator space, offered the following observations 
regarding the jobs emphasis of the Chicago Works 
Together Plan,
I' ve never met a single human being in my 
life who says they started a business so 
they can hire people. I don't believe that 
economic development is the creation of 
jobs. It's bullshit. . . Basically, in my
estimation, in my thinking, you create an 
environment of opportunity, people come in,
®Interview with Bill Higginson, Chicago United, 
March 7, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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they bring the capital resources they've 
got, and the only reason they hire people is to take advantage of an opportunity.^
Downtown business leaders were critical of the plan
because it placed more emphasis upon the residential
neighborhoods outside of the Loop and less emphasis
upon the needs of Chicago's downtown area. Tom
Cokins, Executive Director of the Central Areas
Committee made this point in the following manner,
The Washington administration has focused 
upon the problems of the neighborhoods.
This represents the first time the downtown 
core has had to compete with other areas for 
attention.
Finally, the plan was criticized by community
activists because it had been developed by senior
administrative staff members without any input from
community groups. This critique of the plan was
forcefully presented in The Chicago Workshop on
Economic Development's statement,
While we applauded the Washington Papers, 
which enlisted our participation in framing 
the questions for economic development 
policy and planning, we are tentative about 
this new document because it was drafted by 
the administration's Development Sub-
^Interview with June LaVelle, Executive 
Director, Council of Industries of Northwest Chicago, 
July 14, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
■^Interview with Tom Cokins, Executive director, 
Central Areas Committee, July 15, 1986, Chicago,
Illinois.
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Cabinet, in-house, thereby aborting the 
citizen’s participation process which held 
out great expectations to community-based 
organizations. Without continued citizen 
initiated planning, we once again revert to 
the all too familiar stance of reacting to 
plans constructed elsewhere. . . we remain
firm in our stance that there will be no 
equitable comprehensive plan for Chicago’s 
future unless the planning process continues 
to incorporate genuine citizen participation 
from the neighborhoods. And until 
neighborhoods gain greater authority in 
this process, we conclude that Chicago's 
future will look very much like its past.H
The Washington administration used the 1984
development plan to guide its activities during its
first term in office. In November of 1985, the
administration began the process of revising and
updating the development plan. This was done using a
very participatory process which was markedly
different from the "in-house" planning process which
CWED criticized. The Department of Economic
Development initiated this planning process by hiring
a full-time staff person to conduct interviews with
business, labor and community leaders regarding their
views on economic development and their interest in
the local development planning process. In the Spring
of 1986, the Mayor appointed forty of these
^-Chicago Workshop on Economic Development 
(CWED), "Statement on the "Chicago Works Together": 
1984 Chicago Development Plan, (Chicago, 1984), pp. 
1 , 2 .
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individuals to a taskforce charged with revising the 
city's development plan. These individuals were 
grouped into five teams representing a variety of 
interests • Each team was then asked to examine its
membership and to invite five to ten additional 
persons to join their group whom they felt would make 
their unit more representative of important 
constituencies within the city. Each team proceeded 
to select a convener to chair its sessions and to 
serve on a steering committee for the development 
planning process. Beginning in the summer of 1986, 
the teams met every other week for approximately four 
hours. Each group was given full license to make 
whatever changes they felt were necessary in the plan. 
Each convener then produced, with staff assistance, a 
draft of their team's recommendations. The steering 
committee then worked to integrate these documents 
into one final draft of the plan. During the summer, 
copies of this policy document were circulated among 
various groups from throughout the city. At the end 
of the Summer of 1986, interested groups were invited 
to a day-long conference to review the revised plan. 
After changes suggested by the conference participants 
were incorporated, the proposed draft of the "Chicago 
Works Together": 1986 Chicago Development Plan was
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forwarded to the Mayor for his approval. Like the 
1984 development plan the 1986 update is a policy- 
oriented document in which the priorities are 
significantly different from those of previous Chicago 
plans in terms of its emphasis upon neighborhood 
concerns and citizen participation. The new plan 
differs from the 1984 version in that it is the 
product of a highly participatory planning process 
involving over 500 community leaders.
B. Major Development Decisions
Before the Washington administration could fully 
elaborate its economic development plan, it was 
confronted by a series of major economic development 
issues which challenged the mayor's commitment to his 
reform agenda. Two of these issues were the result of 
policy initiatives of the Byrne administration, while 
one emerged from structural changes occurring in the 
regional and national economies. The two issues 
inherited from the previous administration were the 
proposed redevelopment of the Navy Pier by the Rouse 
Company and the planned 1992 Chicago World's Fair. 
The remaining issue facing the new administration was 
how to respond to the announced closing of the 
Playskool factory by Hasbro Bradley Inc. People 
followed the Mayor’s actions on these issues closely
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in order to determine to what extent his economic 
development policies would reflect the priorities of 
the Washington Papers, the Transition Team Report and 
the "Chicago Works Together": 1984 Chicago Development 
Plan.
1. The Playskool Plant Closing
In September of 1984, Hasbro Bradley Inc., a 
major toy manufacturer headquartered in Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island, announced plans to shut down its 
Chicago-based Playskool production facility. At that 
time, the facility provided full-time employment for 
almost 700 workers, most of whom were Latino women 
from Chicago's Northwest Side.
Community leaders and city officials were angered 
by the company's decision to shut the plant down 
because they were certain that the facility was still 
profitable. In addition, the plant's former owners 
had received in 1980 a $1 million industrial revenue 
bond, a low interest loan, for capital improvements 
aimed at expanding its workforce from 1,000 to 1,400 
employees. After failing to make these improvements 
and reducing its workforce through layoffs, the 
corporation had decided to shift production to one of 
their New England plants. One community activist I 
interviewed described the situation in this way,
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But here is a case where a long-term 
corporate actor on the local scene who had 
recently gotten an industrial revenue bond 
for the purpose of upgrading production 
facilities and to expand the workforce, 
didn’t, and in the process of being sold off 
to another corporate partner from out of 
town, was just going to walk away. .
The mayor responded to the announced closing by
having his senior planners call together a broad range
of community and labor leaders to discuss the problem.
Jim Lemonides, Executive Director of the Greater North
Pulaski Development Corporation, described the
assembled coalition in the following words,
It was a very unique coalition that emerged 
in that it had some people way to the left 
end of the spectrum, pro-labor, people and 
then it had people on the more conservative 
side, including our business development 
association, all pretty much coalesced to 
raise a voice of protest against what was 
happening.^
With the assistance of Robert Mier, who was then 
Commissioner of Economic Development, these 
individuals devised a joint community/government 
strategy aimed at getting the firm to either 
reconsider its decision to close the facility or to 
take steps to address the problems created for the
^Interview with Thom Clark, Editor, The 
Neighborhood Works, July 15, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
^Interview with Jim Lemonides, Executive 
Director, Greater North Pulaski Development 
Corporation, July 16, 1987, Chicago, Illinois.
120
plant's employees and the community by its actions.
It was decided that the city would attempt to 
enter into negotiations with the firm to keep the 
plant operating. Meanwhile, community and labor
leaders organized public demonstrations and a consumer 
boycott of Hasbro Bradley Inc. products. According to 
the Chicago Tribune, "Neighborhood groups started a 
boycott of Lincoln Logs, 6.1. Joe’s and other 
Playskool and Hasbro toys."14 Following an
unsuccessful effort to get the corporation to reverse 
its position, the Washington administration filed a 
legal suit in December of 1984 to prevent the firm’s 
closing. In the suit the city asserted that Hasbro 
Bradley Inc. had violated the terms of their 
industrial revenue bond financing by closing the 
Playskool facility. According to a Chicago Tribune 
article written by Richard C. Longworth, "Hasbro 
Bradley is believed to be the first firm in the nation 
to be sued for moving its operations from a city after 
benefiting from an industrial revenue bond."15
As a result of community and administration 
pressure, the company chose to enter into an out-of-
l^Richard C. Longworth, "Toymaker Cuts Deal With 
City on Closing," Chicago Tribune, September 15, 1987, 
Section 2, p. 1,10.
l^Longworth, p. i.
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court agreement to settle the dispute. The firm 
agreed to pay back the industrial revenue bond. In 
addition, it agreed to keep its factory open and to 
maintain a workforce of 100 employees until November 
of 1985. Furthermore, the company committed itself to 
spending $300,000 to establish and maintain a program 
to help its displaced workers find alternative 
employment. Through this program, any firm hiring a 
former Playskool worker would receive $500, per 
employee hired, in two lump sum payments. Also, the 
corporation established a $50,000 fund to pay for 
extended health insurance and emergency expenses for 
its workers. For its part, the city agreed to drop 
its suit and the community organizations agreed to end 
their boycott and organizing activities.
Hours before a public announcement of the accord 
by Mayor Washington and Hasbro Bradley’s president, 
Stephen D. Hassenfeld, was to be made the agreement 
almost fell apart when the latter objected to language 
in the agreement which suggested a "deal" had been 
struck. Mr. Hassenfeld insisted that the company was 
providing these benefits to its workers on a voluntary 
basis on its own initiative. While ridiculing these 
statements of the firm, city officials inserted 
wording into the agreement describing the voluntary
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nature of the firmfs actions in order to secure the
agreement. While doing so the administration
continued to press the firm to sign the agreement.
The Chicago Tribune described the city's commitment to
securing a written agreement by quoting a Washington
administration official who said,
Without the signing, the city is not going 
to drop the lawsuit. If they sign the deal, 
then we can force them to live up to the 
agreement. That is why the city is so 
adamant about them signing.
While the administration spoke favorably of the 
Playskool agreement, senior officials harbored deep 
concerns about the economic futures of the production 
workers discharged by the firm and the redevelopment 
of the facility for manufacturing purposes. An 
analysis of the experience with the Playskool plant 
closing shows the administration's fears to have been 
justified. According to a Chicago Tribune article by 
Roger Worthington appearing one year after the 
shutdown, 16
16James Strong and Richard C. Longworth, "City, 
Toy Firm Reach Agreement on Plant," Chicago Tribune, 
September 6, 1985, Section 2, p. 1.
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Almost a year after the owners announced the 
closing of the Playskool Plant in Chicago's 
West Side, nearly half the laid-off workers 
have not found work, and no new tenant has 
been found for the 800,000 square foot 
complex, 4501 W. Augustus Boulevard.U
While salaried workers found more success than hourly
employees in securing new employment, large numbers of
both groups of workers were unemployed after one year.
Table 4.2
Playskool Workers Employment/Unemployment Profile* 1**
Type of 
Employee
Number
Employed %
Number
Unemployed % Total
Hourly
Workers 110 27.5% 300 72.5% 400
Salaried
Workers 160 36.9% 273 61.1% 113
All
Workers 270 32.0% 573 67.9% 843
The firm's program was strongly criticized by 
community leaders for its failure to provide 
retraining for production workers. They argued that 
these individuals were being forced to compete for
U Richard Worthington, "Playskool Helping, But 
Most Still Jobless After Layoff," Chicago Tribune, 
September 17, 1986 Section 2, p. 1.
1®Roger Worthington, "Playskool's Program For 
Laid Off Workers Questioned," Chicago Tribune, 
September 15, 1985, Section 2, p. 3.
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jobs in an economy that had a shrinking number of 
production jobs. Such individuals, the critics 
argued, required career counseling and job skills 
training in order to allow them to successfully 
compete for jobs in the area’s growing service sector. 
Without such assistance, employment specialists 
argued, the program was bound to fail. The program 
was also criticized for its failure to spend the 
$50,000 allocated for loans and grants to assist 
displaced workers in securing medical insurance and/or 
other emergency help. During the first year of the 
program’s operation, very few loans were provided and 
no grants were given.
Despite the failure of the administration’s 
efforts to adequately deal with the problems of the 
laid-off Playskool workers, the agreement did reveal 
the seriousness of the mayor's commitment to dealing 
aggressively with threats to the city’s industrial 
base and workforce. It also showed the 
administration's desire to be treated as an equal 
partner, by business, in the economic development 
area. Finally, it illustrated the extent to which the 
administration was prepared to go in order to pursue 
the job generation and employment and training 
objectives of the Chicago Works Together Plan. Thus,
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the importance of the Washington administration’s 
stand on the Playskool issue was largely symbolic. By 
taking a tough stance on the closing, the mayor showed 
his determination to hold the business community 
accountable for promises which they make. The 
following comments by Angela Hyland, a Senior Vice 
President at Standard and Poor’s, suggest that the new 
administration may be making itself heard within the 
business community,
Playskool may be precedent setting. Other 
municipalities will be looking to see if 
Chicago can enforce it (Playskool 
agreement).
2. The Redevelopment of Chicago’s Navy Pier
Constructed prior to World War I, Navy Pier was 
opened in 1916 as a mixed-use facility serving both 
transportation and recreational purposes. Initially 
conceived of as part of the famed Burnham plan of 
1909, the pier functioned as an important shipping, 
military, governmental and cultural center until the 
early 1970s. ^ 0 With the decline in Great Lakes 
shipping and the relocation of governmental facilities 
from the pier in the mid-1970s, the facility fell into
^Ray Gibon, "Playskool Defection Has Cities 
Thinking Twice," Chicago Tribune, January 6, 1985,
Section 2, p. 1.
^Daniel H. Burnham and Edward H. Bennett, Plan 
of Chicago, (Chicago: Commercial Club), 1909.
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disuse and began to show signs of significant 
deterioration.
Beginning with the Chicago bi-centennial 
celebration, especially the visit of the "Tall Ships," 
attention was again focused on the waterfront area and 
its Navy Pier. From 1979 through 1982, the Byrne 
administration permitted the pier to be used for a 
series of week-long cultural events known as the 
"ChicagoFest Celebration." In 1980, with the 
encouragement of Mayor Byrne, the City of Chicago 
entered into an agreement with the Rouse Company to 
formulate a physical design, marketing, and finance 
plan to redevelop the pier for mixed-use commercial 
activities. The Rouse Company was well known, and 
held in high regard, for its waterfront development 
activities in other major cities. They were 
responsible for the successful redevelopment of the 
Quincy Market in Boston, Massachusetts, Inner 
Harborplace in Baltimore, Maryland, and the South 
Street Seaport in New York City. Each project was 
planned as a "festival marketplace," featuring 
restaurants, bars, fast food stands, hotels, boutiques 
and cultural facilities. In 1982, the City Council 
reached an "agreement in principle" with the Rouse 
Company to jointly redevelop the Navy Pier.
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The Rouse Company plan required a total 
investment of $280 million. Under the plan, the firm 
would raise $220 million of this amount and the City 
of Chicago would contribute $60 million. The plan 
featured the creation of 400,000 square feet of retail 
and entertainment space as well as the construction of 
a 250 room hotel and a marina. The city was promised 
50% of the net income from the project and a 
substantial increase in future sales and property tax 
revenues. The project was designed to support 100 new 
businesses and generate 5,000 permanent new jobs. It 
was expected that the City of Chicago would raise $30 
to $40 million of its $60 million contribution by 
securing an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) from 
the Federal government.
When the Washington administration assumed office 
in the Spring of 1983, the city was still involved in 
negotiating the terms of the Navy Pier agreement with 
the Rouse Company. The new administration had some 
serious reservations about the wisdom of spending $60 
million on the creation of a significant amount of 
new retail space, at a location isolated from 
Chicago’s downtown and neighborhoods, when many of the 
city’s existing retail and commercial areas were in 
desperate need of assistance. They were also
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concerned about the impact that an upscale "festival 
marketplace" might have upon the future of the Navy 
Pier as a public space accessible and attractive to 
all Chicagoans. Finally, they questioned the 
advisability of an application on the part of the city 
for an Urban Development Action Grant for the Navy 
Pier project when it appeared certain that the South 
Works steel plant would require a similar grant for 
approximately $40 million. It was unlikely that the 
City of Chicago would receive two such grants, 
regardless of the quality of the city's applications.
After careful analysis, the Washington 
administration decided to submit an Urban Development 
Action Grant application for improvements at the South 
Works. The mayor chose to do this in order to secure 
the future of the city's only fully integrated steel­
making facility and to protect the more than 2,000 
well-paying industrial jobs in the plant. Soon after 
the decision by the mayor to submit a UDAG application 
for the expansion of the South Works facility, U.S. 
Steel, the owner of the plant, cancelled its plans to 
expand operations at the facility.
Following these developments, the city re-entered 
negotiations with the Rouse Company for the 
development of Navy Pier. According to Arturo
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Vazquez, former Deputy Commissioner of the Department 
of Economic Development, the challenge was the 
following,
What could we (the city) do in that 
development that would make it more valuable 
to us. This was a dramatic problem because 
we had a development that was physically, 
socially and economically isolated from the 
city. It was proposed to be stuck out on 
the pier without good transportation 
systems, except for auto users. It drew 70% 
or more of its market from the suburbs. God 
knows who it would employ. It just happened 
to exist within the geographic boundaries of 
Chicago, so with that as a departure point, 
we said, 'what can we do to link the project 
more completely to the city in order to make 
it worthy of some amount of city investment?'21
With the guidance of Robert Mier, former 
Commissioner of Economic Development, the city asked 
the Rouse Company for a series of commitments which it 
felt would maximize the economic benefits from the 
project to the city and its residents. Specifically, 
they asked the firm if it would: give hiring
preference to Chicago job applicants; promote 
entrepreneurial opportunities for minorities and 
women; encourage contracting with Chicago-based 
vendors; offer technical assistance to community-based 
local development corporations; and engage in joint
21Interview with Mr. Arturo Vazquez, former 
Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Economic 
Development, City of Chicago, July 17, 1986, Chicago, 
Illinois.
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ventures with community development organizations.
The Rouse Company enthusiastically agreed to each of
these requests and an agreement was prepared for City
Council approval. The Council, led by Aldermen
Vrdolyak and Burke, opponents of the Mayor, voted to
reject the agreement and to terminate negotiations
with the Rouse Company. According to a recent journal
article by Mier, Moe, and Scherr,
In what is widely interpreted as an action 
solely designed to damage and undermine 
Mayor Washington, his opposition in the City 
Council directed that negotiations with the 
Rouse Company be terminated.22
As a result of the City Council’s actions, the 
city and the Rouse Company ended negotiations 
regarding the development of the Navy Pier. Following 
this development, the mayor appointed a blue ribbon 
committee, a taskforce composed of 22 persons, under 
the direction of Mr. Robert Newman, a partner in the 
law firm of Arvey, Hodes, Costello and Newman, to 
study various options for the redevelopment of the 
pier. In August of 1985, the taskforce 
made its recommendations public in the report, Navy 
Pier: A View For The Future.* 2^ The mayor’s Navy Pier
22Mier, Moe and Scherr, p. 305.
2^City of Chicago. Department of Economic 
Development. 1985. Navy Pier: A View For The Future. 
City of Chicago.
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Taskforce suggested the facility be developed,
as an urban park with extensive and 
innovative cultural and educational 
activities. Specifically, it recommended a 
wide range of expositions, cultural 
exhibits, museums, educational institutions, 
and entertainment events, along with limited 
retail activities.
The taskforce also suggested various passive and 
active recreational uses for parts of the pier. It 
viewed the redevelopment of the facility as a staged 
process in which improvements would be paced with 
increases in the utilization of the facility by the 
public. Finally, the taskforce suggested a quasi- 
public management structure for the pier and improved 
transportation service linking the pier to downtown.
In 1985, the city took an important step towards 
implementing the taskforce’s suggestions by including 
an $18 million item for basic repairs at the pier in 
the city's General Obligation Bond. In addition, the 
administration has since 1985 opened parts of the pier 
up for cultural and recreational activities. After 
reviewing the taskforce's recommendations, Mayor 
Washington suggested a compromise development plan 
which featured a combination of recreational and 
cultural uses for the pier. In his opinion, the pier 
needed some commercial activities to generate 
sufficient revenues to pay for the construction and
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maintenance of cultural facilities on the pier. This 
alternative was being studied by the city when the 
Mayor’s first term ended.
The Washington administration’s approach to the 
planning and redevelopment of the Navy Pier clearly 
demonstrated its commitment to using each development 
project as an opportunity to expand employment and 
entrepreneurial opportunities for Chicago 
residents. This is revealed by its careful weighing 
of the job retention and generation benefits of the 
South Works and Navy Pier projects. Furthermore, it 
is illustrated by the city’s successful efforts to 
incorporate into the Rouse Company agreements language 
which committed the developer to: giving job
preference to Chicagoans; expanding business 
opportunities for minorities and women; emphasizing 
local purchasing; providing technical assistance for 
community groups; and co-venturing with local 
development organizations. Such efforts were 
definitely lacking in the Byrne administration's 
economic development planning and programming. Her 
administration depended upon using city resources to 
maximize private investment in the hope that this 
capital would create jobs over time. The Washington 
administration's approach rejected such "trickle down"
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approaches to development planning and instead focused 
upon incorporating job generation and affirmative 
action commitments as central features of each 
economic development deal.
3. The 1992 Chicago World's Fair
In early 1980, recently retired Commonwealth 
Edison Company president, Thomas G. Ayers brought 
together a small group of influential Chicagoans to 
discuss the idea of organizing a world-class 
international exhibition and fair in Chicago to 
commemorate the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s 
discovery of America together with the 100th 
anniversary of the Columbian Exposition’s "White 
City."2^ The idea was enthusiastically received by the 
business and civic leaders assembled by Ayers. By 
January 1981, this informal network of local movers 
and shakers had transformed itself from a loose-knit 
group into the Chicago World's Fair-1992 Corporation. 
This organization was responsible for raising money to 
support the proposed fair effort and for executing the 
necessary planning to make it a reality. Robert 
McClory, an experienced Chicago political affairs
2^Donald a . Krueckeberg, Introduction to 
Planning History in the United States. The Center for 
Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, (New 
Brunswick, 1983), pp. 58-72.
writer, described the group’s formation in the 
following way,
In January 1981 the Chicago World’s Fair- 
1992 Corporation was launched with Ayers as 
the chairman and an impressive roster of 
corporate and professional boosters 
including Frank Considine of National Can 
Corporation, Donald Petkus of Commonwealth 
Edison, Jack Guthman, a Sidley and Austin 
attorney; George Burke of the Chicago 
Tribune and Bruce Graham of Skidmore, 
Owings, and Merrill architects.^5
In a 700-page application submitted to the United
States Department of Commerce and the Bureau of
International Exhibitions, the planners of the fair
stated that the six month event would take place on a
575 acre site located near Burnham Harbor on Chicago's
South Side. According to the preliminary plan, more
than 150 acres would be created by landfill. The fair
organizers projected an attendance figure of more than
54.1 million visitors. They suggested that more than
30,000 temporary jobs would be created by the event.
According to their estimates, the fair would produce
more than $675 million in revenues, generate over $280
million in taxes and create an $8 million surplus
after expenses.
The preliminary plan for the fair enjoyed the
134
^Robert McClory, The Fall of the Fair; 
Communities Struggle For Fairness. (Chicago, 1986), p. 
1.
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full support of Mayor Jane M. Byrne, who viewed it as
an important step towards achieving one of her
administration’s primary economic development goals,
"to transform Chicago into a national and
international center for finance, trade and
services. "26 Her strong support of the fair was
revealed in the Introduction of her administration’s
Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Plan.
The future will see Chicago rebuilding; 
strengthening its economic position; 
completing its transition to a center of 
international finance and commerce; and 
providing a better quality of life for its 
residents. As the symbol and culmination of 
its decade of rebuilding and growth, the 
city will be host to the 1992 World’s Fair. 
Confident of its potential, Chicago invites the world to celebrate its transformation.27
Shortly after the formation of the Fair 
Corporation, community leaders, under the leadership 
of activist Lew Kreinberg from the Jewish Council on 
Urban Affairs, began to raise serious questions 
regarding the preliminary plan for the fair. 
Kreinberg, along with two other community leaders,
2^City of Chicago. Department of Planning. 1984. 
The Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Development Plan. City 
of Chicago, p. 20.
27city of Chicago. Department of Planning, 1982. 
Chicago 1992 Comprehensive Plan: Goals and Policies 
and Ten-Year Capital Development Strategies. City of 
Chicago, pp. 4,5.
136
Chris Burgess and Thom Clark, presented their concerns 
about the fair in a widely read Chicago community 
development journal called The Neighborhood Works. In 
an article entitled, "World’s Fair Unfair to 
Neighborhoods," they presented serious criticisms of 
the proposed plan for the fair and the lack of citizen 
participation in its formulation.2®
Among the points raised by Kreinberg, Burgess and 
Clark were: the likelihood of increased taxes to pay 
for bonds needed for fair-related construction; 
diversion from neighborhood improvements of limited 
infrastructure dollars for fair expenditures; the 
probability of the fair losing money; a shift of 
consumer spending from neighborhoods to the fair; the 
inevitability of displacement from the neighboring 
areas of Pilsen and Chinatown; the necessity of 
obtaining significant levels of public subsidy from 
the federal, state and local governments; and the 
inadequacy of the proposed transportation plan. 
Finally, they criticized the fair's organizers for 
excluding local officials and community residents from 
the planning process and for refusing to make public 
important fair related documents.
2®Lew Kreinberg, Chris Burgess and Thom Clark, 
"World's Fair Unfair to Neighborhoods," The 
Neighborhood Works, p. 1.
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In response to the threesome’s work, a group of 
leaders from a small group of community organizations 
began to meet to discuss the fair and its impact upon 
the neighborhoods of the city. In the Spring of 1982, 
this somewhat anarchic group of activists formed a 
coalition calling themselves the Chicago 1992 
Committee to oppose the Fair Corporation’s current 
plan which they felt was conceptually, financially, 
socially, economically and environmentally flawed. 
The new organization quickly moved to hire Frankie 
Knibb, a Roosevelt University reference librarian, to 
serve as their sole staff member. The coalition soon 
grew to include participation from more than 55 
community organizations.
While not opposing the idea of a Chicago World's 
Fair, the coalition vigorously fought the Fair 
Corporation's original proposals. According to Knibb, 
they did so for a number of reasons. First, they felt 
the fair would drain city resources away from 
communities in desperate need of assistance. Second, 
they were concerned about the negative impact the 
event would have upon the communities surrounding the 
fair. They feared, as had Kreinberg, Burgess and 
Thom, that the fair would, over time, result in a 
significant amount of residential and commercial
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displacement in the areas of Chinatown and Pilsen. 
Third, they were nervous about the damage the fair's 
activities would have upon the environment. The 
original plan for the fair required the creation of 
150 acres of new landfill along Lake Michigan. In 
addition, 70% of the fair's 400,000 daily visitors 
were expected to travel to the fair by automobile. 
Fourth, they felt the planners had not adequately 
prepared for the parking requirements of the fair's 
daily visitors. Fifth, they were critical of the 
overall transportation plan for the event, which they 
felt offered poor access to the fair for city 
residents. Finally, they criticized the private 
nature of the fair's planning process.29
The Chicago 1992 Committee aggressively presented 
its criticisms of the fair to members of the City 
Council and to the press. At the same time, it 
conducted extensive research into the financial, 
environmental and employment aspects of the 
preliminary plan. On September 15, 1982 the committee 
members went a step further when they offered a 
resolution before the Chicago City Council calling for 
an end to further public spending on the fair pending
29Interview with Frankie Knibb, Staff Director, 
Chicago 1992 Committee, July 18, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
adequate responses by the fair’s organizers to the
many social and economic questions raised by the
event’s critics.^0 The resolution stated,
Be it resolved by the Mayor and the City 
Council that. . . these and other questions 
paramount to the taxpayers. . .  be resolved 
before the City Council authorizes the 
expenditure of any more funds which, 
earmarked or not, are in fact intended to be 
used for this proposed World’s Fair.^l
The City Council held hearings on the resolution and
the Committee spent most of the remainder of the year
organizing for these events.
In April 1983, Harold Washington assumed office.
As a candidate Washington had supported the idea of a
fair but he was also very critical of the private
nature of the fair’s planning process. As mayor,
Harold Washington spoke favorably of the fair but
indicated his administration’s desire to have a more
participatory planning process. Furthermore, he
stated his commitment to having the fair's events and
activities distributed throughout the neighborhoods of
Chicago. Finally, he indicated his concerns about the
financing of the fair. He was strongly opposed to
having the City of Chicago serve as the major
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^Robert McClory, p. 43. 
^^■McClory, p. 13.
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financial backer of the event. According to Robert 
McClory,
He called for an intergovernmental agreement 
between the city, the state and the Fair’s 
governing body which would ’clearly spell 
out that the city will bear no financial 
liability' in the event of a disaster.
'It’s great to host a party for the world,' 
said the mayor, ’but the city cannot afford to be stuck with the tab.'32
The criticisms and questions of the original plan 
offeree^ by the Chicago 1992 Committee, City Council, 
and City Hall put pressure on the Fair Corporation to 
scale down its plans. It presented what promoters 
described as a final plan, which required less 
landfill and construction. However, this plan also 
included a proposed $26 million investment by the city 
to renovate Navy Pier for use by fair goers. In 
addition, it featured the creation of a special taxing 
district in the vicinity of the fair. Within this 
district, all future property tax increases for 14 
years would be turned over to the Fair Corporation 
based upon the rationale that these increased 
revenues were a direct result of the fair’s 
activities. The proposal by the fair’s promoters to 
utilize tax increment financing to help pay for the 
cost of the event raised further questions within the
32McClory, p. 22.
141
administration regarding the feasibility of the fair’s
financial plan. The Mayor's growing concerns
regarding the plan for the fair were revealed in a
January 23, 1984 Chicago Tribune article,
Mayor Harold Washington complained Tuesday 
that the proposed 1992 World's Fair had 
become a 'hard sell' and said it may lack 
adequate political and public support to 
become a reality.33
Following the completion of an Arthur D. Little Inc. 
study of the fair which showed, "the fair will not pay 
for itself," the mayor raised further criticisms of 
the fair's p l a n . in the end, he rejected the use of 
tax increment financing to secure the fair's bonds. 
He stated, "The City of Chicago simply cannot barter 
away its inheritance."35 The mayor's refusal to 
commit city funds to support construction critical to 
the fair's success was one of the key factors 
contributing to the collapse of the fair. Planning 
for the event was finally ended when Illinois House *3
33John McCarron and Manuel Galvin, "Washington 
calls Fair a 'hard sell': Mayor Joins Other
Politicians Who Are Skeptical," Chicago Tribune, 
January 23, 1985, Section 2, pp. 1,5.
34paniel Egler, "Fair Feasibility Study is 
Fairly Inconclusive," Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1985,
pp. 1,2.
35John McCarron and Daniel Egler, "Washington 
Asks Legislature to Hold Off on Fair Decision," 
Chicago Tribune, June 13, 1985, Section 2, p. 3.
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Speaker Michael Madigan refused to support further 
state assistance for the fair which he described as "a 
bad risk."36
The mayor’s refusal to commit city resources to
support a project planned and endorsed by the leaders
of Chicago1s business community was viewed by many as
very significant. In an article he wrote for the
Chicago Tribune at the time of the fair’s demise,
Richard C. Longworth stated,
There are broader lessons to be drawn from 
the fair debacle. The first is that the 
fair was a defeat for Chicago’s Old Guard, 
the businessmen who, with the late Mayor 
Richard J. Daley, presided over every major 
civic project for the last 20 years. They 
put their power and prestige behind the 
fair. In the old days, this would have 
guaranteed its success. This time it wasn’tenough.37
Larry Howe, Executive Director of the Civic Committee 
of the Commercial Club of Chicago, suggested that the 
defeat of the fair by community groups was clear 
evidence of the decline of corporatist planning in the 
City of Chicago. In the future, he felt, community 
groups would have to be consulted on major *27
36j0hn McCarron and Daniel Egler, "Chicago 1992 
Fair Laid to Rest in 1985," Chicago Tribune, June 21, 
1985, Section 1, p. 1.
37Richard C. Longworth, "A Postmortem On The 
Fair," Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1985, Section 1, p.
27.
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development projects, like the fair, if they were to 
be approved.3®
The Washington administration’s response to these 
three planning decisions revealed its commitment to 
redistributive development policies and participatory 
planning processes. In each of these cases, the 
administration aggressively pursued remedies to 
problems which sought to provide direct economic 
benefits for marginalized segments of the community. 
It sought to do so by making investments, by 
developers, aimed at assisting such groups a 
prerequisite for city participation in major economic 
development projects. In addition, the administration 
sought ways to expand citizen participation in policy­
making in each of these cases. The Washington 
administration’s approach to these issues served to 
distinguish it from the Byrne administration by 
demonstrating its strong commitment to the reform 
goals of redistribution and participation. In fact, 
Jane Byrne cited Washington’s decisions on Navy Pier 
and the World’s Fair frequently during her 1987 
campaign to highlight the differences in their 
approaches to economic development.
^Interview with Lawrence Howe, Executive 
Director, Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of 
Chicago, July 18, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
V. Major Economic Development Initiatives
A. Post Election Political Climate
Upon assuming office in April 1983, Mayor 
Washington confronted several problems which 
negatively affected his ability to exercise power and 
govern effectively. Among these obstacles were the 
absence of a ruling majority in the City Council, 
significant opposition to his administration from 
within the municipal bureaucracy, an inherited 
municipal debt of more than $160 million, severe 
restrictions upon his appointment power due to the 
Shakman agreements, and a Federal government committed 
to reducing funding for housing, employment, community 
development and social service programs.
Of these constraints, the most crucial was 
Washington's lack of power in the Chicago City 
Council. Two opponents of the mayor, Aldermen Edward 
Vrdolyak and Edward Burke, controlled 29 council 
votes while the mayor controlled only 21 votes. Both 
Vrdolyak and Burke had lent support to Republican 
mayoral candidate Bernard Epton in his race against 
Washington. The situation was further complicated by 
the opposition's inability to override mayoral vetoes 
because they could not assemble the needed two-thirds 
(34 votes) of the Council to do so. This situation
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set the stage for the development of a long series of
confrontations and deadlocked votes on a variety of
important policy matters. A Chicago Tribune article
described the situation in the following manner,
But Washington's successes have been all but 
obscured by the titanic 'Council Wars' 
struggle with the democratic old guard. The 
Chicago City Council, led by Alderman Edward 
Vrdolyak, has thrown all its energies into 
making the mayor look as bad as possible.^
The frequency and intensity with which the
mayor's supporters and opponents attacked each other
prompted local reporters to refer to these
confrontations as the "Council Wars,' while the Wall
Street Journal described the Chicago political scene
as "Beirut By The Lake." While opinions differed as
to the basis of the Council split, few denied that
Council opposition to Washington involved both racial
prejudice and opposition to reform. Jim Ford, a
policy analyst with the Northern Illinois Planning
Services Agency, referred to the role racism played in
the 'Council Wars' with these words, *5
1Philip Lentz, "Washington: Assessing the Mayor 
at Midterm." Chicago Tribune, April 7, 1985, Section
5, p. 4.
146
While race may not be the issue of the 
Washington administration, it is the issue 
on the other (Vrdolyak) side.^
Richard C. Longworth, while admitting to the role
racism played in creating divisions within the
Council, spoke of other conflicts as well,
I think that it is fashionable today to say 
that it isn't race, but, I think, to a great 
extent, it is. The real basis, I think, is 
money and power. Washington really is a 
reformer. On a personal basis and with all 
those tax problems, he is not as good as he 
should be, but his intentions are as a 
reformer. He is as far as you can be in 
Chicago against the old patronage/clout/ 
corruption thing. I think he does want to 
clear things up.^
The Vrdolyak opposition to the administration, in its
early days in office, was so intense that he refused
for almost three years to approve the appointment of
over 60 Washington appointees to various positions.
As a result of this conflict, legislative
approval for any Washington administration initiative 
faced stiff opposition in the City Council. During 
the period of Vrdolyak and Burke control, the majority 
of the Council opposed the mayor's corporate budget,
^Interview with Jim Ford, Staff member, Northern 
Illinois Planning Services Agency, July 18, 1986, 
Chicago, Illinois.
^Interview with Richard C. Longworth, Staff 
Writer, Chicago Tribune, July 21, 1987, Chicago 
Illinois.
147
community development block grant spending plans, and 
the Navy Pier agreement with the Rouse Company, among 
other things. Late in 1985, a Federal District court 
judge declared seven of the aldermanic election 
districts to be improperly constituted. In the 
opinion of the court, the districts were gerrymandered 
in such a manner as to make the election of a minority 
candidate to office in these districts quite unlikely. 
The court ordered the district lines to be redrawn and 
a special election to be held in April of 1985 to 
fill the disputed Council seats. The mayor worked 
very hard to secure the election of his supporters. 
As a result, four candidates endorsed by the mayor won 
Council seats in the special election. This brought 
the City Council balance to 25 to 25. With the Mayor 
casting the deciding City Council vote in the event of 
a tie, the administration finally took control of the 
City Council, albeit by the narrowest of margins. As 
a result of the special election, the mayor was able 
to reorganize the Council and appoint his key 
supporters to important committee chairmanships, 
thereby enabling the administration to schedule 
hearings and votes on important legislative 
initiatives.
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B. New Programs Established
In spite of the opposition which the
administration faced from the majority bloc in the
Council, during its early years in office, the mayor
was able to formulate and initiate a number of
significant new economic development programs. The
administration usually initiated such programs by
means of executive orders rather than by local
ordinances because of the majority bloc's
unwillingness to pass Washington sponsored
legislation. According to Gary Chico, a legislative
aide to the former Chairman of the Council Finance
Committee, Alderman Edward Burke,
He has certainly done a lot more by 
executive order than any other mayor has. I 
mean, that's just. . . necessity. . . It's 
the mother of invention. Since he would 
have been blocked legislatively, he just 
thought, why bother going through the pass?
Go around it.^
While executive orders allowed the mayor to circumvent 
Council opposition to the establishment of new 
policies, these initiatives would be effective only as 
long as the mayor remained in office.
^Interview with Gary Chico, Legislative Aide, 
Chicago City Council, Finance Committee, July 23, 
1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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1. Buy Chicago Initiative
Among the first new initiatives of the Washington 
administration was the development of the "Buy 
Chicago" program. This effort focused attention upon 
maximizing municipal purchases from Chicago-based 
organizations. The city began this effort by 
developing a data base which included detailed 
information regarding local vendors and their 
products. The city’s Purchasing Department then 
encouraged municipal agencies to maximize their 
buying from locally-based firms. As a result of these 
efforts, local purchases by all city agencies 
increased from 40% to 60% during Mayor Washington’s 
first term in office. This increase in local 
purchasing raised such spending by the city to more 
than $240 million. In addition, it was estimated to 
have retained or generated more than 2,000 jobs in the 
local economy. Having succeeded in increasing local 
purchasing by the city, the Washington Administration, 
with the assistance of executives from IC Industries, 
attempted to encourage private firms in the Chicago 
area to give preference to local firms when purchasing 
goods and services. As part of this effort, the 
administration shared its information on local vendors 
with area firms in order to encourage them to purchase
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local products.
2. Minority Purchasing Initiative
Soon after winning election in 1983, Mayor Harold
Washington established an informal goal of increasing
city purchasing from minority and women-owned firms to
25%. This objective of the administration was clearly
stated in the 1984 development plan,
An interim goal has been established that 
25% of city purchasing activity, or $100 
million, shall be awarded to minority and 
female-owned firms.^
Based upon both municipal reports and press accounts 
the Byrne administration had made only 5% to 6% of its 
purchases from minority-owned firms and only 4.4% from 
women-owned enterprises. This was at a time when, 
according to the U.S. Census, blacks comprised 39.5% 
of the city's population and Latinos made up 14% of 
the population.^ in 1984, minority purchasing by the 
city increased to between 14% and 15%. In that year, 
those expenditures amounted to over $60 million. 
Douglas Frantz and Dean Baquet of the Chicago Tribune 
summarized the administration's progress towards
^City of Chicago Department of Economic 
Development. 1984. "Chicago Works Together"; 1984
Chicago Development Plan. City of Chicago, p. 59.
^John McCarron, "Comeback for Chicago 
Population," Chicago Tribune, November 10, 1986,
Section 1, pp., 1,2.
achieving these informal goals in 1984 with these 
words,
Though the Washington administration has 
almost tripled city business with minorities 
since taking office two years ago, contracts with women have declined.^
Late in 1984, the administration contracted with
the firm of James H. Lowry and Associates to conduct a
comprehensive, eight month study of municipal
purchasing practices with special emphasis on the
effect these practices had upon minority purchasing.
This $635,000 study was completed in March of 1985.
A November 24, 1985 Ghicago Tribune article described
the results of the study in these words,
In March, the long awaited Lowry study- a 
thick, blue-bound book that alleged petty 
corruption and inefficiency was widespread 
in the purchasing office- was released. The 
study asserted Chicago lagged far behind 
other cities in giving contracts to 
minorities, primarily because a small group 
of entrenched white businessmen dominated 
the business.®
In another article, the Chicago Tribune summarized the
Lowry study in the following way,
Lowry's initial study led to a report that 
was highly critical of the city's purchasing 
system. It charged that favoritism had kept *27
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^Douglas Frantz and Dean Baquet, "City Finds It 
Loses Millions on Contracts," Chicago Tribune, March
27, 1985. Section 1, pp. 1, 16.
^"Minority Contracts," Chicago Tribune, 
November 24, 1985, Section 1, pp. 1, 25.
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minorities and women from getting a fair- share of city business.^
The Washington administration used these findings
from the Lowry report to justify the issuance of an
Executive Order committing all city agencies to
increasing minority and women-owned firm purchasing to
30%. Under Executive Order 85-2, all agencies were
required to give 25% of the dollar value of their
contracts to minority-owned firms and 5% of the dollar
value of their contracts to women-owned firms.^0 The
Executive Order stated,
Whereas the practice of racial, ethnic and 
sexual discrimination was, in the recent 
history of the United States, authorized 
and, in some instances, mandated by law;
. . . Whereas past discriminatory practices 
have placed women and racial and ethnic 
minorities in a position of social and 
economic disadvatage which has resulted in, 
among other things, reduced opportunity for 
them to form and control businesses and in 
the lack of opportunities for businesses 
owned and controlled by them; . . . The
Purchasing Agent shall establish a goal of 
awarding not less than 25% of the annual 
dollar value of all City contracts to 
qualifying Minority Business Enterprises and
^Douglas Frantz, "City Plans New No-Bid
Contract For Minority Business Program," Chicago 
Tribune, June 4, 1985, Section 2, pp. 1, 2.
l^City of Chicago, Mayor’s Office. Executive 
Order 85-2: Minority Purchasing Program.
1985).
(Chicago,
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5% of the annual dollar value of all City 
contracts to qualified Women's Business Enterprises.^
The mayor then appointed an aggressive young
attorney, Sam Patch, as Contract Compliance Officer,
to insure the success of this initiative. Patch,
working with the Acting Purchasing Agent, Acting
Corporate Counsel and the Commissioner of Economic
Development, promulgated Regulations Governing
Certification of Minority and Women-Owned Businesses
and Special Conditions Regarding Minority Business
Enterprise Commitment and Women Business Enterprise
Commitment to clearly state the mayor's new policy in
order to insure its implementation.^
A Chicago Tribune article on April 27, 1987
described the success of the Washington minority set-
aside program during 1985 in the following way,
But in 1985, the first year of Washington's 
program, minorities and women won more than 
30% of the $288 million in city contracts 
awarded. At the billion-dollar O'Hare 
International Airport expansion project, 
minority and women-owned firms garnered 
nearly 40% of the $450 million in contracts 
during the same period.^
11-City of Chicago, Mayor's Office. Executive 
Order 85-2: Minority Purchasing Programs. (Chicago,
1985), p. 1, 4.
■^city of Chicago Department of Economic 
Development, title. (Chicago, 1986). pp. 1-32 
(Chicago, 1987). pp. 1-7.
^ Chicago Tribune, April 27, 1987.
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Despite charges that the program was poorly 
managed and used to enrich associates of the mayor, 
the administration expanded the minority set-aside 
program in October of 1985. It did so by requiring 
all developers chosen for sites in the North Loop 
Urban Renewal Area to award 30% of their contracts for 
the design and construction of these buildings to 
minority or women-owned firms. In addition, it
requested that the developers and their future 
building tenants award 30% of their future building 
service and maintenance contracts to minority and 
women-owned firms for a period of at least five years 
following initial occupancy. It was estimated that 
this action by the city in the North Loop renewal area 
increased the amount of money available to minority 
and women-owned businesses by as much as $160 
million.^ In announcing this program, the city 
stated its intention to make such requirements a part 
of all future development agreements.
Influenced by the city's aggressive approach to 
minority purchasing, the Chicago Board of Education 
voted in 1986 to establish a minority set-aside 
program similar to that developed by the City of
■^McCarron, John "Minority Goal For North Loop: 
City Applies 30% Rule to Contractors," Chicago 
Tribune, October 27, 1985, Section 1, p. 12.
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Chicago. An October 23, 1986 Chicago Tribune article
described the program in the following manner,
By a 9-0 vote, the board ordered 30% of the 
dollar amount of all contracts requiring 
competitive bidding to go to minorities and 
women and 40% of all no-bid contracts to go 
to minorities and women. Under both types 
of contracts, women must get at least 5% of 
the dollar amount, according to the new 
rules.
3. First Source Hiring
In keeping with the administration’s focus on job 
creation, the Departments of Planning and Economic 
Development explored various ways of using the city’s 
zoning, condemnation, and funding powers to encourage 
developers to hire unemployed Chicagoans on their 
projects. Initially, the city sought to achieve this 
goal through its First Source hiring program. Under 
this program, any developer receiving city assistance 
or subsidy on a project was required to use referrals 
made by the Mayor’s Office of Employment and Training 
(MET) as their first source of job applicants for 
entry level positions. The Chicago Works Together: 
1984 Chicago Development Plan described this 
initiative in the following manner,
l^jack Houston, "Minorities to Get 30% Share of 
Bids," Chicago Tribune, October 23, 1987, Section 1,
p. 1, 8.
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To make MET the first source of job 
referrals and placements of Chicago 
residents into private sector jobs generated 
through community or economic development 
projects subsidized in whole or in part 
with public funds. An employee who receives 
a subsidized grant or loan is required to 
use MET as a first source of employment 
referral for any job created through that 
subsidy.^
Through the First Source Program, the city sought 
to require all subsidized developers to list entry 
level jobs with the Mayor's Office of Employment and 
Training (MET), on an exclusive basis, for a period of 
two weeks and to grant interviews to those they deemed 
qualified. The program did not, however, require 
employers to hire those referred by the city. The 
First Source hiring policy, as implemented in the 
early part of the Washington administration, was 
described by Joel Werth of the Department of Housing 
in this way,
It's not mandatory. We are simply providing 
a list of entry level workers to the 
developers and to the contractors. While 
there is some sort of obligation, it's sort 
of like the right of first refusal. You 
have to hire from the list. If you can't 
get the people that you need from the list, 
then you can go out and get them from some 
other source, your own sources. So it is an
l^City of Chicago. Department of Economic 
Development, 1984. "Chicago Works Together"; 1984 
Chicago Development Plan. City of Chicago, p. 48.
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opportunity, it's not mandatory- although, 
of course, if we could do so, it would 
probably be more successful.1^
In general, all downtown developers seeking city 
assistance in the form of land assemblage, grants, 
loans, or zoning bonuses were required to participate 
in the program. Frequently, their participation in 
the program was included as a provision in the 
development agreement, loan agreement, or zoning 
variance which they sought from the city. Thus, while 
the City Council never specifically enacted an 
ordinance establishing the program, they did approve 
development agreements, loan agreements, and zoning 
variances which included such provisions.
While an expansion of the program was recommended 
by the Mayor’s Advisory Committee on Linked 
Development in September of 1985, this suggestion was 
not immediately acted upon by the mayor or City 
Council. The Advisory Committee had proposed that the 
program be expanded in two important ways. First, 
they recommended that firms be required to list 
technical, managerial and professional openings with 
the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training. 
Second, they wanted First Source hiring agreements to *28
^Interview with Joel Werth, Director of 
Planning, Department of Housing, City of Chicago, July
28, 1987, Chicago, Illinois.
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be applicable to all future tenants of downtown office
buildings constructed with municipal assistance.
Despite the popularity of the First Source
program with community and labor organizations, the
majority bloc of the City Council and many businessmen
opposed the program. Aldermen Edward Vrdolyak and
Edward Burke claimed the program would create a large
"patronage army." They strongly objected to any
proposal requiring private employers to use the
Mayor’s Office of Employment and Training as a job
source, claiming it would result in increased
patronage power for the mayor, the implicit
assumption being that only supporters of the mayor
would be placed in jobs by his agency. A longtime
City Council aide described the basis of the majority
bloc's opposition somewhat differently,
First Source isn't exactly popular among 
minority aldermen because they would much 
rather work among their own community groups 
so that they can demonstrate that they are 
delivering jobs for them.
In addition, they criticized what they called the 
program's racial and income bias. By establishing 
local MET offices in predominantly lower income areas, 
they claimed the mayor was skewing the benefits of the 
program to his political supporters in the black 
community at the expense of their white ethnic
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constituencies. Gary Chico, legislative aide to the
former chairman of the City Council Finance Committee,
Edward Burke made this point in the following way,
All of the intake centers are located in 
very low income areas and that, ironically, 
coincides with the mayor’s constituency.
The willingness of their side was probably 
not there to come and open the program up to 
the Southwest and Northwest Sides of the 
city, who probably oppose the mayor more 
than they support him.-1-®
Finally, the majority bloc aldermen criticized the
program because it was never subjected to City Council
review and had not been legislatively established by
ordinance. Gary Chico described the implementation of
the First Source program in these words,
We had some serious questions about First 
Source hiring because we felt that, rather 
than appear for the first time to the City 
Council as a rider on a loan agreement, the 
entire concept ought to have hearings. . .
We had absolutely no input. It was put through by way of the back door.19
The program also came under attack from the
development community. First, they raised questions
about the ability of the Mayor's Office of Employment
and Training to administer such a large jobs program.
This point was forcefully raised in a press release *27
Interview with Gary Chico, Legislative Aide, 
City Council Finance Committee, City of Chicago, July
27, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
19interview with Gary Chico.
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issued in September of 1985 by the Chicago Association
of Commerce and Industry,
Last year, employment increased by 64,000 
jobs in Chicago. If only 10% of these jobs 
were covered by First Source provisions, how 
many additional dollars would MET need to 
fund and staff a program to handle these 
referrals?"
Other opponents of the First Source hiring policy 
cited the MET's poor performance in implementing the 
Dislocated Workers’ Program funded by the Job Training 
and Partnership Act (JTPA) in arguing against the 
program. Serious criticisms of the agency's handling 
of this JTPA program are summarized in the following 
excerpt of a Chicago Tribune article written by John 
Ziemba,
Chicago spends an average of $1,200 to 
retrain a dislocated worker, almost twice 
the average $680 spent state-wide, the study 
says. Despite the high cost for each 
trainee, only 23% of the 1,433 people 
enrolled in the city’s program last year 
found jobs, the lowest rate of all areas 
administered by the program in Illinois.^0
Second, they felt the proposal to obligate future
tenants of subsidized office buildings to participate
in the program would serve to accentuate the existing
competitive disadvantage of the Loop compared to
suburban office center locations. They also suggested
20john Ziemba, "Job Training Under New 
Federalism,: Chicago Tribune, October 10, 1985,
Section 1, pp. 1, 20.
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that such agreements had the potential of violating
existing collective bargaining agreements between
employers and unions* Furthermore, businessmen
criticized the program based upon its potential
patronage consequences. In a statement made by the
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, the
problem was described in the following manner,
This ’First Source* idea creates the 
potential for the most incredible patronage 
army since the concept of patronage was 
invented. It is chilling to consider the 
abuse that might come from either the ward 
level or from the city level. Employers, 
particularly the small ones, would be 
vulnerable to all sorts of potential 
harassment and pressures if they were 
required to list entry level openings with the city. 21-
Finally, the program was criticized by some 
businessmen because it impinged upon the traditional 
managerial right of hiring and firing. Mike Thom, 
Director of Governmental Relations for the CACI, made 
that point in the following way, "As long as it is 
mandatory, we are opposed to it."
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the 
administration implemented its program by means of 
provisions included in development and loan 
agreements. Furthermore, in January of 1987, the
2^Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 
Press Release, p. 7.
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mayor signed an executive order requiring that job 
preference be given to unemployed Chicago residents on 
all private projects receiving municipal subsidies.^2 
This initiative of the mayor is described in the 
following excerpt from a Crain's Chicago Business 
article,
Mayor Harold Washington has signed an 
executive order mandating that virtually 
all companies that sell to the city or 
obtain financial incentives from the city 
consider hirina employees referred to them 
from City Hall
The program was expected to generate 1,000 additional
jobs in its first year and more than 10,000 jobs
during its first three years, thus making the 'Chicago
First' hiring program one of the largest municipal
jobs program in the country. The Executive Order 87-1
which established the program stated,
To fully implement the Chicago First 
Program, every City department initiating 
the financial or other economic development 
assistance arrangement with a prospective 
City-assisted Employer is charged with the 
responsibility of identifying appropriate 
loans, bonds, grants, contracts, leases, and 
regulatory variances which have a 
significant impact on job availability, 
which make participation in the Chicago 
First Program feasible for the City and the 
City- assisted Employer; formulating
^City of Chicago, Mayor's Office, Executive 
Order 87-1: Chicago First Program. (Chicago, 1987).
^ " C h i c a g o  First Hiring Program," Crain's 
Chicago Business, January 18, 1987. p. 1.
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effective incentive/penalty provisions 
appropriate to their particular financial or 
other economic development assistance 
arrangement; negotiating a Chicago First 
Agreement with such prospective Employers as 
a condition of the granting of such 
assistance; and for including the Mayor's 
Office of Employment and Training and the 
Department of Personnel in the negotiation process. 4^
4. The Local Industrial Retention 
Initiative (LIRI)
One of the major themes of the Washington 
administration's approach to economic development was 
the importance of maintaining the city's industrial 
base. From the time it first took office, the
Washington administration conducted research to 
evaluate the effectiveness of past industrial 
retention efforts, such as industrial revenue bonds. 
It also included, for the first time, industrial 
streets among improvements to be funded by the city's 
general obligation bonds. Furthermore, it developed 
an early warning system to identify industrial firms 
which were at risk for shutdowns in order to give 
local officials an opportunity to take preventative 
actions.
In addition to the aggressive action it took to
2^City of Chicago, Mayor's Office. Executive 
Order 87-1; Chicago First Program. (Chicago, 1987), 
pp. 1, 2.
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prevent the closing of the Hasbro Milton Inc.’s 
Playskool facility, the administration moved swiftly 
to attempt to keep the Ekco Product Group Inc. 1 s Ekco 
Housewares factory open. The city responded to the 
Ekco plant closing announcement by attempting to bring 
together all the parties that could assist the firm in 
staying in Chicago. The efforts of the city's
Economic Development Commission’s Chairman Ron Gidwitz 
in this regard were described by Daniel Elser in his 
June 16, 1986 Chicago Tribune article,
. Gidwitz has thrown himself into an effort to 
save 500 manufacturing jobs at Ekco 
Housewares Inc. on the Northwest Side. 
Citing the high cost of labor, utilities, 
and taxes, Ecko announced in March its 
intention to move to Sedalia, Missouri. 
Gidwitz brought together company officials 
and leaders of Teamsters Local 714, the 
Illinois Department of Commerce and 
Community Affairs, and the Greater North 
Pulaski Development Corporation to see if a 
resolution could be worked out. 'Ron put us 
in contact with the key people, ' said A1 
Rabin, Vice-President of Marketing at Ecko.
*I am not sure we wouldn't have found these 
people ourselves, but we are talking.^5
As a result of this process, labor concessions and a
finance package were developed that permitted a local
management buyout of the firm which allowed it to
continue to operate.
^Daniel Elser, "Gidwitz Carries Ball For 
Chicago Businesses," Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1986, 
pp. 6, 7.
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In addition to these activities, the city formed 
a number of taskforces to examine the future of 
specific industrial sectors in the city. In its first 
term, the city’s Department of Economic Development 
analyzed the status of Chicago's steel-making and 
apparel industries. In addition, it provided the 
Center for Urban Economic Development with partial 
funding in order to study the future of the Chicago 
printing industry. A recent article on the Chicago 
industrial taskforces described their contribution to
the local economic development planning process in the 
following way,
By including more diverse membership and 
social values, Chicago's task forces have 
challenged assumptions about the problems 
and future of manufacturing in Chicago, 
developed innovative strategies and directed 
implementation, fostered a culture of joint 
problem-solving and increased public
a w a r e n e s s  about 
development.^6 local e c o n o m i c
Finally, the city launched an aggressive new 
outreach effort among industrial firms aimed at
helping them address problems which threatened their
continued operation and expansion within Chicago. The 
Local Industrial Retention Initiative (LIRI) was
^^Stephen Alexander, Robert Giloth and Joshua 
Lerner, "Chicago's Industrial Task Forces: Joint 
Problem Solving For Local Economic Development," 
Economic Development Quarterly, Volume 1, Number 4, 
November 1987, pp. 352-357.
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unique in that it utilized local development
corporations to carry out its activities. Each week,
trained staff from eight community-based development
corporations visited local manufacturing firms in
order to become more knowledgeable about their needs
and to explain the many public programs available to
assist local manufacturers. Jim Lemonides, Executive
Director of the Greater North Pulaski Development
Corporation described his group’s participation in the
program in these words,
Around July of 1984 we were at the point 
where we thought we could handle the 
administration of one of the city's own 
programs out here in the neighborhood. And 
so we became a pilot group through which the 
so-called Local Industrial Retention 
Initiative was instituted. In a nutshell, 
that program involves personal contact and 
outreach to area industrialists to a.) find 
out what is troubling them; b. ) find out if 
they are in danger of shutting their doors, 
and c. ) marketing the city’s programs, 
especially their employment and training 
efforts. Just give them the welcome wagon 
kind of approach. Previously, the city had 
eight staff people doing that program for 
the entire city, responsibility for 
contacting about 8,000 industries a year 
which just wasn't feasible. And so, on a 
trial basis, they farmed the program out to 
us for our 9 square mile area, gave us 
responsibility for making 720 contacts. We 
already had loan packaging capability here.
We had a network of political, business and 
financial people that were rooted in this 
neighborhood and the program was successful 
enough so that it has been spun off. Now it 
has been spun off to about 5 other LIRI 
groups which represent a network of 
neighborhood based organizations committed
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to intervention. It has spawned a lot of 
good development deals, a lot of 
neighborhood hiring and that kind of 
thing.2/
In the program’s first year of operation, it 
succeeded in reaching many more firms than the 
previously centralized program had. As a result, the 
program succeeded in identifying a number of firms in 
each neighborhood which were planning to relocate 
outside of the city due to space or labor problems. 
Both Augustino Olivero of the 18th Street Development 
Corporation and Jim Lemonides of the Greater North 
Pulaski Development Corporation said there were firms 
from their areas that were now working with the city 
to identify suitable relocation sites within the City 
of Chicago rather than moving.
As a result of this program, the city’s funding 
of the Greater North Pulaski Development Corporation 
increased from $25,000 to $65,000 annually. 
Lemonides, who directs this LDC, says participation in 
the program has had a number of important positive 
outcomes for his organization. First, it 
institutionalized industrial outreach at the GNPDC, 
which had historically focused upon the stabilization
^interview with Jim Lemonides, Executive 
Director, Greater North Pulaski Development 
Corporation, July 28, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
168
and redevelopment of neighborhood-based commercial
strips. Second, it enabled the GNPDC, in conjunction
with the Department of Economic Development, to
develop an initial early warning system to guard
against plant closings. Third, participation in the
program helped the GNPDC in establishing closer
working relations with the city, which made municipal
decision-makers more sensitive to the needs of
neighborhood-based industrial organizations. Finally,
the program contributed to enhancing the understanding
LDC staff members have of the development process,
particularly as it affects industrial firms.
Arturo Vazquez, former Deputy Commissioner of
Economic Development and Director of the Mayor1s
Office of Employment and Training, described another
benefit of the LIRI Program which he oversaw during
his tenure in the Department of Economic Development,
Many of the qualitative benefits of the 
program are quite important, when you look 
at local leadership in terms of industrial 
retention and expansion. There is an 
expansion in the numbers of informed people 
across the city that are really dealing with 
and augmenting the resources the city has to work with.28
Vazquez went on to say that there is now a new
^Interview with Arturo Vazquez, Deputy 
Commissioner of Economic Development, Department of 
Economic Development, City of Chicago, July 28, 1986, 
Chicago, Illinois.
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political constituency which understands the 
importance of maintaining the city's industrial base 
and which now has more knowledge and skills to do so 
ef fectively.
The decentralized Local Industrial Retention 
Initiative appears significant for two reasons. 
First, it represented the Washington administration's 
commitment to maintaining the city's manufacturing 
sector. The administration's interest in this 
industrial sector appeared clear to many of Chicago's 
industrialists with whom I spoke. June LaVelle 
stated,
He (Robert Mier) is the only one we have 
seen that is making a commitment of dollars 
and assistance to doing industrial retention 
and he is not smoke stack chasing. They 
know that doesn' t work. The know they have 
to retain the ten and twenty-man shops, 
little metal shops and woodworking out­fits. . .29
Second, it represented a vigorous new commitment 
towards building the organizational capacity of 
community-based development organizations. The 
Washington administration was committed to providing 
funding and technical assistance aimed at increasing 
the ability of local development corporations and
29jnterview with June Lavelle, Manager, 
Northwest Side Industrial Council, July 29, 1986,
Chicago, Illinois.
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community based organizations to enter into 
partnerships with developers to execute large scale 
projects and to cooperate with the public sector to 
co-produce or subcontract for the delivery of 
important municipal services, as is the case in the 
industrial retention area.
It attempted to strengthen the organizational 
capacity of community organizations in a number of 
important ways. First, the Washington administration 
significantly increased funding for community-based 
development organizations. It expanded the number of 
programs being funded and increased the amounts 
provided to such groups* As of 1986, the Department 
of Economic Development was supporting some 99 housing 
and development organizations. The city's support for 
these groups more than doubled and the number being 
assisted increased from 115 to over 200 during the 
first term of Mayor Washington.
Municipal funding was also provided, at critical 
times, to city-wide organizations which strongly 
advocated neighborhood-oriented development 
strategies. The Washington administration provided 
support for the Chicago Workshop on Economic 
Development (CWED) to examine the potential 
contribution city purchasing power could make towards
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neighborhood job creation. This assistance permitted 
CWED to hire its first full-time community organizer. 
The administration also provided support to the 
Chicago Jobs Coalition for research into "First 
Source" hiring programs. This support enabled the 
coalition to hire staff and maintain its activities. 
Finally, the city provided support to the Center For 
Neighborhood Technology to enable it to conduct 
research into alternative methods of solid waste 
disposal for electroplating establishments. This aid 
was very important to the maintenance of this city­
wide technical assistance organization.
Under Washington, the city's approach to 
providing funding to community organizations changed 
dramatically from that of past administrations. 
Historically, the city offered seed money to 
community organizations to assist in their 
establishment. Such financial assistance was short­
term and its amount tended to decrease over time in 
the belief that this approach would encourage 
financial and organizational self-sufficiency. The 
Washington administration's approach to funding 
community groups was very different and was described 
in the following way by Arturo Vazquez, former Deputy 
Commissioner of Economic Development,
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The policy was changed to an incentive 
policy that established a floor for funding 
so that every community organization would 
be able to hire a staff person and a part- 
time secretary. And then we said ’the more 
you do, the more you get. ’ So we 
established two other levels that increased 
the funding as they worked up their 
capacity. We also established a program of 
organizational support to provide technical 
assistance and training to local 
organizations who had reached their capacity 
and then developed a whole series of 
seminars that gave them information on all 
of our programs.^0
Jim Lemonides, Executive Director of the Greater North 
Pulaski Development Corporation, described the 
Department of Economic Development's approach to 
funding community-based development corporations in 
these words,
The previous administration said, ’We ought 
to cut off groups that have the capacity and 
make them stand on their own two feet.' Rob 
Mier’s philosophy was that those groups that 
have the sophistication and capability at 
the neighborhood level should get more of 
our support and be encouraged to develop 
their own program to a greater extent.
To assist organizations in moving through the
three developmental stages described briefly by former
Deputy Commissioner of Economic Development, Vazquez,
the Mayor’s Office of Technical Services worked
closely with community groups in helping them
^Interview with Art Vazquez. 
^Interview with Jim Lemonides.
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establish representative boards, clear goals and 
objectives, strategic planning capabilities, better 
financial planning systems and improved managerial 
practices. Specifically, the city attempted to 
provide technical assistance to enhance the 
organizational, neighborhood economic development and 
project development capacity of Chicago’s local 
development corporation network.^2 Toward this end, 
the Department of Economic Development funded the 
Institute of Cultural Affairs to run a series of 
strategic planning and organizational development 
workshops. The Institute drew on the expertise of 
Professor Wim Wiewal of the University of Illinois at 
Chicago’s Center For Urban Economic Development for 
assistance. While some community groups asked the 
Department of Economic Development to focus more of 
its technical assistance on development financing and 
loan packaging workshops and bristled at the city’s 
requirement of a three-year strategic plan for all 
funded groups, the LDC staff members I spoke with felt 
very positively about the assistance they received.
While a definitive analysis of the effectiveness 
of these efforts requires more time, many civic
3^City 0f Chicago, Department of Economic 
Development. Technical Assistance to Businesses and 
Development Organizations. (Chicago, 1986).
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leaders have indicated that they appear to be working.
According to Edward Lawrence of the Urban Investment
and Development Company,
They are starting to create community 
institutions, and a lot of them have shown 
strong performance in the commercial, 
mercantile and organizational areas.33
There also appear to be at least some examples of
LDC ’ s which have received support from the city being
accepted as partners by developers on new projects.
In 1986, the GNPDC worked closely with the Chicago
commercial developer Harry Chaddick in formulating
redevelopment plans for the abandoned Playskool
factory site while a South Austin development
organization worked with another private developer to
plan for the re-use of the Sunbeam factory site. Both
projects were aimed at redeveloping these facilities
for manufacturing purposes.
The administration was also committed to
expanding its use of community organizations for the
delivery of basic municipal services. In addition to
the Department of Economic Development’s industrial
retention program, the Department of Housing utilized
community organizations as "delegate agencies" in 3
33 interview with Mr. Edward Lawrence, Economic 
Development Investment Company, March 11, 1986.
Chicago, Illinois.
order to implement an early warning system for 
residential housing abandonment and to provide basic 
energy conservation information and financing to 
neighborhood residents.
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VI. New Policy Initiatives Debated
In addition to the Buy Chicago, Minority Business 
Enterprise, Chicago First and Local Industrial 
Retention Initiative Programs, the Washington 
administration struggled to implement other economic 
development policies aimed at achieving the goals of 
the "Chicago Works Together": 1984 Development Plan.
Among those initiatives were linked development, 
general obligation bonding for neighborhood 
infrastructure improvements, and various new forms of 
citizen participation. While a general obligation 
bond was approved by the City Council in 1985, 
ordinances establishing linked development and first 
source hiring policies were never passed. However, 
the administration did implement these policies, in 
some cases, by including such provisions in newly 
signed development agreements which were approved by 
the City Council. This was particularly true of 
projects planned for parcels 16 and 17 in the North 
Loop Urban Renewal Area.
A. General Obligation Bonding and the 
Neighborhood Investment Program
Recognizing the need to make significant new 
capital improvements in the residential neighborhoods 
outside of the Loop, the Washington administration
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proposed a general obligation bond to the City Council 
in June of 1984. The proposed general obligation bond 
would have funded, among other things, such 
activities as road construction and repair, street and 
sidewalk lighting, sewer installations, reconstruction 
of vaulted sidewalks, repairs to Navy Pier, and new 
municipal facilities.^
Approval of the general obligation bond was 
sought because the city had been unable, given its 
capital budget, to keep elements of the public 
infrastructure in good repair. Antiquated 
infrastructure facilities, such as low railroad and 
street overpasses, frequently added considerable 
distances to the shipping bills of Chicago-produced 
manufacturing products, undermining their competitive 
position in the world marketplace. The low interest 
rates in 1984 also provided the city with an 
opportunity to refinance its 1982 general obligation 
debt while securing additional financing to make new 
improvements.
City Council approval for the new general
■^Vaulted sidewalks are a Chicago phenomena which 
appear in certain residential areas built upon marshy 
lands. As a result of repeated resurfacing of streets 
and sidewalks, in these areas, people's homes now 
appear to be substantially below the street grade. 
Sidewalks in these areas need continuous reinforcement 
if they are to remain structurally sound.
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obligation bond was sought for these improvements 
because it gave the city greater discretion in the use 
of its funds than other financial instruments. 
General obligation funds were preferable, for 
instance, to revenue bonds which could only be used 
for improvements related to revenue producing 
facilities for which income streams could be dedicated 
to retiring such bonds. For example, revenue bonds 
used to make improvements in mass transit systems were 
often secured by projected income from fare boxes. 
Revenue bonds for municipal recreational facilities 
such as beaches or golf courses were often secured by 
projected income from admissions or entrance fees. 
Such instruments were not available for the funding of 
a neighborhood infrastructure program.
Despite the logic of the administration's 
request, the proposal was not acted upon by the 
Finance Committee of the City Council. The committee, 
which was chaired by a Washington opponent, Alderman 
Edward Burke, refused to hold hearings on the measure 
and tabled the proposal after its second reading 
before his committee. The Finance Committee also 
refused to take action on the re-introduced version of 
the measure in May of 1985. The opposition argued 
against the measure stating that it was poorly
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conceived and would increase property taxes for those 
owning homes assessed at $60,000 by more than $18 a 
year.
With falling interest rates undermining the 
opposition's arguments and with the encouragement of 
his staff, the mayor decided in 1985 to make the City 
Council's failure to act on his general obligation 
bond request a public issue. The mayor did this by 
means of a well planned and orchestrated media and 
community organizing campaign. First, the 
administration developed a basic brochure which 
described the 1985 General Obligation Bond Program and 
its benefits to neighborhoods and suggested ways 
individuals could support its passage through the 
City Council.^ The brochure described the work to be 
done in the neighborhoods, the low cost to homeowners, 
the added costs of delaying the bond issue, and the 
input citizens could have in shaping the list of 
improvements to be completed in each neighborhood. 
Second, the Mayor planned and led a series of 
neighborhood bus tours with Council members and the 
press aimed at highlighting the need for such a 
program as well as its potential benefits. Irene
^City of Chicago. Department of Planning. 1985 
"The 1985 General Obligation Bond Program," 
Informational brochure, City of Chicago.
180
Sherr, former Assistant to the Commissioner of 
Economic Development, described the first tour and its 
impact upon one alderman opposed to the program in 
this way,
Rob Mier and Brenda Gaines came up with this 
idea to get the mayor, aldermen, 
legislators, and the press on a bus to show 
them what the problems were. The first area 
visited was the Southwest Side in Alderman 
Sheahan's ward. He had the largest single 
amount of projects in the General Obligation 
Bond, about $7 or $8 million just in his 
ward. Once they went out there, people just 
poured out of their homes and started 
talking to the mayor, saying ’This is great, 
we want our streets repaired. ' One by one, 
all four of the aldermen on the bus said 
they backed it (The General Obligation 
Bond). Once that happened, Alderman Burke 
came out with a statement, ’As long as we 
see a full list of the projects, we’re all 
going to consider this.
On a specially equipped, $50,000 tour bus donated
by Citicorp, the mayor led as many as three
neighborhood tours a day to build support for the
passage of the general obligation bond which he
referred to as the "Neighborhood Investment Program."
Sherr described the bus tours and the Mayor' s media
campaign in the following way,
It (the bus) was perfect. It could hold the 
mayor, the press and a few other people.
The mayor made three tours a day. Everyone 
would pile into the bus. It made great news
3Interview with Irene Sherr, Assistant to the 
Commissioner of Economic Development, City of Chicago, 
October 11, 1985, Chicago Illinois.
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stuff. It gave the reporters a chance to 
talk with the commissioners. People got a 
sense of what the issues were. We got 
positive press coverage, so tours were 
planned for the Southwest Side and another 
tour for the Northwest Side. In each place 
they tried to visit a range of projects- an 
industrial street, a vaulted sidewalk, a 
cave-in in front of a nun’s house. All 
these great things were happening just as 
the $125 million General Obligation Bond was 
in the Finance Committee.^
Third, the mayor and the commissioners made a 
concerted effort to speak to as many business, 
community, labor and church groups as possible about 
the merits of the program, urging them to contact 
their alderman to ask for support of the measure.
Influenced by the positive publicity generated by 
Washington’s "road show" and growing community support 
for the general obligation bond, the majority bloc in 
the Council reversed itself and decided to support the 
bond program. In addition, the 29 opponents of the 
Mayor decided to add their own projects for their 
wards to the list of planned activities. The mayor's 
21 supporters were then under political pressure to do 
likewise. They could not afford to be portrayed as 
being less aggressive than the mayor’s opponents in 
seeking help for their individual wards. These 
additions to the program pushed its total cost to over
^Interview with Irene Sherr.
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$200 million. The administration felt this figure was
more than the city could afford to spend. Therefore,
the mayor directed staff from the Departments of
Public Works and Economic Development, along with
representatives of the Mayor's Office of Budget and
Management, to review all funding requests made by the
City Council. Having done so, the mayor then asked
staff from the Finance Committee to join his own staff
in individually negotiating each alderman's set of
requests. The goal of these negotiations was to
reduce the cost of the program while insuring its
passage. Irene Sherr described the outcome of this
process in the following way,
Eventually, it was all negotiated out and we 
ended up with a $185 million bond issue. So 
it passed at the end of August. The mayor 
was able to get much support because it was 
practically impossible for an alderman to 
say he was against it when the public had 
the sense that it was just a mom and apple 
pie thing in which everyone got something.^
Among items included in the 1985 General 
Obligation Bond were $18 million for the partial 
renovation of Navy Pier, $950,000 for repairs to fire­
fighting facilities, $9,590,000 for new municipal 
office buildings, $940,000 for police department
interview with Irene Sherr, Assistant to the 
Commissioner of Economic Development, City of Chicago, 
October 7, 1985, Chicago, Illinois.
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facilities, $27,750,000 for sewer installations, and 
more than $105,590,000 for neighborhood infrastructure
improvements.
According to Dave Mosena of the Department of 
Planning,
The General Obligation Bond Program that we 
just passed last summer is the first general 
obligation bond that we issued this term.
It spent over a year in the City Council 
before it was finally approved. It was 60%, 
maybe it was 70%, even 80% neighborhood 
improvements. It was very much a 
neighborhood capital re-investment program of $185 million.^
Specifically, the 1985 General Obligation Bond Program 
funded the types of neighborhood improvements listed 
in the table on the following page.^
While the mayor was generally praised for taking 
the initiative for proposing and fighting for the 
approval of the general obligation bond, his capital 
planning record was not without its critics. Among 
the most vocal opponents of the administration’s
^Interview with Dave Mosena, Department of 
Planning, City of Chicago, June 25, 1986, Chicago,
Illinois.
^City of Chicago. Department of Planning. 
1985. ”1985 General Obligation Bond Program Detail: 
Final Allocations," City of Chicago, pp. 1, 2.
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Table: 6.1
1985 General Obligation Bond Detail: 
Neighborhood Infrastructure Expenditures
A. Lighting Expenditures: 
Replace 50,000 Street 
and Alley Lights 
Replace Obsolete Lane 
Control Signals 
Replace Rusted Street 
Light Poles
Replacement of Trolley 
Poles
Installation/Replacement 
of Traffic Signals
1,000,000
50,000
1,400,000
350,000
5,000,000
B. Streets and Sidewalk Expenditures: 
Alley Construction Citywide 
New Street Construction 
(WPA Streets)
Residential Street Resurfacing 
Vaulted Sidewalk Reconstruction 
50/50 Sidewalk Program 
Industrial Street/Business 
Area Improve.
Viaduct Repair/Reconstruction 
Centerline Drainage 
Lakefront Protection
1,300,000
22,751,500
40.560.000
11.100.000
3.000. 000
14,775,000
2,104,500
2.000. 000 
200,000
Neighborhood Infrastructure
Program Subtotal $105,591,000
capital planning and spending activities was John L. 
Greer, a researcher with the Center For Urban Research 
and Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, whose 
study Capital Investments in Chicago; Fragmented 
Process, Unequal Options was extremely critical of the
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city's program.®
Based upon an analysis of the spatial 
distribution of the administration's proposed $3.2 
billion capital spending program for the years 1985 to 
1989, Greer asserted that,
The City of Chicago is a partner and active
According to Greer, the city planned to spend $739 
million on O'Hare improvements over the next five 
years and $459 million on improvements in the Loop. 
During this same period, the city planned to spend $1 
billion on transportation projects throughout the 
city. However, only $1 billion was allocated for 
neighborhood improvements. Greer described the city's 
capital spending approach in the following way,
®James L. Greer, Capital Investments in Chicago: 
Fragmented Process, Unequal Options. Center for Urban 
Research and Policy Studies, University of Chicago, 
(Chicago, 1986).
9 John McCarron, "O'Hare, Loop Eat Up Repair 
Funds," Chicago Tribune, July 7, 1986, Section 2, pp. 
1, 4 .
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The city’s planned capital program provides 
for extensive development in a few areas in 
Chicago, notably O'Hare Airport and the 
Loop, while Chicago’s neighborhoods will be 
the recipients of only a minimal level of 
public investments.^
Greer argued that neighborhood programs were so small 
that they served only a maintenance function, while 
downtown and airport investments were large enough to 
leverage private investment and thus serve a genuine 
economic development purpose. Furthermore, Greer 
noted that the distribution of the proposed 
neighborhood investments was quite inequitable. While 
a few community areas would receive as much as $40 
million in infrastructure improvements during the next 
five years, over 50 community areas would receive less 
than $10 million in public investments during this 
period.
Greer's research suggested that a gulf existed 
between the Washington administration's rhetoric and 
its actions. While the administration’s 1984 
development plan called for actions aimed at 
establishing a pattern of "balanced growth" within the 
city, the administration continued, according to 
Greer, to concentrate public investments in areas that
lOjames L. Greer, Capital Investments in 
Chicago: Fragmented Process, Unequal Options. Center 
for Urban Research and Policy Studies, University of 
Chicago, (Chicago, 1986) p. 1.
187
didn't appear to need such assistance, namely the 
downtown and airport areas.
To remedy the situation, Greer called for the 
development of an integrated, interdepartmental 
approach to capital planning. The City of Chicago had 
historically permitted each department to develop, in 
isolation, its own capital plans. These proposals 
were then compiled into one document; however, they 
were not integrated in a manner that required each 
public investment to be mutually reinforcing of the 
city's overall development goals. Greer also 
recommended increasing the city's investments in its 
residential neighborhoods while reducing its 
commitment to the Loop and O'Hare. Finally, he called 
for greater citizen participation in capital planning, 
arguing for the establishment of a New York-styled 
system of community boards which would advise the city 
on capital spending priorities.
Greer was also critical of the 1984 General 
Obligation Bond Program which he suggested was 
influenced more by politics than by community needs. 
He criticized the proposal to disburse improvements 
throughout the 50 wards of the city, arguing that 
some were more needy than others. He was particularly 
critical of the proposal to pave 5 miles of roads
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within every ward. He also criticized the vague 
nature of the plan. He felt the Mayor's Neighborhoods 
Improvement Program should have specified the 
location of each improvement to be made instead of 
leaving the final negotiations of the improvements up 
to the affected city agency, aldermen and community 
groups. Finally, Greer attacked the plan as being 
poorly formulated, ". . . Greer doubts if the
administration had the opportunity to carefully plan 
the program to spur neighborhood development^
While the Greer report provides public finance 
novices with a helpful introduction to capital 
planning, it, unfortunately, does not provide a very 
useful analysis of the city's capital spending 
activities. This is due to a lack of clear conceptual 
thinking and a number of methodological weaknesses in 
his research design.
Greer included in his analysis of capital 
spending, revenues from general obligation bonds, 
revenue bonds and intergovernmental aid spent on 
capital improvements. This approach tends to give a 
distorted picture of the city's capital spending 
priorities because many of these revenues can only be
^ B e n  Javorsky, "A Political Scientist 
Challenges the City's Capital Improvements Budget, 
The Reader, July 18, 1986, pp. 3, 35.
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used for specific purposes. The city lacks the power 
to use many of these funds to meet infrastructure 
needs as they define them. For instance, the city may 
use its airport revenue bonds on projects related to 
activities at O ’Hare and Midway Airports; it cannot 
use such revenues for street repairs in the 
residential neighborhoods surrounding these 
transportation facilities. The city may only use its 
federal transportation funds for improvements on its 
mass transit system; it cannot use these resources to 
rehabilitate streets in areas requiring new 
infrastructure investment. By including these 
dedicated revenue sources in his analysis, Greer gives 
an inaccurate sense of the administration’s 
priorities. His criticism of the administration’s 
capital program holds it accountable for spending 
choices over which it has little or no power.
Greer's approach to analyzing the locational 
impact of infrastructure spending also appears flawed. 
In analyzing the distribution of benefits from 
infrastructure spending, Greer calculates the total 
dollar amount of public investments made in a 
particular community area. If a particular investment 
covers more than one area, he divides the dollar 
amount of the investment by the number of community
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areas it is located in and credits each community area 
with an equal amount of benefit for the investment. 
This approach equates the location of that investment 
with the benefit produced by the investment. This is 
frequently not the case. For example, according to 
Greer's method, if a large recreation center was 
located in community area X, that community area would 
be credited with the investment and assumed to be the 
sole beneficiary of the facility. If the facility 
served youngsters from the entire city, this method 
would fail to communicate the true distribution of its 
benefits.
Finally, Greer's analysis can be criticized, as 
was done by former Commissioner of Economic 
Development, Rob Mier, on the basis of its use of 
community areas for his locational analysis. These 
areas, Mier argued, are so large as to not accurately 
present the true effects of the proposed 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  p r o g r a m  upon the city's 
neighborhoods.
Thus, in spite of the criticisms raised by Greer, 
the 1985 General Obligation Bond Program appears 
noteworthy because it represented the first time 
public investments for basic infrastructure 12
12Javorsky, p. 3
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improvements in residential neighborhoods outside of 
the Loop were given priority in a general obligation 
bond offering. Typically, such bonds have been used 
to support activities in the Loop. In addition, the 
1985 General Obligation Bond was the first time such 
funding has been used to support economic development 
activities in industrial areas and commercial strips 
outside of the Loop. Among the projects funded were a 
high tech park on the University of Illinois at 
Chicago Campus, renovations at Navy Pier, improvements 
to five industrial streets and the redevelopment of 
five neighborhood retailing and commercial centers. 
Robert Mier commented upon the inclusion of these 
expenditures in the General Obligation Bond with these 
words,
I am pleased that the City Council is 
considering support for the funding of 
important economic development projects such 
as these in the General Obligation Bond. As 
far as we can tell, this is the first time 
the city has supported economic development 
capital activities in such a bond issue. In 
the past, we have relied on the federal 
government, especially the Economic 
Development Administration and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
to provide financial support for 
infrastructure improvements serving 
business areas. As we all know, these 
sources of federal funds are rapidly drying 
up, shifting the burden to the state and 
local governments. I believe that these 
modest economic development projects will 
provide a strong signal to the business 
community of the willingness of local
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government to shoulder the burden of 
c o n t i n u i n g  to p r o m o t e  e c o n o m i c  
development.
The spending priorities represented in the 1985 
General Obligation Bond reflected a real commitment on 
the part of the Washington administration to the 
preservation of residential neighborhoods and existing 
manufacturing areas. They were consistent with the 
policy objectives articulated in both The Washington 
Papers and the 1984 development plan. These
priorities stand in stark contrast to those embodied 
in past bond issues which concentrated public 
infrastructure investments in the downtown area.
Thus, the Washington administration's
Neighborhood Improvement Program, contained in the 
1985 General Obligation Bond, stands as evidence of 
the mayor's commitment to achieving a more balanced 
pattern of growth within the city. His establishment 
of a special capital planning unit within the 
Department of Planning suggested the seriousness of 
his commitment to utilizing the city's infrastructure 
spending as a redistributional tool aimed at achieving
l^City of Chicago. Department of Economic
Development. 1985. "Statement on Economic
Development Projects in the General Obligation Bond," 
statement made by Commissioner Rob Mier before the 
Finance Committee, City Council, City of Chicago, 
August, 1985, pp. 1, 2.
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this outcome. The administration was not successful 
in developing an institutionalized mechanism for 
eliciting citizen input, on an ongoing basis, on these 
capital spending decisions.
B. Linking Neighborhood Needs to Downtown 
Resources
Following the election of Harold Washington as 
Chicago's first black mayor, leaders of Chicago's 
white ethnic communities began voicing fears regarding 
the future of their neighborhoods. Many community 
leaders in these areas were certain that Washington 
would give preference to the needs of his own ethnic 
community at their expense, as Daley, Bilandic and 
Byrne had done before him. These feelings were 
particularly strong in the wards on Chicago's 
Northwest and Southwest Sides represented by the 
"majority bloc" controlled by Aldermen Edward Vrdolyak 
and Edward Burke.
These concerns were transformed into action in 
the early months of 1984 when leaders of the Northwest 
Neighborhood Federation and the Southwest Neighborhood 
and Parish Federation came together to form a new 
coalition called the Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our 
City Coalition (SON/SOCC) aimed at advancing the 
concerns of the city's working class, white ethnic
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neighborhoods.-^ The name of the coalition was
strikingly similar to the call which local Democratic
leader Vrdolyak had made in 1983 to white precinct
workers to labor hard to beat Washington. Joseph
Crutchfield, Co-Chair of SON/SOCC, described the
origins of the coalition in the following way,
It got started, I guess, after the mayoral 
election in 1983. There was a strong 
feeling in the so-called 'ethnic 
communities,' the white middle class 
community, that issues that were very 
important to the neighborhoods were really 
not being addressed. On both sides of the 
fence, whether it was the Washington 
administration or the majority bloc, the 
real issues that were important to all 
neighborhoods within the city were not being 
addressed. So, we felt that something had to be done about that.-*-5
As the new coalition's leaders were organizing
community groups to attend their first public meeting,
they released what they called "The Declaration of
Neighborhood Independence," which articulated the
group's basic political philosophy. In part, it read:
These are extraordinarily trying and 
dangerous times for Chicago. None know or 
u n d e r s t a n d  this better than the 
predominantly white ethnic neighborhoods of *15
14»Three Highlights of Chicago's Linkage 
History," Factsheet produced by Save Our 
Neighborhood/Save Our City Coalition (Chicago, 1985)
p. 1.
15Interview with Joseph Crutchfield, Co- 
Chairperson, Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our City 
Coalition, October 8, 1985, Chicago, Illinois.
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the city. Instead of the order and peace 
which we have rightfully grown to expect 
over the years, a distressing politics of 
needless conflict and mindless vengeance has 
become the order of the day. Responsibility 
for this deplorable state of affairs rests 
with the current Mayor of Chicago, Harold 
Washington. Behind the well-crafted public 
veneer of the Mayor as Charmer, Healer and 
Reformer, there thrives political 
opportunism, ready to exploit every racist 
fear and antagonism without regard to their 
dire consequences. Instead of genuine 
reaching out for the best in people, Mayor 
Washington creates and encourages situations 
and circumstances which bring out the very 
worst.16
While a number of well-known community leaders, 
including Monsignor Jack Egan of the Archdiocesan 
Office of Social Justice, criticized the strident 
rhetoric and blatant racism of SON/SOCC's call to 
action, more than 1,000 community leaders attended the 
coalition’s funding meeting on April 29, 1984. At 
this event, delegates unanimously approved the 
coalition’s "White Ethnic Agenda."^ Of the many 
items included on the agenda, the two that stirred the 
most interest were a home equity insurance proposal 
and a Boston-styled linkage program. The latter
l^Larry Bennett, "When Progressives Collide: 
Chicago's Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our City 
Coalition and the Washington Administration, " 
unpublished paper presented at the Association of 
Collegiate Planning Schools Conference, October, 1986, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pp. 19-20.
l^Bennett, p. 8.
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program has since been adopted in numerous other 
communities.
The linkage proposal called upon developers of 
large downtown office buildings to contribute $5 per 
square foot on newly constructed commercial space to a 
neighborhood improvement fund. The revenues from this 
one-time payment would be distributed among Chicago’s 
77 community areas, on a per capita basis, to be used 
for housing and economic development projects. Within 
each community area, neighborhood residents would 
determine which projects were to be funded by linkage 
dollars by means of neighborhood referenda. 
SON/SOCC’s leaders estimated that the program would 
generate, in the short term, more than $80,000,000. 
When distributed equally across all community areas 
within the city, according to the coalition’s 
proposal, each community area would receive more than 
$1,350,000 in linkage revenues.
The SON/SOCC Convention, along with its issues 
program, received a great deal of attention from the 
media. In the months following this initial forum,
l^Dennis Keating, "Linking Downtown Development 
to Broader Community Goals: An Analysis of Linkage
Policy in Three Cities," Journal of the American 
Planning Association, Volume 52, Number 2, pp. 133- 
141.
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leaders of the coalition sought support for their 
linkage proposal from other community organizations, 
the mayor, both factions of the City Council and a 
variety of civic organizations. The coalition based 
its lobbying efforts for the establishment of a 
linkage program on the following arguments. First, 
they stated that the growth of downtown’s service 
sector had caused a tightening of the city’s 
residential real estate market. According to their 
data, expanded employment within the Loop had 
increased the number of individuals needing shelter in 
a housing market in which dwelling unit losses had 
exceeded dwelling unit additions for more than a 
decade. Second, the coalition asserted that bank 
disinvestment from Chicago’s residential neighborhoods 
had funded downtown development. Third, the coalition 
claimed that the concentration of public 
infrastructure funds within the Loop and the lack of 
such investment within the city’s neighborhoods 
amounted to an office space subsidy to developers and 
corporate tenants by Chicago taxpayers. Finally, 
leaders of the coalition claimed that new employees 
securing work in the Loop's service economy were 
displacing low income workers from neighborhoods near 
the central business district, especially in the
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communities along the Lakefront.
The negative impact of downtown development and 
the neighborhood subsidy of development in the Loop, 
in the opinion of many community leaders, offered a 
compelling case for the establishment of a linked 
development program. Following the April SON/SOCC 
Conference, the concept was endorsed by a variety of 
local development corporations, affordable housing 
advocates, community activists and minority 
organizations.
On September 30, 1984, Mayor Harold Washington,
the target of SON/SOCC’s first meeting, was invited to 
address a candidates night sponsored by the group. At 
this forum, the mayor indicated his support of 
SON/SOCC’s home equity insurance and linkage 
concepts. Furthermore, he announced plans to 
establish a city-wide taskforce to explore alternative 
proposals aimed at establishing a linked development 
program in Chicago. Finally, the mayor committed 
himself to helping SON/SOCC*s work on the issue by 
providing its leadership with needed housing market 
data and technical assistance for their linkage 
research activities. The mayor indicated his support 
of SON/SOCC*s linkage initiative with the following
words
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Corporate Chicago and corporate America must 
believe that reinvestment in all of Chicago 
is good business. I want to take the 
opportunity to lend my support to the 
ambitious, but necessary neighborhood revitalization the coalition is advancing.1*
Pat Dowell, a planner from the Department of
Planning, described the genesis of linkage in Chicago 
in this way,
A number of things were going on at the same 
time. The city internally was looking at 
linkage as an economic development tool. 
The community organizations were looking at 
a linked development tax-mainly SON/SOCC and 
the housing development organizations. The 
directors of these organizations were 
formally meeting and discussing linked 
development as a housing tool. In April, 
SON/SOCC had a convention at which they 
approved on their agenda a linked 
development policy as specified in Boston. 
They were running with a strictly Boston 
program. The city jumped at it since we 
were looking at linkage ourselves and had a 
commitment to public participation as 
specified in the 1984 development plan. The 
mayor decided to form an advisory committee 
to come up with some linkage ideas, and in 
October a committee was formed.^0
SON/SOCC's success in putting their version of 
linkage on the top of the municipal development agenda 
was quite remarkable and was based upon a number of 
factors. First, many of the more radical community
1^Linda Rae Kris, "Plan Would Link Loop to 
City's Neighborhoods," Lerner Newspaper, September 19, 
1985, p. 1.
^Interview with Pat Dowell, Senior Planner, 
Department of Planning, City of Chicago, July 24, 
1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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organizations, such as The Chicago Workshop on 
Economic Development (CWED), were eager to develop a 
relationship with this white ethnic organization in 
hopes of building a powerful city-wide, multi-racial 
community movement. Therefore, they quickly moved to 
endorse the SON/SOCC linkage initiative. Second, 
SON/SOCC's strong base in the wards of the majority 
bloc aldermen made them an attractive ally for the
i
mayor. Third, the coalition was advocating a very 
specific program that people knew was functioning well 
in another city without dire consequences. Finally, 
the organization did an excellent job of mobilizing 
and expanding its political base through its work on 
the issue. SON/SOCC's leaders did extensive research 
on linkage, issued regular press statements, spoke 
frequently before other organizations, canvassed door- 
to-door on linkage, attended public hearings with 
their supporters, did mailings to educate people, 
collected pro-linkage petitions, and surveyed 
citizens' attitudes toward their proposal. Among the 
most clever organizing activities carried out by 
SON/SOCC was the distribution to organizations 
throughout the city of a questionnaire which asked 
community leaders to describe what they would do, in 
their neighborhoods, with more than $1.35 million in
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future linkage payments. The mailing generated a 
tremendous amount of interest on the part of community 
leaders in the SON/SOCC linkage program.
In the fall of 1984, Mayor Washington appointed 
21 citizens to the Advisory Committee on Linked 
Development. Among those asked to serve on the 
committee were nine community leaders, nine 
businessmen, one foundation officer, one labor leader, 
one religious leader, two aldermen, and four 
administration officials. Included among the 
appointees were Commissioners Robert Mier and 
Elizabeth Hollander, Citicorp Vice President Walter 
Clark, Monsignor Jack Egan of the Archdiocese of 
Chicago, Robert Belcaster of Tishman Speyer Properties 
Inc. and Joseph Crutchfield of SON/SOCC. From the 
committee's inception, the composition of the 
taskforce was criticized. Developers asserted that 
the committee was dominated by community activists 
while local development corporations protested their 
exclusion. In spite of these complaints, the work of 
the advisory committee proceeded through the winter 
and spring of 1984. Following months of long 
meetings, the committee decided on June 7, 1985 to
hold a public hearing on their draft linkage report. 
The report recommended the establishment of a linked
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development program with these words,
For Chicago, quality of life means 
neighborhoods with viable, interesting 
commercial areas, affordable housing, good 
schools, and good public services. It is 
for these reasons the Advisory Committee is 
recommending establishing a program that can 
invest in neighborhoods--The Linked Development Program.
As conceived by the advisory committee, the 
linked development program would fund a variety of 
housing and economic development projects in 
neighborhoods throughout the city on a first come, 
first served basis. Non-profit development 
organizations, working alone or in collaboration with 
for-profit developers, would be eligible to 
participate in the program. The fund would provide 
both loans and grants for projects that enjoyed broad 
community support but which could not proceed but for 
such financing.
While it did not specify a final set of 
recommended funding sources, the report did discuss 
the possibility of using a variety of different taxes 
to finance the program. Among these were: the
expansion of the real estate transfer tax to include 
land trusts; a $0.10 per square foot use tax on all
21city of Chicago. Department of Planning. 1985 
"Draft Report of the Advisory Committee on Linked 
Development," City of Chicago, p. 7.
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commercial space over 100,000 square feet; the 
imposition of a $10.00 per square foot exaction fee 
for all new office space constructed within the 
central business district; the elimination of the 
local property tax exemption for insurance company 
properties; and the reform of the cityfs zoning bonus 
system to permit higher floor area ratios for 
buildings when the developers contributed to a linked 
development fund.
In addition, the advisory committee report 
recommended requiring all city-assisted developments 
and their future tenants to participate in the city’s 
"First Source" hiring program. Under this program, 
affected developers and their tenants would be 
obligated to post, for a period of two weeks, all 
entry level positions with the Mayor’s Office of 
Employment and Training (MET) prior to publicly 
announcing these positions. The participating 
organizations would then be required to interview all 
properly screened job applicants referred to them by 
the city. The firms, however, would not be obligated 
to hire these individuals unless they were deemed 
qualified. In addition, the report recommended 
changes in the county tax system aimed at encouraging 
the rehabilitation of multi-family dwellings. Another
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recommendation suggested more aggressive use by the 
city, for neighborhood stabilization purposes, of the 
county's existing property tax abatement program. The 
committee's final recommendation proposed a creative 
financing mechanism aimed at expanding available 
funding for affordable housing programs involving land 
trusts. While including all these possible funding 
measures in their draft report, the committee did not 
expect that all of these tax levies would be approved 
by the mayor and City Council. They chose to present 
these proposals in their report so that all reasonable 
options for the funding of a linkage program could be 
considered.
The committee estimated that revenues from the 
complete set of proposed taxes would be approximately 
$26 million a year. Table 6.2 summarizes the expected 
annual yield from each proposed tax source.
Following the adoption of the Draft Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Linked Development on June 7, 
1985, five members of the committee, representing the 
development community, decided to issue a minority 
report attacking the report's recommendations. Chuck 
Thurow and Pat Dowell, planners representing the 
Department of Planning who helped staff the committee,
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Table 6.2
Estimated Yields From Preliminary Linkage Proposals^
Source Estimated Annual Yield
A. Real Estate Transfer 
Tax on Land Trusts $ 4,000,000
B. Use Tax $ 16,980,000
C. Exaction Fee $ 4,800,000
D. State Tax Code Changes 
for Insurance Companies $ 1,000,000
E. Zoning Incentives N/A
Total $ 26,780,000
stated that the actions of these individuals came as a 
surprise to most members of the committee. Despite 
the frequency with which community representatives on 
the panel argued for exaction fees based upon the need 
for downtown developers to make "reparations for past 
damages," the business members on the committee 
appeared somewhat oblivious to the level of resentment 
which most community representatives felt towards 
developers. The hostility felt towards developers by 
most community representatives on the panel was 
probably best communicated by the following 
description of the linkage concept by Joseph 
Crutchfield,
22Advisory Committee, p. 15.
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This is a program of retribution against 
downtown developers who have stripped 
neighborhoods, and who must be forced to pay for their past sins.23
In their 22-page document entitled, "Draft Report: The
Advisory Committee on Linked Development Draft
Minority Report on the Proposed Exaction Tax," the
five representatives of the development community
strongly criticized the draft report issued by the
majority of the committee.24 They criticized both the
content of the majority report and the process used by
the committee to formulate its recommendations.
First, they attacked the composition of the committee
and the representation offered to the business
community, asserting that the- committee was community
dominated. The minority report stated,
The majority members of the committee were 
selected primarily because of their concern 
for neighborhood development. Due to the 
fact that neighborhoods would be the 
ultimate recipient of any "linked 
development" taxes levied, it was 
preordained that the committee’s majority 
vote would favor some sort of tax on 
commercial development.25
2^Alfred S. Lanier, "Linked Development: 
Retribution, Exaction, or Cooperation," Chicago 
Enterprise (Commercial Club of Chicago, 1986) July 
1986, Volume 1, Number 1, p. 2.
2^City of Chicago. Department of Planning. 
1984 "Draft Report: The Advisory Committee on Linked
Development Draft Minority Report on the Proposed 
Exaction Tax," City of Chicago.
2^Minority Report, p. 1.
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Second, the minority report rejected claims made 
by community activists that downtown development was 
causing a general rise in residential housing costs. 
This was a crucial criticism because Illinois law 
requires clear proof of the negative impacts of a 
particular development on a community before it 
permits a local municipality to levy an impact or 
exaction fee to mitigate these effects. This legal 
requirement is powerfully stated in the following 
statement from an opinion of the City of Chicago’s 
Corporation Council.
In order to be legally defensible, the 
exaction fee approach requires establishing 
a rational relationship between the impact 
of the development being exacted and the 
party or area being impacted. According to 
Illinois case law, the relationship has to 
be 'significant and unique.1 If there is 
such a relationship, the negative impact can 
be mitigated either through direct action 
by the developer or through the nayment of 
fees targeted to resolving these.
The minority cited Chicago’s declining population,
relatively stable housing costs, and rising
residential vacancy rates to counter the majority’s
assertion that a "housing crisis" existed for which
downtown development was responsible.
2^City of Chicago. Department of Planning. 
1985. Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked 
Development: Resource Subcommittee, "Staff Report on
Exactions," City of Chicago, p. 1.
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Third, the minority rejected the suggestion made 
by linkage advocates that downtown growth contributed 
to the reduction of economic opportunities for 
Chicago's neighborhood residents. They argued 
instead that increased employment within the downtown 
service sector had made a substantial contribution to 
offsetting job losses in the neighborhood-based 
manufacturing sector. In fact, they pointed out the 
fact that some 61% of all downtown jobs went to 
residents of Chicago's neighborhoods. Thus, those in 
the minority stressed the important role which 
Chicago's booming downtown played in helping the city 
maintain its place in the national economy in spite of 
its faltering industrial sector. Finally, they 
asserted that the combined effect of the $26 million 
in new linkage related taxes would severely cripple 
the downtown commercial real estate market. This, 
they explained, would force job-producing service 
sector firms to seek locations outside of the city. 
As a result, they argued, the city would lose a 
significant number of jobs and desperately needed tax 
revenues. According to the minority report,
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The central business district (CBD), which 
includes only one percent of the city's land 
area, provides 34% of the city's jobs, 23% 
of real estate taxes and 13% of retail 
sales.
They argued against the assertion of linkage
supporters that the downtown office market was strong
and healthy by citing increasing office vacancy rates,
falling absorption rates and increasing suburban
competition. The minority report stated,
In 1985, the Chicago suburban market had 
less than a two percent share of the 
metropolitan market. Ninety-eight percent 
of the share was centered in the central 
district in an area of less than two miles. 
Presently, the suburban market has 
approximately thirty-five percent of the 
metropolitan market while the CBD share has 
decreased to approximately sixty-five 
percent. There is little reason to doubt 
that the CBD's share of the market will 
continue to erode.
The minority report cited a 1985 analysis of the
Chicago real estate market completed by the Building
Managers Association of Chicago to support their
argument of a weak Chicago office market. According
to the Building Managers Association Report,
We currently have a vacancy rate of 17% in 
competitive space in the central area which 
translates to ten million square feet of 
space vacant with thirteen million square 
feet coming out of the ground. In 
refiguring absorption over the past five
^Minority Report, p. 7. 
^Minority Report, p.8.
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years, we have absorbed 1,490,000 square 
feet per year. Based upon the above figure 
this is a fifteen year supply of space.
Numerous studies of the Chicago area office
market indicated that suburban commercial space was
approximately $2 per square foot, less expensive than
comparable space in the central business district.
The proposed use tax would have served to double the
advantage which suburban space offered to potential
commercial tenants. Don Kane, a former city
development official, described the competition for
office space within the metropolitan region in the
following manner,
Fifteen years ago you had no competitive 
centers in Chicago that would compete with 
the Loop. Now you do have other centers and 
they are constituted by the Route 15 
corridor which stretches from Oak Park all 
the way to DuPage County. In addition, you 
have the significant development of office 
and office related-industries in the non- 
Chicago portions around O'Hare field. 
Finally, you have a concentration of office 
activities in Lake County along Lake Country 
Road and further up north.29
Citing data from a Chicago Association of Commerce and
Industry study, the minority members of the committee
predicted a sharp decline in the central business
district real estate market if a linkage program was
29Interview with Don Kane, Investment Banker and 
Financial Consultant, July 26, 1986, Chicago 
Illinois.
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enacted.
Based upon information generated by Shlaes 
and Company, a linked development tax will 
reduce the rate of return on equity invested 
in a typical downtown office building 
project by 25%, decrease the rate of return 
on total capital (debt plus equity) invested 
in a project by 8% and increase the amount 
of equity required to undertake a project by 
as much as 73%.^0
Following the release of both the majority and 
minority reports from the Mayor's Advisory Committee 
on Linked Development, Chicago's largest business 
organization sponsored a press conference to state its 
strong opposition to a legislatively mandated linked 
development program. The press conference, organized 
by the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 
brought fifteen organizations together in what was 
referred to as the Business and Labor Coalition on 
Linked Development. Joining with The Chicago 
Association of Commerce and Industry to oppose the 
establishment of a linkage program were The 
Association of Industrial Real Estate Brokers, The 
Builders Association of Chicago, The Building Managers 
Association, The Burnham Park Planning Board, The 
Chicago Board of Realtors, The Chicago Federation of 
Labor, The Chicago Office Leasing Brokers
^Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 
Linkage Factsheet, September 18, 1985, pp. 5-6.
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Association, The Civic Federation, The Construction
Employees Association, The Greater North Michigan
Avenue Association, The Greater State Street Council,
The South Side Planning Board and Local 25 of the
Service Employees International Union.
The coalition's position was clearly communicated
in its September 18, 1985 press release on the issue,
The Linked Development Taskforce's Majority 
Report's proposal will critically endanger 
future growth of business in the City of 
Chicago, and significantly lower the quality 
of life for all Chicago citizens. The 
reason is quite simple. Linked development 
will drive more jobs out of the city.^l
The coalition based its position on a survey of 2,732
CACI member firms from the metropolitan region. In
short, the survey revealed that 97.5% of the
responding firms felt that the added costs of linkage
would impact upon their firms. Specifically, the
survey indicated that, in the event of a $10 exaction
tax levy, 87% of the firms considering expansion in
the area would look for non-Chicago locations while
31% would look to relocate outside the State of
^Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 
Press Release, "Business and Labor Coalition on Linked 
Development," (Chicago, 1985), September 18, 1985.
p. 1.
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Illinois.32
CACI summarized the results of the survey in the 
following manner,
Our estimate, based on the survey, shows 
that the city could put almost 600,000 jobs 
at risk, with average annual earnings of 
more than $7 billion. This would mean the 
loss of an estimated $19 million in the 
city’s part of the state income tax, $98.8 
million in the city's share of the retail 
sales tax. and $35 million in head taxrevenues.^3
On the evening of the CACI press conference, the 
Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Development held 
a public hearing on its report. Many community, 
civic, labor, and business groups came to state their 
positions on the issue. While most issue-oriented 
community organizations and housing groups, such as 
SON/SOCC and CWED, supported the general outlines of 
the Advisory Committee's recommendations, the city's 
local development corporations, represented by the 
Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development 
Organizations (CANDO), opposed the establishment of a 
mandatory linkage program. In particular, they 
opposed the imposition of a use tax on commercial 
space because they felt it would make the task of *3
^^chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, 
Press Release, "Total Chicago Survey Results: Link
Development," (Chicago, 1985), p.l.
3^CACI, press release, p. 4.
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redeveloping marginal commercial strips in residential
neighborhoods more difficult. The majority of the
civic groups participating in the hearing also opposed
a legislatively mandated linkage program. Among these
groups were the Metropolitan Housing and Planning
Council, the Civic Federation, and the Chicago United
organizations. Business and development
organizations, particularly those active in downtown,
universally opposed the linkage options contained in
the committee’s majority report.
The issue and the hearings received a great deal
of press coverage. Both Chicago dailies came out
opposing mandatory linkage programs similar to those
proposed by the committee. The Chicago Tribune ended
its editorial entitled "Downtown vs. Neighborhoods"
with the following words,
The mayor's taskforce could have emphasized 
the positive and produced solid, creative 
recommendations for rebuilding Chicago's 
neighborhoods. Instead, it re-ran an old, discredited line--more taxes.^4
Chicago's neighborhood press, on the other hand,
tended to run editorials which were generally
supportive of the advisory committee's majority
report. The following is an excerpt from an editorial
^"Downtown vs. Neighborhoods," Chicago 
Tribune, August 30, 1985, Section 1, p. 22.
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appearing in the All City Chicago News publication,
For too long, Chicago city government has 
given away the right to the development of 
the Loop, offering major funding where 
subsidies were not needed, and asked nothing 
in return for the neighborhoods where 90% of 
the people of Chicago live and work. 
Government elected by the people is supposed 
to be an advocate in dealing with the major 
financial sector. The experience in other 
cities has shown that government ’advocacy* 
and gentle persuasion does not drive away 
developers, it brings them in through a 
stronger working relationship with the city.
We commend Mayor Washington for bringing 
Chicago up to date.35
Following the hearings, the Mayor’s Advisory 
Committee met in attempts to develop a specific 
linkage program that the majority of the committee 
could form a consensus in support of. The business 
representatives, led by Robert Belcaster of Tishman 
Speyer Inc., asked the committee to give Belcaster 
time to formulate a program that the business and 
development community could support. In May 1986, 
Belcaster proposed the establishment of a voluntary 
public/private linkage program. Under the Belcaster 
program, Chicago developers would match, on a two to 
one basis, each dollar of linkage financing which the 
city made available. In 1985, this would have created 
a $10 million linkage program, for in that year the
35"Linked Development," All Chicago City News, 
June 5, 1984, p. 10.
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City of Chicago had appropriated $3,5 million for the 
establishment of a linkage program using revenues 
coming from developers repaying UDAG loans. These 
funds were to be made available for neighborhood 
development projects which were undertaken, on a 
partnership basis, by community and downtown based 
developers.
After listening to the Belcaster proposal for a 
voluntary linkage program, the committee decided to 
table the measure until its June meeting. During the 
remainder of May and the early part of June, 
developers on the committee and representatives of the 
Department of Planning met with community groups to 
urge them to support the voluntary approach. As the 
June meeting of the Mayor's Advisory Committee 
approached, it appeared to most observers that the 
Belcaster proposal was headed for adoption. However, 
shortly before the meeting, Bob Brehm of the 
Bickerdike Development Corporation called Commissioner 
Robert Mier to indicate that he and other community 
activists on the committee were unified in their 
opposition to a voluntary program. He stated that the 
community representatives were in full support of a 
legislatively mandated program similar to the one 
proposed by SON/SOCC. Following this call, there was
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a meeting between the mayor and Commissioners Mier and 
Hollander, and the administration decided to side with 
community groups on the committee in opposing the 
Belcaster proposal. At the June 7, 1985 Advisory 
Committee meeting, the body voted 11-7 to reject the 
Belcaster proposal. Community groups felt the 
expected revenues from a voluntary program would be 
too small. They were also skeptical of the 
developers' willingness to fund the program on an 
ongoing basis. Belcaster responded by revealing the 
names of some of the developers who had voluntarily 
committed to donations to the fund. In addition, he 
pledged his own future support for a $10 per square 
foot mandatory exaction fee if the developers did not 
meet their commitments. Despite Belcaster*s 
arguments, the committee decided to turn down his 
proposal. Angered by their decision, he made a motion 
to adjourn the committee and stormed out of the 
conference room.
Community activists on the Advisory Committee, as 
well as those active on the linkage issue, viewed the 
committee’s vote very differently. Dan Sawislak, a 
SON/SOCC organizer, described the vote in this manner,
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People voted in terms of organizing and not 
their organizational treasuries. It was a 
unified neighborhood vote. People felt they 
had taken a positive stand and that it meant something.36
There was always a fear on the part of the more 
militant A1insky-styled community organizations like
SON/SOCC that the local housing and development groups
would seek an easy compromise on the linkage issue
because of the benefits they would derive from
expanded funding for neighborhood development which
linkage would provide. However, those representing
local development organizations voted with the more
direct-action-oriented SON/SOCC and CWED
representatives against the voluntary program offered
by the development community. Joel Werth, former
Director of Planning for the Department of Housing,
explained the opposition of community groups to the
proposed voluntary program in these words,
The thinking was that community 
organizations would be selling themselves 
short with a voluntary program. It was a 
very bad negotiating strategy to dilute the 
argument for a mandatory approach to the 
exaction fee by incorporating a voluntary 
approach. So they went with the strongest 
argument they had. If the mayor rejects the 
approach and tells them to come back with a
^Interview with Dan Sawislak, SONN/SOCC 
Organizer, March 28, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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voluntary program, that was for him to do 
but they didn't have to take thatposition.
While the Department of Planning remained 
committed to reconvening the advisory committee in 
1986 in order to formulate a linkage program which 
would receive the support of those on the committee, 
it did not do so. SON/SOCC responded to this 
situation on February 12, 1986 by announcing the
launch of a petition drive aimed at placing a 
referendum supporting a Boston-styled mandatory 
linkage program on the April 1987 general election 
ballot. The group committed itself to collecting
200,000 valid petition signatures in order to do so. 
The question to be placed before the voters would 
read:
Shall the City of Chicago enact a linkage 
ordinance which would require from all 
developers of commercial space a one-time 
up-front contribution of five dollars ($5 
per square foot of office space exceeding
100,000 square feet) for the purpose of 
establishing a neighborhood trust fund which 
shall be distributed to Chicago's 77 
neighborhoods in proportion to the
^Interview with Joel Werth, Director of 
Planning, Department of Housing, July 28, 1986,
Chicago, Illinois.
population which shall in turn be applied to 
neighborhood projects as determined by 
individual neighborhood referendum.®®
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Joseph Crutchfield, Co-Chair of SON/SOCC, described
the reason for the petition drive in this way,
Perhaps the administration grew nervous in 
the face of opposition from businessmen, or 
maybe public officials just didn't agree 
with the recommendations. Whatever the 
reasons, we find the city's lack of follow- 
through discouraging.®^
The response of the development community to the 
announcement of SON/SOCC's petition drive was quick 
and definitive. Leaders from the largest development 
firms in the city formed a new political action group 
to advocate the defeat of any legislatively mandated 
linkage program. Professor Louis H. Masotti, from 
Northwestern's Center for Urban Affairs and Policy 
Research, described their organizational efforts with 
these words,
Linkage has mobilized a good deal of 
business community opposition. In Chicago, 
linkage is nowhere. It's in limbo, and my 
guess is that it will never be implemented 
because the developers are well organized 
now. The City has stalled long enough. The 
development community has organized 
something called the Chicago Downtown 
Development Council. They have assessed 
themselves $0.03 a square foot. Now, I
®®SON/SOCC, Press Conference, "SON/SOCC 
Announces Linkage Referendum Drive", Press Release 
February 12, 1986.
®^S0N/S0CC, Press release, p. 2.
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remind you that there are 90,000,000 square 
feet of space downtown. Lets assume that 
they get 75,000,000 square feet at $0.03 a 
square foot. It comes to about $2,000,000 
in a war chest to fight with.4®
In Masotti*s opinion, downtown developers realize the
important role which healthy neighborhoods play in the
maintenance of a vital downtown. However, they reject
a mandatory program which requires them to contribute
to a fund over which they cannot exert any political
control. According to Masotti,
They (developers) understand the argument of 
linking neighborhoods to downtown. They do 
not accept the procedures which essentially 
give money to organizations over which they 
have no control nor role, watching people 
just throw the money away.* 41
The basis of the developers’ opposition, he 
suggested, was their deep concern about the future of 
the downtown office market. Despite a 1985 study of 
the downtown real estate market by Masotti and Mary K. 
Ludkin which documented the strength of the market, he 
said developers were nervous about increased suburban 
competition and rising office vacancy rates.42 As of
4®Interview with Louis H. Masotti, Professor, 
Northwestern University, Kellogg Graduate School of 
Business, July 29, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
41Masotti Interview.
42Tom Gibbons, "Six Year Building Boom in and 
Near the Loop," Chicago Sun Times, August 21, 1985. 
p. 4.
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July 11, 1986, the downtown office vacancy rate stood 
at 11.3% as compared with a rate of 11% a year 
earlier. However, analysts from the Real Estate 
Research Corporation were predicting a rise to 15% 
over the next two years.
In the fall of 1986 as the mayoral election 
approached, SON/SOCC switched its tactics, abandoning 
its referendum drive. Instead, the SON/SOCC members 
decided to seek passage of a City Council resolution 
calling for the enactment of a mandatory linkage 
program. While SON/SOCC did a great deal of effective 
organizing on the issue, linkage failed to become a 
major campaign issue in the election. The unified 
opposition of the business community to this 
initiative served to prevent it from becoming a major 
campaign issue. Another reason for the failure of 
linkage to become a major election issue in 1987 was 
the lack of enthusiasm for the issue on the part of 
some of the community organizations. They disagreed 
with SON/SOCC’s proposal to distribute the linkage 
monies across the city’s 77 neighborhoods on a per 
capita basis. Many groups, including CWED and the 
Chicago 1992 Committee, felt these funds should be 
targeted to the neighborhoods most in need. As a 
result of these disagreements, little effort was made
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by many of these groups to support the SON/SOCC 
effort. Instead, these groups focused their attention 
on redefining the linkage issue. Leaders of OWED and 
the Chicago 1992 Committee, in particular, spoke of 
refocusing the political dialogue around the somewhat 
broader issue of "balanced growth."
Despite the absence of a legislatively-mandated 
linkage program, the city sought in its negotiations 
with developers to exact commitments aimed at 
assisting Chicago's neighborhoods and their residents. 
The city has done so in two ways. First, it has 
required developers receiving municipal assistance on 
projects to utilize the Mayor's Office of Employment 
and Training in filling entry level jobs. In what has 
come to be called the city's "Chicago First" hiring 
program, the city requires all downtown developers 
receiving city assistance to post exclusively with the 
city, for a two week period, all entry level 
positions. Developers are obligated to interview 
candidates screened by the Mayor's Office, however, 
they are not required to hire these individuals unless 
they are fully qualified. Second, the city has 
required developers active in the North Loop Urban 
Renewal Area to offer a specified number of hours of 
technical assistance to community based development
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corporations. During the last two years of the 
Washington administration, three such developers were 
obliged to provide technical assistance to 
neighborhood-based development organizations as part 
of development agreements negotiated with the city. 
Stein and Company, a developer active in the North 
Loop area, donated 2,000 hours of technical assistance 
to the 18th Street Development Corporation to assist 
this organization with financial planning and loan 
packaging. As part of another agreement, Rubloff Inc. 
received a zoning bonus but was required to assist the 
Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development 
Organizations (CANDO) with efforts to promote 
neighborhood-based commercial properties. Rubloff 
worked with this city-wide organization in sponsoring 
a very successful retail market fair which resulted in 
the opening of 132 new stores and the creation of 520 
jobs. Finally, the Leo Burnett USA Agency provided 
public relations services to the Southeast Chicago 
Development Commission to attract new industry. 
Alfred S. Lanier, writing in the Commercial Club of 
Chicago's publication, Chicago Enterprise, made the 
following comments about linkage provisions in 
recently negotiated development agreements.
Eclipsed by the fighting over compulsory
exaction are a number of voluntary linkage
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efforts being quietly promoted by the 
Washington administration, by a rather novel 
use of the city’s zoning powers.^
Augustino Olvero, Executive Director of the 18th
Street Development Gorporation, was critical of this
form of linkage because it provided technical
assistance rather than capital resources to community
development organizations. He also felt the city
lacked appropriate mechanisms to monitor compliance by
developers.
Despite these criticisms, the Washington
Administration moved to expand these case by case
linkage agreements on March 17, 1987 when it formally
announced the establishment of its Neighborhood
Partnership Program. According to a press release
issued by the Mayor's Office on that date,
Under the Neighborhood Partnership Program, 
the city arranges for the provision of 
technical services to community development 
projects. The services are provided on a 
voluntary basis by real estate developers 
and businesses who are undertaking major 
downtown development projects and are 
negotiated by the Department of Planning as 
part of redevelopment agreements in the North and South Loop.^
^Alfred b . Lanier, "Linked Development: 
Retribution, Exaction, or Cooperation, " Chicago 
Enterprises, July 1986, Volume 1, Number 1, p. 4.
^ C i t y  of Chicago, Office of the Mayor. 
"Neighborhood Partnership Marks Historic Agreement." 
Press Release (Chicago, 1987) pp 1-4.
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The first round of the expanded technical assistance 
program generated 2,200 hours of professional 
assistance for seven local development organizations.
In the opinion of many community leaders, while 
they have been unsuccessful in securing the enactment 
of a local linkage ordinance, their efforts have had a 
number of positive outcomes. First, they have alerted 
Chicago's business and development communities to the 
needs and growing political power of Chicago's 
neighborhoods. Second, they have placed the 
development needs of Chicago's neighborhoods on the 
top of the municipal policy agenda. Third, they have 
served to build the membership bases of those 
organizations participating in the linkage organizing 
campaign. Fourth, they have enabled community leaders 
to become more knowledgeable of the development 
process. Fifth, they have united blacks, whites, 
Latinos and asians around a program of shared 
concerns. Sixth, they have contributed to the 
enhancement of the political sophistication of 
Chicago's community leaders. Seventh, some support 
has been elicited from downtown developers for 
neighborhood development projects because of these 
efforts. Finally, they have made visible the 
limitations mayors have in attempting to affect the
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direction of the local and metropolitan economies.
Former Commissioner of Economic Development, Robert
Mier made the following remarks regarding the benefits
which the linkage campaign generated.
It broadened people's understanding of what 
they are engaged in. It exposed people's 
basic tendencies. It certainly showed the 
true colors of the development and business 
community. It also showed the latitude they 
were willing to pursue voluntarily and I 
think that it has underscored the belief 
that if you are going to do anything 
meaningful, you've got to do it legislatively.45
Joel Werth, former Director of Planning for the 
Department of Housing and former Deputy Press 
Secretary for the mayor, described the value of the 
linkage campaign carried on by community groups in the 
following manner,
The organizing has less to do with coming up 
with $10 million— which after all isn't
that much money anyway— and more to do with 
getting on the agenda of the municipal 
decision-makers' big questions of how do we 
govern the city, who is going to be making 
the expenditure decisions in the new 
administration, in other words, looking at 
the question of the movement of capital—  
larger questions than have ever been asked 
before on the municipal agenda.46
45interview with Robert Mier, Commissioner of 
the Department of Economic Development, City of 
Chicago, July 23, 1986. Chicago, Illinois.
^interview with Werth.
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C. Citizen Participation in Development 
Planning
One of the central themes of Harold Washington’s 
1983 mayoral campaign was his call for more citizen 
participation in public policy-making. This 
commitment to participatory democracy was 
operationalized by Harold Washington through the 
process he used in developing the political program 
for his campaign. Shortly after entering the race, 
Harold Washington brought together 150 community, 
civil rights, small business, labor and religious 
leaders from 75 organizations to develop the basic 
planks for his campaign. These policies were later 
organized into a campaign document called The 
Washington Papers. Following his election, the mayor 
again chose to involve community leaders in the 
process of organizing his new administration. He did 
so by involving more than 200 people from over 100 
organizations in his Transition Team. This group was 
charged with the responsibility of making policy 
recommendations to the mayor aimed at assisting each 
department in moving forward in policy directions 
supportive of the general goals and principles 
articulated in The Washington Papers.
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After taking office, the mayor issued an 
executive order establishing a freedom of information 
program. Under this initiative, every department head 
was required to respond to informational inquiries 
from citizens, political leaders, reporters, academics 
and others in a timely fashion. The executive order 
stated,
The public policy of the Executive Office of 
the mayor is hereby declared to be that all 
persons are entitled to access to 
information regarding the affairs of 
government and official acts of those who 
represent them as public servants. Such 
access is required to enable the people to 
discuss freely and fully all matters 
necessary for the making of governmental 
judgments. To that end, the provisions of 
this order shall be liberally constructed to 
provide access to public records to the 
extent consistent with due protection to 
individual privacy, business proprietary 
i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t a l  
effectiveness.^
Furthermore, the administration encouraged 
municipal department heads to collect and share 
important information on programs of concern to 
citizens. An interesting example of such data sharing 
was the early release of a city study of the 
effectiveness of its industrial revenue bond program 
in preserving production jobs within the city.
4?City of Chicago, the Mayor's Office. 
Executive Order 83-1: Freedom of Information.
(Chicago, 1983) p. 1.
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Despite the controversial nature of this information, 
a report was completed, printed and distributed to key 
opinion makers throughout the city.
Department heads were also encouraged to be more 
accessible to community groups. The mayor set an 
example in this regard by speaking, on a regular 
basis, to a wide range of community groups including 
those with which he was not popular. The best example 
of his willingness to dialogue with those opposing him 
was his appearance in October 1984 at a candidates 
night sponsored by the Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our 
City Coalition (SON/SOCC). This group represented the 
Northwest and Southwest Sides of the city that had 
voted for the mayor’s Republican opponent and had 
authored a "White Ethnic Agenda" for the city soon 
after Harold Washington's election. Elspeth Revere, 
Executive Director of the Woodstock Institute, 
commented upon the accessibility of development 
officials in the Washington administration using the 
following words,
I think that people, first of all, feel like 
they have better access than they ever have 
had before. For example, Robert Mier and 
Elizabeth Hollander were in the non-profit 
sector before, so that people feel they can 
call up Rob Mier and Elizabeth Hollander
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whenever they want and they know that they 
won’t get the bureaucratic run around or at 
least they feel there is access.^®
Despite this effort on the part of the Washington
administration, many community leaders criticized the
lack of citizen input in policy-making at City Hall
during the early days of the administration. Many
community leaders, supportive of the mayor, were
disappointed in the Washington administration’s
failure to maintain a high level of citizen
involvement in the planning activities that
immediately followed the transition period. The
Department of Economic Development was subjected to
particularly harsh criticism for excluding community
and neighborhood leaders from the process of
formulating the "Chicago Works Together": 1984 Chicago
Development Plan. Wim Weiwel, a leader of the Chicago
Workshop on Economic Development, offered his
criticisms of the planning process utilized in
devising the 1984 development plan with these words,
I think that there are really two points of 
criticism of the Chicago Works Together 
Plan. One was the process which they used 
to put together and issue it. There was no 
community participation in the process of 
developing the plan. Mier's (Department of 
Economic Development’s) response was, ’Hey,
^Interview with Elspeth Revere, Executive 
Director, Woodstock Institute, July 26, 1986, Chicago, 
Illinois.
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it came out of a whole movement which was 
nothing but participation, and what we did 
was simply to codify the kinds of things 
that had been said by OWED and the people 
involved in it. ’ This point is easily 
confronted by saying that they didn’t even 
bother to acknowledge the contribution. 
Secondly, they should have, nevertheless, 
had some formal procedure and subsequently 
we talked with them on how to structure and 
implement such a participatory procedure.^
Robert Mier, former Commissioner of Economic
Development, in responding to the criticisms of the
1984 development planning process, argued that the
plan was essentially the product of a long process of
collaboration with community leaders and did not
require additional consultation and review. He made
the following remarks regarding this question in an
interview I conducted with him and two of his
associates in 1986,
When the administration was formed and a 
team was put together, rather than opening 
it up to the world and saying, 'Let’s put 
together a development plan,' there was more 
feeling that we already had a plan that was 
derived by being opened to the world, and 
now the trick was to get the bureaucracy to 
adopt it. So the putting together of the 
1984 development plan was more than anything 
else a process of adoption by the 
bureaucracy- sort of closing the doors, 
working in-house, literally looking at every 
project and program and laying them against
49 interview with Wim Weiwel, leader, Chicago 
Workshop on Economic Development, July 27, 1986,
Chicago, Illinois.
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the goals and objectives and policies of 
the platform and seeing what fit and what 
didn't fit and what made sense and what 
needed to be re-thought a bit.50
Joel Werth, former Director of Planning in the 
Department of Housing, supported Mier's view of the 
1984 development planning process, arguing that the 
content of this policy document would not have been 
fundamentally changed by a more participatory 
planning process.
The principles of the development plan, the 
concepts, the messages, the language, 
regardless of whether or not there was heavy 
neighborhood participation- and this will 
sound ridiculous-the principles echo very 
much of the empowerment language, the 
principles that people in the neighborhood 
would have wanted there had they had their 
say, because the people devising this plan 
and developing it had worked in the 
neighborhoods for years and years. They 
were the outsiders that suddenly became the 
insiders when Harold Washington becameMayor.51
Notwithstanding Mier and Werth's defense of the 
process utilized in formulating the 1984 development 
plan, a significantly more participatory approach was 
taken in 1986 in devising the 1986 update of the 
Chicago Works Together Plan. This process is fully
50lnterview with Robert Mier, Commissioner, 
Department of Economic Development, City of Chicago, 
July 23, 1986.
51interview with Joel Werth, Director of 
Planning, Department of Housing, City of Chicago, July 
28, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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explained near the end of this chapter.
In addition to the changes which the 
administration made in the economic development 
planning process, they made significant changes in the 
approach used in planning municipal finances. 
Specifically, they established new procedures for 
developing the city’s corporate and community 
development budgets. To make possible an appreciation 
of the significance of these changes, a brief 
description of the budgetary process that existed in 
the Daley administration, which was shared with me by 
Jim Ketchum of Trust Inc., a good government group in 
Chicago, follows:
During the Daley years, the budget was 
historically released the day after 
Thanksgiving, and that was at a public 
hearing. It was the first time any member 
of the public had a crack at it. You can 
imagine the hordes of people who were 
willing to go to City Hall on the Friday 
after Thanksgiving to pour over the 
document.52
Ketchum further pointed out that Illinois state law 
requires passage of local municipal budgets by New 
Year’s Day, making real scrutiny of the budget, given 
its late release date, highly unlikely.
52interview with Jim Ketchum, Staff Associate, 
Trust Inc., October 13, 1985, Chicago, Illinois.
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Citizen participation in the budgetary process 
changed dramatically under the Washington 
administration. First, the budget was released in 
draft form for the public to review near the end of 
the summer. Second, a day-long conference involving 
several hundred to a thousand civic leaders was held 
to permit community residents to make their priorities 
for the budget known to department heads. Following 
this conference, changes were made in the document, 
which was then presented to the City Council, which 
then held hearings on the budget. Unlike previous 
City Council hearings on the budget, these sessions 
were usually extensive and resulted in some changes in 
the document. Dave Mosena of the Department of
Planning described the progress the Washington 
administration had made in developing a meaningful 
role for citizens in the budgetary process in the 
following words,
We didn't have a budget process, for 
example. It was a very closed process. The 
budget was always worked out internally. It 
was never shared with the public. It was 
generally rubber stamped by the City 
Council. We opened up the budget process.
We created, a schedule for its release and 
kept moving its release earlier into the 
fall so that there was a review. Each year 
we hosted an annual budget conference 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  with w o r k s h o p s  and
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presentations by department heads and the 
mayor to an audience of 1,000 people at a 
downtown hotel.53
A similar process was developed to formulate the
city’s annual community development block grant
budget. Again, Mosena described the process,
We created an annual workshop to which we 
invited everyone with an interest in the 
community development program, and it wasn’t 
the kind of meeting where we sat down and 
simply said ’Here’s what we are going to do 
with our $100 million in community 
development money for you.’ It was a 
program in which we gave an overview of 
where the city stood and what was done with 
your money last year, and then broke into 
workshop groups chaired by a Commissioner or 
Deputy Commissioner from different 
departments and worked with community groups 
on how they wanted to see the money spent 
and what priorities in the neighborhood 
should be.5^
Jim Ketchum of Trust Inc. described the changed 
organizational climate brought about by the Washington 
administration's approach to the budget process in the 
following way,
The public hearings begin in August now. I 
will never forget this great moment in 
democracy in Chicago. The first time I ever 
walked into City Hall and asked for a copy 
of the budget before it was approved and no 
one called me any names, shunted me to 
twenty different people, gave me the third 
degree about why I wanted it, or asked me if 
I was a communist or some such thing. I
53interview with David Mosena, Department of 
Planning, City of Chicago, July 25, 1986.
^interview with Mosena.
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could go into City Hall and walk out with a 
copy of the proposed budget. This 
represented a real change in and forChicago.^5
In addition to providing access to government 
information and an active role for citizens in the 
budgetary process, the Washington administration 
depended heavily upon the use of citizen advisory 
boards appointed by the mayor to examine and 
recommend solutions to pressing problems facing the 
city. From the time he took office, Harold Washington 
began forming citizen taskforces to study such issues 
as municipal finances, steel-making, solid waste 
disposal, linked development, industrial retention, 
redevelopment of Navy Pier and land use. While each 
taskforce investigated a specific municipal problem, 
the process utilized by all appears to have been 
similar. First, the mayor appointed a committee of 
between twenty and twenty-five persons representing a 
broad cross-section of political constituencies 
affected by the problem being studied. With the 
assistance of staff, this group developed a 
preliminary policy report. Commenting on the role 
taskforce members themselves played in the process, 
Thom Clark, Editor of the "Neighborhood Works", made
55Interview with Jim Ketchum.
238
the following comments based upon his experience on
the solid waste taskforce,
A blue ribbon panel, but again not a blue 
ribbon panel that was put together for the 
sake of rubber stamping some consultant1s 
research report, but a blue ribbon panel 
that was indeed a working group with all 
sorts of committees representing a vast 
array of interested parties from community- 
based recyclers to waste management 
officials to street and sanitation 
people.56
Typically, following the release of the 
preliminary policy report by the taskforce, there 
would be a public review and comment period of 
approximately two months. During this period, members 
of the taskforce and their assigned departmental staff 
attempted to speak to as many groups as possible about 
the report to elicit their input. Thom Clark 
described this part of the process using the 
experience of the Steel Taskforce as an example, in 
the following way,
But even here, now that they are ready to 
go, what you have here is a consensus 
document which is pretty strong, tough and 
realistic. You have a consensus document 
that, when its embargo comes off this 
Sunday, is not the final product, 'cause 
they are going to kick off a two-month 
comment period. They have been meeting 
editorial boards, hoping to have a number of 
editorials focus on the issue. A local 
business publication will probably do a
^Interview with Thom Clark, Editor, The 
Neighborhood Works, July 29, 1986.
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special on this issue. The intent is that, 
as the initial report starts circulating 
out and around, that there will be a two 
month comment period with presumably a lot 
of education sessions, public forums, 
workshops, etc. to refine the document.^7
Once the comment period was completed, the
taskforce usually held a public hearing to get final
input before redrafting the policy report. These
recommendations were then forwarded to the mayor who
could accept, amend or reject the report before
implementing its recommendations or forwarding those
requiring legislation to the City Council for final
action. Dave Mosena outlined the final stages of the
Solid Waste Advisory Committee's work in the following
words,
The Solid Waste Taskforce, which has just 
finished its work, spent a year reviewing 
all the options open to the city on how it 
disposes of its garbage, which is a very 
controversial political question which has 
direct impact upon the neighborhoods that 
live near landfills. For example, it has 
hammered out a compromise policy which will 
soon be transmitted to the mayor and then 
turned over to city departments with hopes 
it will begin to execute the policy, 
hopefully with continued supervision and 
oversight from a solid waste commission 
created by the mayor. It's an example of 
the kind of open government stuff that's 
been going on. It's real important, I 
think.
^Interview with Thom Clark. 
5®Interview with Dave Mosena.
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Diane Robinson, a staff member of the Department 
of Economic Development, identified the following 
stages in a typical taskforce process: basic issue
education, exploration of options, evaluation of 
various policy alternatives, consensus building and 
decision-making. While supporters of the 
administration suggested that the use of taskforces 
revealed a new openness on the part of the 
administration to the creation of spirited public 
debate on controversial policy initiatives, others 
suggested that they were mechanisms of cooptation 
aimed at advancing the mayor's own political agenda. 
Critics argued that the composition of each taskforce 
was weighted in such a manner as to insure outcomes 
consistent with the mayor's own reform politics. 
While this may have been the case with the linked 
development committee, it does not appear to have been 
the case with the mayor's other taskforces.
Despite Harold Washington's campaign commitment 
of establishing meaningful participation for community 
groups in decision-making processes dealing with local 
land use matters, little progress was made towards 
this goal. There was no movement towards the 
establishment of neighborhood planning councils, as 
advocated by the mayor during his election campaign.
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As a result, citizen groups did not have any formal
process through which to make their voices heard on
critical land use and development questions affecting
specific parcels within their neighborhoods. Nor were
there mechanisms through which neighborhood residents
could formulate plans outlining visions for the future
development of their own communities. Under the Byrne
administration, neighborhood councils had been
established throughout the city in order to address
local planning decisions like these? however, the
program was never fully implemented. John Melaniphy,
a consultant who assisted the Byrne administration in
crafting its approach to neighborhood planning,
outlined the difficulties such citizen participation
presented to local government officials,
We identified two very serious problems.
One is that neighborhood needs assessments, 
by the very fact that you do them, raise 
expectation levels in neighborhoods. Number 
two, it is a political threat. Daley would 
never have it, because he figured that what 
you ended up doing was establishing another 
hierarchy outside of the political 
hierarchy, which was dangerous. I think 
Jane Byrne had come to the same conclusion as we reached the end of our study.
Aldermen were particularly concerned about the effect
the establishment of such neighborhood planning
^Interview with John Melaniphy, Principal, 
Melaniphy Associates, May 8, 1986, Chicago, Illinois.
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councils would have upon their power. One alderman 
from the majority bloc, who I interviewed, was very 
clear about his opposition to any proposal which, in 
his words, would increase the powers of "stone 
throwers and rebels who are chopping away at the 
institution."
While community activists demanded greater 
participation in government decision-making, many 
voiced concerns regarding the time which formal 
participation mechanisms required. A number of the 
neighborhood leaders I interviewed expressed the 
opinion that activities related to involvement in 
advisory boards occupied much valuable time in the 
busy schedules of their organization’s best leaders. 
As a result, it threatened the on-going community 
outreach and mobilization activities which were so 
important to the political base-building efforts of 
their organizations. Participation in advisory boards 
sponsored by the mayor presented community leaders 
with other dilemmas as well. For instance, when an 
issue arose in their community, was the best course of 
action to work with new leaders in developing a direct 
action organizing response to it or was it to call up 
their new colleagues at City Hall for assistance? 
Finally, many community groups were confronted with
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the problem of what their political stance on a 
particular issue should be when they were involved, 
along with other constituencies, in a consensus­
building process? Was it reasonable for community 
organizations to engage in militant, direct-action 
organizing tactics to apply pressure on other 
constituencies who were also involved in a taskforce 
process when their leaders were participating in a 
collaborative effort of this kind? Community 
organizations asked to participate, for example, on 
the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Development 
refrained from public demonstrations and inflammatory 
rhetoric while their leaders participated in this 
taskforce process. Some leaders felt this stance may 
have served to minimize political support for their 
position, making a negotiated compromise with the 
development and business communities less likely.
Notwithstanding the administration's inability to 
develop a meaningful neighborhood planning program, 
Harold Washington succeeded in opening up the 
decision-making processes of local government to a 
much wider range of community groups than had ever 
been permitted to participate in such processes in the 
past. The administration showed its willingness to do 
this on important policy issues which, in some cases,
had the ability to shape the way the City of Chicago
would look in the future. In this regard, the
administration made a significant change in the
political culture of Chicago that will have an
important effect on the process for decision-making in
the future and, therefore, on the kinds of decisions
produced. According to Robert Mier, former
Commissioner of Economic Development,
You know, w h e n  I think of the 
accomplishments that are lessons for anyone, 
to me the first one is that open 
government works. Its hard, but those who 
argue that you have to close up government 
to deal with a wide range of difficult 
issues are nuts. I don't think that we have 
a problem or decision or program or a 
policy that could not stand, not only the 
scrutiny, but the participation of as wide 
a group as possible.^0
The administration's willingness to make accessible 
municipal data, its encouragement of public officials' 
outreach to communities, its development of 
participatory budget processes and its subjection of 
major policy initiatives to rigorous public debate 
represented a serious commitment to the principles of 
participatory democracy on the part of the Washington 
administration.
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60Interview with Robert Mier.
VII. Conclusions
A. The Successful Initiation of the Populist 
Model
In Chapter I two research questions were 
presented: 1) Did the Washington Administration 
initiate a Populist Model of local economic 
development planning; and, 2) did it successfully 
institutionalize these innovations? If this occurred, 
the additional question of why this took place becomes 
important.
During its five years in office, the Washington 
Administration made significant progress towards 
replacing Chicago's traditional model of local 
economic development planning, characterized by pro­
growth policies and elitist decision-making processes, 
with a progressive model of local economic development 
planning, featuring redistributive policies aimed at 
assisting the poor and participatory decision-making 
processes involving a wide range of community leaders.
Through a variety of redistributive policies the 
Washington Administration successfully redirected 
millions of dollars of public and private investment 
into minority and women-owned firms and older 
residential and industrial areas of the city outside 
of its central business district. These policies
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sought to directly assist poor and working-class 
Chicagoans by improving the infrastructure within 
their neighborhoods, increasing the number of 
affordable housing units, and expanding available job 
opportunities.
Among the redistributive programs established by 
the Washington Administration was the Minority 
Purchasing Program which required municipal agencies 
to secure 25% of the dollar value of their contracts 
from minority-owned firms and 5% of the dollar value 
of their contracts from women-owned firms. Another 
redistributive initiative of the Washington 
Administration, the Chicago First Program, made 
municipal agencies responsible for securing 
commitments from city-assisted businesses to 
participate in a locally administered employment 
program aimed at generating jobs for long-term 
unemployed Chicagoans. Linkage provisions contained 
within development agreements negotiated by the 
Washington Administration with private developers 
which mandated investment in community-based housing 
and development projects represented yet another 
redi stributive program.
The greater emphasis given infrastructure 
expenditures in older residential and industrial
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areas, expanded funding of community-based development 
organizations, increased local purchases by municipal 
agencies and industrial retention initiatives carried 
out by the Washington Administration represent 
additional redistributive programs designed to expand 
economic opportunities for poor and working-class 
Chicagoans.
The Washington Administration also instituted 
numerous reforms aimed. at making local government in 
Chicago more open and responsive. By providing wider 
access to government information and encouraging 
greater citizen participation in local decision­
making the Washington Administration sought to provide 
community leaders and neighborhood activists with a 
greater voice in local government decision-making.
The most dramatic step taken by the mayor to 
create a more open government in Chicago was his pre­
election settlement of the Shakman suit. By agreeing 
to severely limit the number of supporters he would 
appoint to municipal positions, Harold Washington took 
a major step towards eliminating patronage within 
city government. The resolution of this case freed 
municipal workers to participate in the political 
process without fear of official retaliation and
harassment.
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The Washington Administration also established a 
local Freedom of Information Program which required 
Chicago officials to provide citizens with requested 
municipal data in a timely manner. The mayor also 
made himself available to community residents and 
groups wishing to see him and encouraged his staff to 
do the same. The mayor was well known for his 
practice of giving out business cards, complete with 
his home number, to citizens he met on the street who 
had complaints, concerns or suggestions. The 
Washington Administration also made the municipal and 
community development block grant budget processes 
more open by releasing preliminary drafts of these 
documents well in advance of legislatively-mandated 
approval deadlines and by holding community hearings 
and community-wide conferences for the purpose of 
reviewing these plans prior to their submission to 
City Council.
The Washington Administration increased citizen 
participation in policy-making by using mayoral- 
appointed citizen taskforces to study delicate policy 
issues in order to suggest constructive solutions 
around which consensus could be built. Finally, the 
Washington Administration evolved, during the course 
of its tenure in office, a highly participatory form
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of municipal policy-making which featured the use of 
citizen taskforces, wide distribution of preliminary 
policy reports, community and editorial board 
briefings on pending issues, sixty-day comment 
periods, community-wide conferences and extensive City 
Council debates on new policy initiatives.
B. Progress Made By the Washington  
Administration
What factors accounted for the Washington 
Administration’s apparent success in building 
sufficient political power, during its first term in 
office, to have permitted it to have implemented key 
portions of its progressive local economic 
development agenda and created the conditions for 
possible institutionalization of these reforms when 
other reform-minded political leaders, such as former
t
mayor Jane M. Byrne, had been unable to do so? The 
data presented in this case study suggest that 
significant differences in environmental conditions, 
campaign organization and administrative practices may 
explain the relative success of the Washington 
Administration and failure of the Byrne Administration 
in institutionalizing a progressive model of local 
economic development.
Jane Byrne ran for office and served as mayor
during a period in which the nation's economy 
experienced severe problems. The economic problems 
facing older central cities during this time were 
particularly acute. Economic analysts and citizens 
alike were pessimistic about the nation's economic 
future and particularly troubled by the difficulties 
confronting older central cities. By the time Harold 
Washington ran for mayor and assumed office, the 
performance of the national economy had improved 
dramatically. Many regions of the country, along with 
scores of cities, were experiencing significant 
economic growth. Certain central cities, however, 
primarily in the northeast, mid-Atlantic and midwest 
regions of the country, including Chicago, continued 
to face severe economic problems. The contrast 
between the performance of the national economy and 
that of individual central cities, such as Chicago, 
served to undermine political support for traditional 
local economic development policies emphasizing pro­
growth strategies and elitist planning processes while 
enhancing the appeal of alternative local economic 
development policies and programs.
The strength of black electoral support also 
affected the abilities of each administration to 
effectively advocate a progressive local economic
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development agenda. Registration among black voters 
had risen steadily in Chicago since the mid-1970s 
increasing the potential political power of this 
electoral constituency. The severe employment, 
housing, education and health care problems, in 
addition to the official indifference to the needs of 
black families had served to alienate many from the 
local Democratic Party.
Both Jane Byrne and Harold Washington, who were 
viewed as reformers, received substantial support from 
black voters during their first successful mayoral 
campaigns. Following her election as mayor, Jane
Byrne made a series of appointments and policy 
decisions which seriously eroded her support within 
the black community. Among the most important of 
these decisions was her failure to select two highly 
qualified black candidates to top positions within 
Chicago*s police department and school district and 
her decision to create a white-controlled housing 
authority and school board. These and other decisions 
by Jane Byrne generated a tremendous black voter 
backlash against her administration.
Why did Jane Byrne choose to abandon her black 
constituency following her first election? She may 
have felt, as did her political mentor, Richard J.
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Daley, that black voters would continue to support the 
Democratic Party regardless of what it did because 
they had little alternative. There was no Republican 
Party in Chicago, per se, and failure to support the 
Democratic Party might cost the black community the 
modest number of elected positions and patronage jobs 
which the Democratic Party offered the black 
community. Or, she might have reasonably assessed the 
negative impact these decisions would have upon her 
black support but may have believed such steps were 
necessary to sustain her support within the city's 
white ethnic communities, which were experiencing 
increasing minority competition for jobs, housing and 
political power during this period.
Harold Washington remained sensitive to the needs 
of his black supporters following his election. He 
appointed many blacks to key offices within his 
administration, instituted an aggressive minority 
purchasing plan, pressed city-assisted businesses to 
hire the long-term unemployed and increased support 
for community-based housing and economic development 
programs. At the same time, he persisted in efforts 
to build support for his administration within the 
city's white ethnic communities, particularly in 
those neighborhoods comprising the political base of
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the machine politicians who opposed his 
administration. By committing funds for 
infrastructure improvements in white ethnic wards and 
pledging to support the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save 
Our City Coalition's homeowner equity insurance and 
linkage proposals, Harold Washington increased white 
support for his administration.
The relative strength of the city's neighborhood 
organizing movement while each administration was in 
office affected the ability of each administration to 
advocate a progressive local economic development 
agenda. Chicago has a rich tradition of neighborhood 
and community organization which goes back to Saul D. 
Alinsky's work with the families of packinghouse 
workers in the Back of the Yards area of Chicago. 
Historically, neighborhood organizations, in Chicago 
as elsewhere, have focused their attention quite 
narrowly upon local issues such as street conditions, 
municipal service delivery and crime protection. 
Concerned about such municipal service questions, 
these organizations had not in the past focused much 
attention upon local economic development issues. 
When Jane Byrne ran for mayor in 1979, most community 
organizations were quite small, relatively weak, under 
staffed and involved in confrontational direct action
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campaigns against City Hall aimed at securing local 
improvements in municipal service delivery. They 
played a negligible role in Chicago’s electoral 
process at that time.
As a result of their success on local municipal 
service issues, many community organizations began to 
devote greater attention to the economic problems 
which their members faced. Beginning in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Alinsky-styled community 
organizations began to develop housing and community 
development corporations. The capital needs of these 
subsidiary organizations caused the leaders of these 
groups to reject traditional economic development 
policies which focused resources on downtown-oriented 
projects at the expense of the development needs of 
the city’s older working-class neighborhoods and 
industrial areas. Such leaders became strong 
advocates of progressive development policies which 
emphasized the needs of poorer residents of the city.
By the time Harold Washington ran for mayor in 
1983, a loose-knit coalition of community organiza­
tions committed to fundamentally changing local 
economic development policy in Chicago had formed. 
The Chicago Workshop on Economic Development (CWED) 
provided the Washington campaign with a detailed local
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economic development platform, skilled political 
workers and needed support early in the campaign. 
These inputs were critical to the success of the 
Washington campaign and its ability to aggressively 
pursue progressive local economic development 
policies.
Improved economic conditions, increased black 
voter registration and the intensified interest of 
community organizations in local economic development 
policy issues served to create a political environment 
more supportive of the Washington Administration's 
progressive economic development agenda. These 
factors, along with Harold Washington's response to 
these circumstances, may partially explain the 
relative success of his administration's reform 
efforts and the lack of success of similar efforts by 
Jane Byrne.
The approaches which Byrne and Washington adopted 
in organizing their respective campaigns may have also 
contributed to the outcomes of their local economic 
development reform efforts. While Jane Byrne 
described herself as a "populist", she did not 
formulate and present a specific reform agenda during 
her 1979 mayoral campaign. While speaking of the need 
to reduce municipal corruption, increase government
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efficiency, address neighborhood concerns and expand 
citizen participation in policy-making, Jane Byrne 
failed to develop a detailed campaign platform 
describing the policies she would pursue to achieve 
these objectives. As a result, she failed to fully 
mobilize reform-minded Chicagoans who were committed 
to fundamentally changing municipal development 
policies and programs. Support for her administration 
was therefore limited among many networks of reformers 
who questioned her progressive commitment and 
credentials. This lack of support among politically- 
active reformers may have, in the context of a 
machine-controlled municipal bureaucracy, caused Byrne 
to re-evaluate her commitment to fundamental change as 
the campaign progressed.
The style of Byrne’s 1979 campaign may also have 
affected her ability to develop support for her 
proposed reform initiatives. The 1979 campaign of 
Jane Byrne combined the old fashioned practice of 
political horse trading in which the candidate 
promised to support certain positions in return for 
formal endorsement and support from specific 
organizations with a very effective media strategy 
which highlighted the municipal service shortcomings 
of the Bilandic Administration through carefully
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staged media events featuring Jane Byrne. 
Participation in the planning and organization of the 
campaign was largely restricted to a small coterie of 
family members and close political associates. The 
campaign did not seek to involve interested 
individuals and groups in the formulation of Byrne's 
issue platform or campaign strategy. The limited 
nature of participation in the campaign may have 
dampened enthusiasm, lowered expectations, and reduced 
commitment to the Byrne campaign, weakening Byrne's 
base of support when confronting the machine 
dominated City Council and municipal government.
The 1983 campaign of Harold Washington differed 
dramatically from the 1979 effort of Jane Byrne. 
Washington presented an extensive and detailed reform 
agenda in a 52-page campaign document known as The 
Washington Papers. In the "jobs" and "neighborhood 
development" sections of this paper Harold Washington 
offered a specific set of policy initiatives aimed at 
advancing his local economic development objectives. 
Throughout the 1983 campaign, Washington hammered away 
at these themes during his interviews and speeches by 
discussing the specifics of each of these proposals. 
As a result of this approach, the Washington campaign 
aroused the interest and elicited the participation of
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many reform-minded citizens in the white, black and 
Latino communities. As the 1983 campaign progressed, 
good government groups representing middle-class white 
residents, housing and community development 
organizations from a wide range of ethnic communities 
and almost all of Chicago's civil rights institutions 
became active in the Washington campaign largely 
because of its reform agenda. This electoral base 
gave Harold Washington's reform efforts a considerable 
amount of credibility, legitimacy and political power.
The participatory nature of the Washington 
campaign helped transform this support into a powerful 
social movement within the city. While involving 
large numbers of black community leaders and a more 
limited number of white and Latino community leaders 
in its efforts, the Washington campaign drew its most 
critical support from black churches, community 
organizations, businesses and radio stations. 
Organized through an informal steering committee which 
grew to include more than fifty individuals, the 
campaign actively solicited input for the Washington 
campaign's platform, strategy and tactics from 
community residents.
More than seventy-five groups from throughout the 
city participated in the formulation of The Washington
259
Papers. The focus upon broad citizen participation 
was emphasized throughout the campaign and evoked a 
deep loyalty and commitment on the part of Washington 
supporters, who often expressed their feelings about 
the effort in almost spiritual terms, describing it as 
a "crusade."
The administrative practices of each 
administration may also have influenced the ability of 
each administration to advance a progressive local 
economic development agenda. Upon her election as 
mayor, Jane Byrne assembled a senior staff and cabinet 
which featured a mix of reformers and machine 
politicians. In addition, Byrne permitted the machine 
to fill the majority of leadership positions within 
the City Council. These staffing and appointment 
decisions created divisions within her administration 
and caused many of her supporters to question her 
commitment to reform.
These appointment decisions, along with Byrne’s 
change of position on the proposed extension of the 
downtown subway system, construction of a municipal 
baseball stadium and development priorities for the 
North Loop Urban Renewal Area aroused the ire of many 
of her community supporters who felt she was 
abandoning her progressive agenda.
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The Byrne Administration's 1992 Comprehensive 
Plan was widely criticized by neighborhood leaders and 
community activists who opposed its focus upon 
continued investment in the central business district, 
additional funding of the expansion of O'Hare 
International Airport, increased support for major 
airport-related highway construction, and further 
infrastructure development connected to the proposed 
1992 World's Fair. While the plan mentioned the 
development needs of the city's older residential and 
industrial neighborhoods, it failed to propose 
specific initiatives to address these needs.
The Byrne Administration did take several steps 
toward responding to the needs of the city's older 
residential areas. Funding for community-based 
organizations involved in affordable housing and 
community development efforts in low and moderate 
income areas of the city was significantly increased. 
The Byrne Administration also provided funding to 
assist local merchants in forming associations to 
develop physical improvements and consumer marketing 
plans for neighborhood retail strips. Furthermore, 
they created a fund to assist local shopkeepers in 
improving the exterior appearance of their stores 
through a commercial facade improvement program.
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Finally, the Byrne Administration established a micro 
loan program aimed at assisting entrepreneurs with 
start-up costs.
The Byrne Administration did not establish an 
effective means for coordinating and supporting the 
reform efforts of officials working within its various 
mayoral agencies. As a result, policies and programs 
were, at times, poorly integrated. Individuals 
advocating progressive change within specific mayoral 
departments often experienced feelings of isolation 
and demoralization. The frequency with which Jane 
Byrne replaced program directors, criticized her staff 
and reorganized the structure of her administration 
created great uncertainty and made it extremely 
difficult for staff to efficiently pursue her 
administration's reform agenda.
Throughout the 1979 campaign Jane Byrne committed 
herself to encouraging citizen participation in local 
government decision-making. Shortly after assuming 
office, Byrne revealed the nature and scope of the 
city's fiscal problems by discussing, in detail, 
Chicago's proposed municipal and school budgets. In 
addition, she hired the firm of John A. Melaniphy 
Associates to conduct a needs assessment of Chicago's 
77 neighborhoods and to recommend changes in the
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city's planning process aimed at incorporating local 
leaders into the policy-making process. However, 
after spending more than $600,000 on the study, Byrne 
abandoned plans for fully-empowered neighborhood 
planning councils and proposed a system of citizen 
advisory boards which lacked decision-making power.
Shortly after her election as mayor, Jane Byrne 
made a series of decisions which served to alienate 
major elements of the progressive coalition which 
elected her. Byrne's failure to successfully 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with the 
city's trade unions resulted in her loss of labor 
support. Her refusal to appoint two well-qualified 
blacks to top positions within the police department 
and school district, along with her changing the 
balance of power in the housing authority and school 
board, through her appointments, to control by whites, 
caused many black leaders to withdraw support from her 
administration. Byrne's willingness to allow the 
machine to retain control over the City Council, along 
with her abandonment of community planning councils, 
reduced liberal support for her administration. While 
these actions alienated progressive leaders from her 
administration, they endeared her administration to 
the leaders of the machine. This transformation of
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Jane Byrne’s base of political support reduced the 
likelihood that she would aggressively pursue a reform 
agenda in the local economic development policy area.
Washington's senior staff appointments, like 
those of Jane Byrne, included a mix of progressive 
community activists, good government liberals and 
mainline public administrators. While his selections 
for the positions of Commissioner of the Department of 
Economic Development and Commissioner of the 
Department of Housing were progressives committed to 
the Washington economic development doctrine, his 
choice for Commissioner of the Department of City 
Planning was an experienced bureaucrat who was not 
deeply committed to his approach to local economic 
development planning. This divergence of opinion on 
basic economic development policies, along with the 
severe restrictions against hiring his political 
supporters imposed by the Shakman court degree 
clearly affected Washington's ability to implement, 
his local economic development agenda.
Unlike Jane Byrne's early economic development 
decisions, Harold Washington's clearly reflected the 
reform politics of his campaign. His decision to 
submit an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) 
application to the federal government for the
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expansion of the South Works steel complex rather than 
for the commercial development of the Navy Pier 
emphasized the administration’s new economic 
development priorities. Washington's cooperation with 
and support for activist community and labor groups 
seeking to prevent the closing of the Hasbro 
Company's Playskool Factory distinguished his 
administration's local economic development policies 
from those of past Chicago mayors. His willingness to 
sue a major manufacturer over its failure to abide by 
the terms of a local economic development loan 
expanded his administration's support among 
progressive labor and citizen groups. Washington's 
refusal to provide municipal subsidy for a business 
supported World's Fair further strengthened his 
administration's reform credentials.
These decisions reflected Washington's commitment 
to pursuing economic development policies which 
expanded job opportunities for Chicagoans and improved 
conditions within the city's older residential and 
industrial areas. These decisions also served to 
reinforce Washington's image as a reformer and 
expanded his support among liberal and progressive 
organizations.
The "Chicago Works Together": 1984 Development
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Plan offered a detailed statement of the Washington 
Administration’s local economic development 
philosophy, goals and objectives. The plan's emphasis 
upon job creation for Chicagoans, neighborhood 
economic development, affordable housing and citizen 
participation in planning stood in stark contrast to 
the Byrne Administration's 1992 Comprehensive Plan 
which stressed the need to continue to invest in 
downtown infrastructure, expand O'Hare International 
Airport and improve the area's highway system.
While the administration was criticized for not 
adopting a more participatory approach to the 
development of this planning document, the plan itself 
was widely praised by community leaders and 
neighborhood activists. Following the publication of 
the plan, Washington and his cabinet launched an 
aggressive outreach program among community groups 
aimed at eliciting their support for the plan. 
Wearing "Chicago Works Together" buttons, armed with 
copies of the plan, the mayor, along with the senior 
staff of the Department of Economic Development, spoke 
to hundreds of community groups about the need to take 
a new approach to local economic development planning.
The 1984 development plan presented a new vision 
of the role which local government should play in the
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economic development process. It caused many 
individuals, inside and outside government, to re­
evaluate their assumptions regarding local economic 
development planning and belief in traditional 
development strategies and programs. The plan's 
content helped build support for the administration 
among those groups which had been excluded from 
meaningful participation in the city's previous 
economic development programs. Women, blacks, 
Latinos, small businessmen and local manufacturers 
were encouraged by the emphasis which the Washington 
Administration's plan gave their needs.
The plan also served to refocus the municipal 
political agenda by giving the needs of the city's 
older residential and industrial areas a new priority. 
By presenting specific performance goals and program 
outputs, the plan represented a much more initiatory 
and pro-active approach to local economic development 
by the city. By actively involving local residents in 
the formulation of the 1986 development plan, the 
Washington administration built considerable support 
among civic leaders for its progressive policies.
Upon assuming office Harold Washington took 
several important steps aimed at building support for 
his local economic development policies among members
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of the municipal bureaucracy. * He brought the 
directors of the city's various development-related 
mayoral agencies together under the leadership of Dr. 
Robert Meir to evaluate municipal programs in light of 
his own local economic development policies. In 
addition, he established numerous interdepartmental 
taskforces, at various levels of the municipal 
bureaucracy, to formulate plans and programs aimed at 
advancing his local economic development agenda. 
Furthermore, he encouraged individual department heads 
to develop mechanisms through which they could 
actively involve their employees in discussions about 
the city's evolving economic development program. In 
doing so, Washington focused the attention of the 
municipal bureaucracy upon his development policy 
initiatives and programs.
By involving managers from all levels of the 
bureaucracy, in the process of formulating and 
implementing the city's new local economic development 
strategy, he reduced the likelihood that departmental 
policies and programs would displace those of the new 
administration. His efforts to involve non-executive 
staff members in the local economic planning process 
caused many to re-evaluate their initial resistance to 
the new administration. As a result of these efforts,
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Washington mobilized a considerable degree of support 
for his local economic development policies within the 
municipal bureaucracy.
Following his election, Washington worked hard to 
maintain support for his local economic development 
agenda among his followers. Washington, along with 
his senior cabinet members, kept a campaign-like 
speaking schedule, addressing tenant, community, 
labor, civic, small business, women’s and minority 
groups on the importance of adopting a new approach to 
local economic development planning. In addition, 
Washington dramatically expanded access to senior 
development officials and major economic development 
programs for community and neighborhood organizations. 
Furthermore, officials in the Department of Economic 
Development sought ways to involve community leaders 
in collaborative efforts to address major economic 
development issues. For example, when the Hasbro 
Company announced the closing of its Playskool 
factory, Mr. Robert Mier, Washington’s Commissioner of 
Economic Development, invited local community and 
labor leaders to City Hall to discuss developing a 
joint city-community response to this issue.
The Washington Administration significantly 
increased municipal funding for community-based
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economic development organizations. It provided 
enhanced technical assistance for these groups and it 
offered support to several city-wide coalitions which 
took a progressive approach to local economic 
development issues. These steps served to maintain 
and, in some cases, build political support for 
Washington’s local economic development program among 
community groups.
Washington also made serious efforts to build 
support for his local economic development program 
among groups which were not supportive of his 
administration. Following his election, Washington 
appeared before a meeting of the Save Our 
Neighborhood/Save Our City Coalition, a community 
group based in the wards of his Council opponents 
which was very hostile to his administration, offering 
to work with them on two of their most important 
issues. Shortly thereafter Washington proposed a 
Neighborhood Infrastructure Program to be funded 
through a general obligation bond which, if funded, 
would have provided significant new capital investment 
for every ward within the city.
Both of these initiatives were examples of the 
Washington administration's efforts to build support 
for their local economic development policies among
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those communities which had not previously endorsed 
the Washington campaign. In developing new policy 
initiatives, the Washington administration sought to 
highlight the support they were giving to residents 
residing in the political wards of their opponents in 
hopes of eroding their support of the machine. By 
increasing investments in the cities older residential 
neighborhoods, the Washington administration sought to 
increase support for their local economic development 
programs.
Seeking to move increasing numbers of city 
residents into action on behalf of his local economic 
development agenda, Harold Washington frequently 
polarized the political environment by exacerbating 
his conflict with machine leaders, Council Members 
Vrdolyak and Burke. Washington took every opportunity 
to identify Vrdolyak and Burke as the major obstacles 
preventing economic revitalization of Chicago’s older 
residential and industrial neighborhoods.
At the same time, Washington, unlike Byrne, 
sought to move conflict over the direction of local 
economic development policy outside of the mayor’s 
office in order to allow his staff to concentrate on 
the daily requirements of administration and 
politics. Washington successfully shifted the arena
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of much of this conflict from the mayor's office to 
mayoral taskforces which he established to address 
thorny policy issues facing the city. Thus, 
Washington established citizen advisory committees 
representing a wide range of opinions on such 
controversial issues as solid waste disposal and 
linkage.
Despite Council opposition, the Washington 
Administration was able to successfully implement 
several important programs contained in its 1984 
development plan. The administration established a 
local purchasing program within city government which 
saved several thousand manufacturing jobs. In 
addition, the Washington administration significantly 
increased the proportion of city contracts awarded to 
women and minority-owned firms. Furthermore, the 
administration required city-assisted businesses to 
post all entry level jobs with the Mayor's Office of 
Employment and Training before publicly announcing 
them in order to assist the long-term unemployed. 
Finally, the administration forced developers seeking 
city-owned property to provide technical assistance to 
community-based organizations involved in local 
economic development projects.
While seeking to build support for his economic
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development policies within the existing political 
environment of Chicago, Harold Washington was, at the 
same time, involved in efforts to change this 
environment. Working with the mayors of other 
Illinois cities and suburbs, Harold Washington helped 
establish a regional coalition opposed to Governor 
James Thompson's economic development policies. 
Working with the mayors of other large cities through 
the National League of Cities and the National 
Conference of Mayors Harold Washington became 
increasingly involved in efforts to oppose the urban 
policies of the Reagan administration. Through 
speeches, interviews, articles and public testimony, 
Harold Washington and his senior advisors actively 
pursued opportunities to challenge prevailing economic 
development policies being pursued in Washington and 
encouraged in state capitals by policy-makers 
influenced by the supply-side economic policies of the 
Reagan administration.
C. Failure to Institutionalize
Despite the importance of many of these policy 
and process reforms, the Washington Administration did 
not succeed in institutionalizing a populist model of 
local economic development planning within the 
municipal government of Chicago. While the Washington
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Administration was extremely effective in establishing 
a new vision, goals, policies and programs, as well as 
organizational structures and conflict resolution 
mechanisms, in the local economic development policy 
area, these understandings never became part of the 
"taken for granted" assumptions guiding policy-makers 
and planners within municipal government. Only within 
the Department of Economic Development, and to a 
somewhat more limited degree within the Department of 
Housing, did the Washington doctrine of progressive 
local economic development policy-making become 
dominant in influencing the issues focused upon, 
policies formulated and programs implemented.
The Mayor’s Development Sub-cabinet was unable to 
unify the city’s major development-related departments 
in support of the Washington Administration's 
redistributive development policies and participatory 
decision-making processes. While several municipal 
agencies continued to pursue pro-growth policies 
formulated by elitist decision-making processes, other 
agencies gave the mayor only rhetorical or 
inconsistent support. Knowledgeable insiders and 
observers understood the varying degrees of commitment 
and support for the mayor's economic development 
agenda which existed within the city's various
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municipal agencies.
A dramatic example of the internal divisions 
which developed within the administration on important 
development policy matters was the Department of 
Planning’s advocacy of a voluntary linkage program 
proposed by representatives of the development 
community and the Department of Economic Development's 
endorsement of a community organization proposed, 
legislatively enacted, mandatory linkage program. 
Such disagreements over basic economic development 
policy issues weakened the administration’s 
effectiveness in building political support for a 
progressive local economic development agenda.
These conflicts affected the Washington 
Administration's ability to overcome the machine- 
dominated City Council’s opposition to its reform 
agenda. Unable to build a majority coalition within 
the Council in support of its reform agenda the 
Washington Administration resorted to non-legislative 
mechanisms for advancing its policies and programs. 
By means of administrative goal-setting, executive 
orders and individually negotiated development 
agreements, the Washington Administration established 
progressive economic development policies and 
implemented programs for which it could not secure
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legislative support.
The Washington Administration established its Buy 
Chicago Purchasing Program by means of an 
administratively established and enforced set of 
procurement goals. The Washington Administration 
instituted its Minority Purchasing, Chicago First 
Hiring and Freedom of Information Programs by means of 
executive orders issued by the mayor. The Washington 
Administration linked approval for downtown 
development projects to developer contributions to 
community-based economic development efforts through 
provisions included within individual development 
agreements negotiated between the city and private 
developers.
While administrative goal-setting, executive 
orders and individual development agreements made it 
possible for the Washington Administration to 
implement redistributive development policies and 
participatory decision-making processes in the face 
of significant internal, City Council, party and 
business sector opposition, these mechanisms did 
little to institutionalize the values these policies 
represented and the pattern of resource allocation 
they reflected within the formal structure and 
decision-making processes of local government. Such
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policies and programs lacked the force of law and were 
designed to remain in force only as long as the mayor 
issuing these directives was in office.
As a result, policies and programs established 
through such executive initiatives are not as secure 
as those resulting from legislative action. The 
latter, particularly if they are of a reform nature, 
usually require the mobilization of a concerned 
citizenry for their passage. Such policy initiatives 
are more likely to stand, regardless of who occupies 
City Hall, and are not easily reversed without broad 
citizen support. The local economic development 
planks of the Washington doctrine were implemented by 
means which did little to structurally alter local 
economic development planning in Chicago. Upon the 
death of Mayor Washington in 1988, many of his reforms 
were discarded by the administrations of Bernard 
Sawyer and Richard M. Daley Jr. The ease with which 
these administrations set aside the reforms of the 
Washington Administration is evidence of its failure 
to institutionalize these local economic development 
policies and programs within Chicago’s municipal 
government.
While the Washington Administration did not 
succeed in institutionalizing a progressive model of
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local economic development planning during its first 
term in office, it appeared as if it was poised to do 
so at the beginning of its second term. As a result 
of having secured the election of four of its 
supporters during the court-mandated councilmanic 
elections of 1985, the mayor assumed control of the 
Chicago City Council. This power enabled the mayor to 
appoint his supporters to key legislative 
chairmanships giving him the ability to exert 
considerably more control over the legislative 
process. The mayor’s political influence was further 
enhanced by his impressive 1987 re-election victory 
during which he maintained his overwhelming base of 
support within the black community while substantially 
increasing his electoral strength in both the Latino 
and white wards. These developments greatly increased 
the political power and influence of the mayor thereby 
increasing the chances that he could successfully 
institutionalize his progressive model of local 
economic development planning during his second term 
in office.
D. R e f l e c t i o n s  on the P r o c e s s  of 
Institutionalization
Harold Washington successfully demonstrated the 
possibility of populist planning but he did not
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institutionalize his administration's innovations so 
they would extend beyond his time in office. This is 
indeed the major conclusion of this thesis, however, 
it is hard to resist further interpretation. One 
notices the disjuncture between the initiating process 
that occurred during the Washington Administration and 
the institutionalization process as formulated by 
Selznick.
Philip Selznick's theory of institutionalization 
provides elegant criteria for evaluating the degree to 
which a leader has succeeded in infusing his/her 
vision, values and approach into the "taken for 
granted" assumptions which guide a formal 
organization, his theory offers little assistance in 
understanding the process by which this occurs. His 
work does not discuss the methods by which newly 
appointed or elected leaders can successfully create 
the conditions under which his/her vision of the local 
state and its various functions can come to dominate 
the thinking and behavior of members of the municipal 
bureaucracy in an unconscious or "taken for granted" 
manner.
A careful examination of the Washington 
Administration's reform efforts suggests there is a 
very important phase of the urban reform process which
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follows the movement building and proceeds the 
institutionalization phase which is critical to the 
success of any municipal reformer. At the point when 
a newly appointed or elected municipal leader assumes 
power, he/she must begin a process of building support 
for his/her reform agenda within his/her 
administration and the community. The experience of 
the Washington Administration may offer unusually rich 
insight into what I will call the p r e ­
institutionalization phase of the urban reform process 
because it encountered such vehement opposition from 
within the municipal bureaucracy and among certain 
elements of the business and development communities.
During this pre-institutionalization phase of the 
urban reform process, which appears to have lasted 
throughout the Washington Administration's first term, 
Harold Washington engaged in a wide range of 
activities aimed at building his power and 
solidifying his position within the government. For 
purposes of this analysis I have placed these 
activities in one of the following four categories: 
plan-making, team-forming, agenda-setting and base­
building.
1. Plan-making
During his first term in office Harold Washington
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refined his local economic development policies and 
presented them, in a systematic form, in the Chicago 
Works Together: 1984 Development Plan. The
publication of this policy plan, along with the 
mayor's consistent references to it, offered community 
and neighborhood activists evidence of the 
administration's ongoing commitment to progressive 
economic development policies. The plan also served 
to focus the municipal bureaucracy's attention on 
economic development issues of concern to low and 
moderate income families living outside of "The 
Loop." Furthermore, the plan served as a tool for 
evaluating the administration's performance in this 
area and for holding it accountable to the 
constituencies which helped elect it. Finally, the 
plan functioned as an organizing device around which 
local citizen activists could agitate for greater 
support for programs aimed at addressing the needs of 
poor and working-class communities within the city.
2. Team-forming
The Washington Administration also devoted a 
great deal of energy during its first term to 
building a core group of senior and middle level 
officials who were committed to the goals and 
objectives of the Washington Administration's local
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economic development agenda. Washington worked hard 
to recruit several commissioners who were committed to 
his approach to local economic development. Shortly 
after assuming office, Mayor Washington formed a Sub- 
Cabinet for Development, under Dr. Robert Meir, to 
insure that mayoral agencies implemented policies 
which advanced the local economic development 
priorities of the administration. In addition, the 
administration formed inter-agency committees of 
senior and middle level officials in order to develop 
specific policies aimed at achieving the economic 
development goals of the administration. The 
administration also encouraged development-related 
departments to establish in-service training programs 
aimed at involving staff, from all levels in policy­
making discussions related to the local economic 
development agenda. Finally, the administration 
strategically managed its conflict with Councilmen 
Vrdolyak and Burke in order to create a visible 
"enemy" which could be used to mobilize support for 
Mayor Washington.
3. Agenda-setting
The Washington Administration also focused a 
great deal of attention upon various efforts aimed at 
placing the mayor’s local economic development issues
282
at the top of the municipal agenda. It engaged in 
informal goal-setting, issued executive orders, 
formed mayoral taskforces, pursued a regional and 
national urban legislative strategy and, on some 
occasions, carried out community organizing drives in 
order to gain control over the municipal political 
agenda. It emphasized its commitment to industrial 
retention and minority purchasing by adopting informal 
goals for local purchasing and minority contracting. 
It revealed its determination to increase citizen 
participation in policy making and to focus greater 
attention on job creation by issuing executive orders 
establishing local Freedom of Information and Chicago 
First Hiring Programs. It signalled its interest in 
the future of the city's steel-making and printing 
industries, resolution of the city's growing solid 
waste disposal problem, development of Navy Pier and 
the implementation of a linkage program by 
establishing mayoral taskforces focused upon each of 
these problems. It also attempted to influence the 
local political agenda by aggressively pursuing a 
regional and national legislative agenda aimed at 
impacting state and national policies. Finally, the 
Washington Administration, on two occasions, developed 
and implemented highly successful organizing drives
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aimed at influencing municipal and corporate decision­
making when it carried out its publicity campaign to 
pass the 1984 General Obligation Bond and its lawsuit 
and labor support activities aimed at keeping the 
Playskool factory open. Despite the relative success 
of these efforts, the Washington Administration rarely 
pursued community organizing approaches to building 
support for its policies and programs.
4. Base-building
Finally, the Washington Administration made a 
consistent effort during its first term to attempt to 
build political support among groups which had not 
supported it. During its first year in office the 
Washington Administration proposed a General 
Obligation Bond which would have provided each of 
Chicago's 77 community districts with an equivalent 
amount of infrastructure support. This approach to 
capital spending helped to undermine the arguments of 
the mayor's opponents who said that he would 
concentrate resources within the black and Latino 
neighborhoods at the expense of the city's white 
ethnic communities. Shortly after his election, 
Harold Washington attended a candidates' night 
organized by the Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our City 
Coalition, a group hostile to the mayor, listened to
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their concerns and promised to work with them on 
their two major issues— linkage and homeowners equity. 
Washington’s willingness to work with those who 
opposed to his administration earned him the respect 
of many throughout the city, particularly those 
residing in Chicago’s white ethnic areas.
These four activities, which constitute the 
primary foci of attention of reformers during the pre­
institutionalization stage, have clear links to the 
four elements of institutionalization which Selznick 
discusses. Plan-making activities, if successfully 
completed, provide reformers with clear goals and 
mission statements for their administration. Team­
building activities permit reformers to create 
specialized planning units dedicated to the 
preservation of reform ideals and the development of 
progressive programs within administrations. Team­
building activities, if they involve bringing external 
constituencies into the policy-making process, can 
also provide reformers with a mechanism for resolving 
conflict. Agenda-setting activities enable reformers 
to infuse within their administration institutional 
commitments which become the taken for granted 
assumptions upon which organizational members make 
decisions. Finally, base-building activities provide
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reformers with the necessary political support to 
prevail against external attack by local elites. 
While the elements of pre-institutionalization 
discussed in this thesis do not correspond exactly to 
the characteristics of institutionalization discussed 
by Selznick there does not appear to be substantial 
overlap.
E. Implications for Future Research
While it is not possible to generalize on the 
basis of data emerging from a single case study, such 
research can highlight questions which deserve further 
attention. The Ghicago case study presents several 
research questions which merit the attention of 
social scientists interested in the urban reform 
process. Is successful municipal reform in other 
cities preceded by a pre-institutionalization phase as 
was the case in Chicago? Is this phase characterized, 
as was Chicago’s, by a focus on plan-making, team­
forming, agenda-setting and base-building? If not, 
are there other activities which reformers engage in 
to affect change in these cities? Is the priority 
given each of these activities affected by the nature 
of the political environment in which the reforms 
occur? For example, is base-building given a greater 
emphasis by reformers in those cities characterized by
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highly centralized forms of political power?
These and many other questions could be 
effectively pursued by means of a comparative case 
study focused upon the reform efforts of several big 
city mayors. Great care would be necessary in 
selecting the comparison cities for such a study. 
Researchers would have to identify cities in which 
progressive reforms had been institutionalized in the 
manner in which Selznick and others have discussed. 
In addition, researchers would have to identify cities 
which shared common demographic, economic, and 
political characteristics.
Scholars could carry out such research in one of 
two ways * They could develop case studies of the 
reform efforts of several mayors by collecting primary 
data for the purpose of exploring the questions posed 
in this thesis regarding the urban reform process. 
Or, they could utilize existing case studies of local 
reform efforts by engaging in secondary analysis of 
these materials. The viability of this approach would 
depend upon the quality of existing case studies of 
such reform efforts.
Results from such research would provide those 
interested in positive social change with much needed 
insight into the urban reform process. This knowledge
might enhance the effectiveness of future reform 
efforts and contribute to an improvement in the 
quality of American urban life.
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Appendix A: Research Design and Methodology
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A. Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods
This particular research project examines a 
number of different aspects of local economic 
development policy and planning in the City of Chicago 
during the first term of Mayor Harold Washington. The 
study documents the major development proposals, plans 
and decisions of the Washington administration from 
1983 through 1987. In addition, this research 
explores the manner in which the mayor and his senior 
planners sought to change economic development 
policies and processes. Finally, the thesis evaluates 
the extent to which these steps produced a 
fundamentally new approach to local economic 
development planning in this city.
These objectives influenced the specific research 
design used in executing this study. According to 
Robert K. Yin,
In the most elementary sense, the design is 
the logical ,sequence that connects the 
empirical data to a study’s initial research 
questions and, ultimately, to its 
conclusions.^
Given the kinds of questions this thesis explores, the 
limited control I had over the events being 
investigated, the enormous complexity of the
1Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and
Methods. (Beverly Hills, 1984), p. 28.
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organizational environment being examined and the 
contemporary nature of the activities being studied, 
qualitative research methods appear to be the most 
appropriate to use.
John Van Maanen gives us the following definition
of qualitative methodology.
It is at best an umbrella term covering an 
array of interpretive techniques which seek 
to describe, decode, translate and otherwise 
come to terms with the meaning, not the 
frequency, of certain more or less naturally 
occuring phenomena of the social world.^
The specific data collection activities described by
such an approach include: study of documentary
evidence, examination of archival materials, use of
sample surveys, secondary data analysis, participant
observation, discovery of artifacts, and
interviewing.
These research techniques are particularly useful 
in studying complex social phenomena which feature the 
involvement of many individuals and numerous 
organizations. These methods are also extremely 
effective in examining the process individuals or 
groups use to transform a social situation. 
Additionally, these data collection techniques are 
capable of revealing the motivation behind individual
^Van Maanen, p. 9.
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or collective action as well as the meaning 
participants in such social situations attach to 
events. Finally, these methods are effective in 
examining the relationships which exist between a 
particular object of study and its organizational 
context.
These methods also have a number of potential 
drawbacks which can sometimes undermine their 
effectiveness. They can lack rigor which makes the 
replication of procedures and findings difficult. In 
addition, it may be difficult to generalize the 
results from qualitative research if methods are not 
carefully selected. Furthermore, many studies based 
upon such methods provide so much detailed description 
that they are very difficult to read. Also, these 
methods require the participation of skilled and 
experienced researchers who are familiar with the use 
of these data collection and analysis techniques. 
Finally, the time and money required for the 
completion of research projects using qualitative 
methods make them difficult to complete.
B. Presentation of the Research Design
I have attempted to address these problems of 
qualitative methods by following the advice of Robert 
K. Yin in the development of my research design.
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First, I utilized an orienting theory to focus on the
most important data and to set boundaries for the case
study. Second, I established a case study protocol
drawing upon a variety of methods to increase the
replicability and validity of my findings. Third, I
developed an extensive data base of original
documents, archival materials, interview transcripts
and field notes to document my observations and
support my conclusions. Fourth, I incorporated
research activities into my study which I was
experienced with from my prior training. Finally, I
recruited three individuals to provide me with
feedback upon my observations and conclusions so as to
provide partial verification of my findings.
The following section outlines the major elements
of the research methods I used, my rationale for
selecting them and my evaluation of their limitations.
While this process appears, in retrospect, to be
logical and thorough, it is important to know that
this research design evolved over the course of my
work in Boston and Chicago. This experience is
consistent with that of William F. Whyte who stated,
But I am convinced that the actual evolution 
of research ideas does not take place in 
accord with the formal statements we read on 
research methods. The ideas flow in part 
out of our immersion in the data and out of 
the whole process of living. Since so much
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of this process of analysis proceeds on an 
unconscious level, I am sure that we can 
never present a full account of it.^
The two communities I initially selected to study
were chosen because their recently elected mayors had
indicated their strong commitment to changing the
nature and direction of local economic planning. In
brief, they promised to shift local development
policies in ways that would provide greater
assistance to the poor. In addition, they committed
themselves to expanding citizen participation in the
local planning process. Boston and Chicago became the
sites of my study of local economic development
planning based upon the degree to which their
executives promised to pursue policies and processes
which were radically different from those pursued by
the majority of American communities in the Reagan
era. I received further encouragement to study these
two communities from personal friends of mine who
worked in each administration. These colleagues
offered to assist me in collecting documents and
gaining access to important participants in the local
development process.
Initially, I planned to examine the way in which
^William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society: 
The Social Structure of an Italian Slum. (Chicago, 
1946), p. 280.
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Mayor Raymond Flynn of Boston and Mayor Harold 
Washington of Chicago addressed a number of specific 
policy issues and planning decisions. I anticipated 
examining the approaches these two cities took to 
retaining manufacturing jobs, training unemployed 
workers, creating affordable housing and increasing 
private sector investment in poor and working class 
districts. The result would have been two comparative 
case studies to document the major economic 
development planning initiatives and accomplishments 
of both administrations, and I would present an 
analysis of the extent to which these mayors had 
institutionalized a progressive approach to planning 
in the economic development policy area.
The following section outlines the original 
research design I formulated in order to complete this 
research. A thorough review of the existing 
literature on urban economic development, progressive 
administration and citizen participation was planned. 
Having completed this library research, I expected to 
search the recent scholarly and popular literature on 
the social, economic and political history of these 
two communities. Following this reading, I proposed 
to review, on a daily basis, the news articles in the 
major daily newspaper of each of the two cities.
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After initiating the clipping, filing and cataloging 
of these articles, I anticipated contacting a limited 
number of community activists, public officials and 
business leaders from each community in order to 
interview them. The purpose of these preliminary 
interviews would be to get a sense of views which 
local leaders had on the major development policy 
initiatives of the Flynn and Washington 
administrations. Next, I planned to collect and 
review documentary materials related to each 
development issue mentioned by the local leaders 1 
interviewed. Among the materials I anticipated 
examining were press releases, municipal ordinances, 
public testimony, agency reports, municipal budgets, 
planning documents and other public materials.
Subsequent to these activities, I would contact 
the highest ranking officials in Boston's and 
Chicago's development agencies seeking sponsorship for 
my research as well as various forms of assistance. 
Having done these things, I would seek to interview 
as many key individuals involved in the decision­
making process on the development issues facing each 
community as possible. By speaking with these 
individuals, I would attempt to document the major 
policy initiatives, development decisions and citizen
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participation efforts of each mayor.
During field visits to each city to conduct 
interviews, I hoped to observe as many relevant public 
events related to the issues of my study as possible. 
After completing interviews, I looked forward to 
collecting additional documents related to these 
issues.
Using data generated by the above-mentioned 
research activities, I planned to formulate two 
written case studies focused upon the local economic 
development policy-making and planning activities of 
these two cities. After completing these initial case 
studies, I hoped to secure the cooperation of two 
informed "insiders" who I would ask to review my case 
studies in terms of their basic accuracy and 
analytical soundness. Expecting to revise my case 
studies using key informant feedback, I looked forward 
to developing finalized case studies.
C. Summary of Completed Research Activities
The next section outlines the research activities 
which I actually completed as part of this research. 
Following Babbie's advice, I began my actual research 
on this topic with a review of the recent research in
this area.
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As is true of all research methods, you
would be well advised to begin with a search
of the relevant literature.
During the fall and winter of 1984 I began my search 
of the literature on urban economic development, 
p r o g r e s s i v e  administration, and citizen 
participation. In addition, I reviewed the recent 
scholarly work examining the social, economic and 
political histories of Chicago and Boston.
Among the volumes I found particularly useful in 
learning about the historical development of Chicago 
was Mayer and Wade's Growth of the Metropolis.  ^
0'Connor1s Clout: Mayor Daley and His Chicago, ®
Royko's Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago,  ^ Holli
and Green's The Making of the Mayor: Chicago 1983,**
and Kleppner's Chicago Divided: The Making of a Black
^ Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social 
Research, (Belmont, California, 1979) p. 211.
^Harold A. Mayer and Richard C. Wade, Growth of 
the Metropolis, (Chicago, 1969), pp. 375-474.
^Len O'Connor, Clout: Mayor Daley and His
city, (Chicago, 1985), pp. 225-262.
^Mike Royko, Boss; Richard J. Daley of Chicago, 
(New York, 1971).
^Melvin G. Holli and Paul M. Green, editors, The 
Making of the Mayor: Chicago 1983, (Grand Rapids,
1984) pp. 141-166.
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Mayor  ^ were helpful in revealing the recent political 
history of the city. Meyerson and Banfield’s 
Politics, Planning and the Public Interest -^Q and 
Squired, Bennett, McCourt and Nyden’s manuscript, The 
Third City: Race, Class and the Response to Urban
Decline^  were useful in getting an understanding of 
Chicago's planning history. Algren's Chicago; A City 
on the Make, ^  Terkel's Chicago, ^  and Bowden and 
Krineberg's Street Signs Chicago: Neighborhoods and
Other Illusions of Big-City Life^  provided me with a 
number of different perspectives upon the cultural 
life of the city.
Among the volumes I found most illuminating of 
Boston's recent economic history were the Boston
9Paul Kleppner, Chicago Divided: The Making of 
a Black Mayor, (DeKalb, 1985), pp. 240-254.
^Martin L. Meyerson and Richard Banfield, 
Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (Chicago, 
1964), pp. 303-329.
-^Gregory D. Squired, Larry Bennett, Kathleen 
McCourt and Philip Nyden, The Third City: Race,
Class and the Response to Urban Decline in Chicago, 
(Chicago, 1985), pp. 41-62.
•^Nelson Algren, Chicago: City on the Make,
(Chicago, 1951) pp. 52-79.
l^Studs Terkel, Chicago, (New York, 1985).
14Charles Bowden and Lew Krineberg, Street Signs 
Chicago: Neighborhood and Other Illusions of Big-City
Life, (Chicago, 1981).
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Redevelopment Authority Reports, Boston Tomorrow: 
Background on Development^® and Boston Tomorrow: 
Issues of Development.^  The Boston Chapter of the 
Democratic Socialists of America book entitled Who 
Rules Boston^  provided me with an overview of the 
community power structure of the city. J. Anthony 
Lukac's Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the
Times of Three American Families-^ offered a poignant 
look at the nature of community life and racial 
conflict in the city.
While reading these materials, I began to 
receive, read and clip the Boston Globe and the 
Chicago Tribune on a daily basis. I clipped all those 
articles from each paper dealing with the new mayors, 
economic conditions, development problems, planning 
decisions and local politics in each community. I 
engaged in similar clipping activities removing
^ B o s t o n  Redevelopment Authority, Boston 
Tomorrow: Background on Development, (Boston, 1983),
pp. 3-34.
^Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston 
Tomorrow: Issues of Development, (Boston, 1983),
pp. 4-23.
1^Democratic Socialists of America, Who Rules 
Boston?, (New York, 1986), pp.
1®J. Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent
Decade In the Lives of Three American Families, (New 
York, 1986).
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articles from Crain’s Chicago Business and Crain's 
Boston Business which I also subscribed to. Within a 
very short period of time, I amassed articles on some 
seventy-five topics from each city which were related 
to my research. I established a set of files, 
organized on a topical basis, in which I kept 
newspaper and magazine articles in chronological 
order.
Shortly after beginning my newspaper files, I 
started an index card file of the names of individuals 
and organizations which appeared in the articles I cut 
out of the local papers. After less than two months 
of newspaper clipping, I had an index card file of 
individuals and organizations which included 
approximately fifty entries from each city. I hoped 
to use these individual and organizational names as 
the basis of my preliminary interviewee list for each 
community.
Having completed an initial review of the 
relevant literature on economic development planning 
and local history, I planned a single three-day trip 
to each city during the spring of 1985. These 
preliminary field trips to Boston and Chicago had a 
number of specific purposes. First, I wanted to gain 
a basic familiarity with the spatial organization of
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these communities, especially their mass transit 
systems. Second, I wished to collect reference 
materials, public reports and private documents from 
each city dealing with the issues of my research. 
During these first trips to each community I secured a 
variety of maps, local residential and business phone 
books, municipal government directories, comprehensive 
plans, city ordinances, press releases, executive 
orders and various private reports and studies. 
Third, I hoped to schedule appointments with high 
ranking planning officials in each city in order to 
discuss my research with them and ask for their 
cooperation and assistance. Fourth, I wanted to 
identify those development issues which were viewed by 
a cross-section of community leaders in each city as 
the most important planning issues facing their local 
mayors. Fifth, I wanted to develop a revised list of 
local leaders who I could interview regarding the 
issues identified above.
I accomplished these objectives during two three 
day visits to Boston and Chicago during the spring of 
1985. I collected needed documents by visiting a 
variety of local institutions. I secured local 
government cooperation on my research from former 
Commissioner Robert A. Mier of the Chicago Department
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of Economic Development and Mr. Thomas Snyder of 
Boston's Office of Neighborhood Assistance. These two 
individuals also reviewed my initial list of planning 
issues and interviewees and made numerous helpful 
suggestions. I received further feedback on my 
preliminary list of issues and interviewees from a 
group of twelve local community, business and 
municipal leaders with whom I spoke during these brief 
visits. Following the advice of William Foote Whyte, 
I selected key institutional leaders to speak with at 
this time.
The researcher at an early stage tries to 
identify those in leadership positions in 
hopes that they will provide useful contacts and even informal sponsorship.^
Returning to New York City subsequent to these
meetings, I reformulated the list of issues which I
planned to examine in each city. I revised this list
of issues based upon the feedback I received from
those I interviewed. The preliminary set of issues I
developed to investigate included: linkage policies,
employment and training programs, infrastructure
initiatives, and community planning experiments. My
list of potential Boston interviewees increased from
1^William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte, 
Learning From the Field: A Guide From Experience.
(Beverly Hills, 1984.), p. 37.
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60 to 87 individuals whereas my list of potential 
Chicago interviewees expanded form 43 to 66 
individuals as a result of my conversations with local 
leaders. Following these activities, I collected 
additional documentary and archival materials on each 
of these issues. In addition, I read scholarly 
materials and policy-related reports from other 
communities on these issues in order to be prepared to 
speak with leaders in Boston and Chicago about these 
issues.
Following these activities, I wrote to the 120 
individuals whose names appeared on my preliminary 
list of Boston and Chicago interviewees requesting an 
opportunity to speak with them regarding their views 
on local economic development planning. (See Appendix 
B for a copy of the letter I used to contact each 
potential interviewee.) In doing so, I identified 
myself as a graduate student in Cornell University’s 
City and Regional Planning Program. I stated that I 
wished to include their views on local economic 
development policy as part of my doctoral thesis. I 
wrote each individual on my personal stationery 
requesting an hour of their time during my next visit 
to their city. I followed up on each of these letters 
by phone during the late spring of 1985.
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These phone calls resulted in some twenty-five
individuals agreeing to see me in each city. During
the summer of 1985, I travelled to each city for a
two-week period to begin initial interviewing for my
study. All of these interviews were scheduled with
individuals whose names had appeared on my original
list, which was constructed on the basis of my
newspaper clipping activities. I interviewed these
individuals using an interview schedule based upon
thirty open-ended questions focused upon local
economic development policy. While I found the
interview guide to be enormously useful in beginning
the interviews, I soon realized that I had to take a
much more flexible approach to conducting these
sessions. 1 found myself agreeing with Michael J.
Priore's view on structured schedules.
While the guide was invaluable, 1 soon 
realized that most people had a subset of 
these issues to discuss and very clear ideas 
about them. After getting a sense of what I 
wished to know, most spoke at length 
uninterrupted except by a limited number of 
questions to clarify.^0
William Foote Whyte makes a similar point.
The good research interview is structured in 
terms of the research problem. The 
interview Structure is not fixed by 
predetermined questions, as in the 
questionnaire, but is designed to provide
20’Van Maanen, p. 72
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the informant with freedom to introduce 
material that was not anticipated by the 
interviewer.21
At the beginning of each interview, I introduced 
myself, presented the objectives of my study, reviewed 
the major topics I wished to discuss and outlined the 
ground rules for the interview. The ground rules were 
very simply that I would, if they agreed, tape record 
the entire session and be free to use anything they 
said in my thesis. All but one of the interviewees 
agreed to participate in my research on this basis. 
One employee of a local legislative body who had to 
work with representatives of both parties asked that 
his comments not be identified. I agreed to keep this 
individual's comments anonymous and I conducted an 
interview with this person on this basis. Each of 
the interviews I conducted lasted between sixty and 
ninety minutes. All but one of these sessions were 
conducted in the business offices of the interviewees. 
During the course of each interview I took extensive 
notes. This gave the respondents a sense of my 
interest in their comments and it offered me an 
immediate record from which to base my future 
questioning and preliminary analysis. I also tape 
recorded each interview and found that most
21Whyte, p. 97.
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interviewees soon forgot about the taping. It also 
appeared to me that the tape recorder gave the 
interviewees a sense that their comments were valued 
and that they were participating in a serious research 
effort. I concluded this based upon the repeated 
experience I had when a tape ran out. Every 
interviewee stopped talking until I reloaded the tape 
player so that the record of their comments would be 
complete. On a number of occasions I deliberately 
ignored the end of a tape and found that the 
interviewees would either stop speaking or call my 
attention to this fact.
During the fall and winter of 1986, I had each 
of the fifty interviews which I had completed in 
Chicago and Boston transcribed by a professional 
typist. Once these tapes were transcribed, I began a 
preliminary analysis of my data. I did this analysis 
in order to identify the key development issues and 
decision-making processes facing the chief executive 
of each city. I attempted to use the newspaper 
clippings and public records which I had collected on 
each community to verify some of the statements made 
during interviews.
In the winter of 1986, I presented a research 
paper documenting the major economic development
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initiatives of the Washington and Flynn 
administrations at the Annual meeting of the New York 
State Sociological Association in Dobbs Ferry.^2 This 
paper contained my preliminary assessment of 
Washington and Flynn's success in transforming local 
economic development planning in their respective 
cities. This paper suggested that much more 
fundamental changes were occurring in Chicago than in 
Boston in the economic development policy area. Based 
upon these findings and the resource requirements of 
doing in-depth case studies in both cities, I decided, 
with the encouragement of the chairman of my Special 
Committee, to restrict my research to activities in 
Chicago and reorganize my thesis as a single case 
study of local economic development policy-making and 
planning in Chicago.
During the spring of 1987, I re-examined my list 
of potential Chicago interviewees. I decided to 
augment my initial set of twenty-five interviews with 
an additional twenty-five. I decided to include an
equal number of community activists, public 
officials/planners, and business leaders in my sample. 
Furthermore, I decided to draw the majority of my
^ K e n n e t h  M. Reardon, "Local Economic 
Development Planning in Chicago and Boston: Case
Studies in Community Empowerment," (New York, 1986).
308
future interviewees from the names of those provided 
to me by past interviewees. In the end, my 
interviewee pool consisted of fifty-one persons from 
the city of Chicago. (See Appendix C for a complete 
list of these individuals.) The composition of this 
group is presented below.
Table 8.2
List of Chicago Interviewees
Public Officials/
Community Activists ____Planners_____  Businessmen
Total 18 17 16
ListGenerated 8 8 11
Interviewee
Referral 10 9 5
During the summer of 1987, I interviewed these 
remaining individuals using the same interview format 
I had developed for the first group of Chicago 
interviews I had completed. (Please see Appendix D 
for a copy of the interview schedule which I used for 
these interviews.) In the late summer of 1987, these 
additional interviews were transcribed and I began a 
preliminary analysis of this data. Those economic 
trends, issues and decisions which a significant 
number of respondents discussed were examined
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particularly closely. I reviewed the relevant
documents and newspaper clippings on each of these
issues to verify the basic facts offered by the
respondents and to check the soundness of their
analysis. Thus, I sought to increase the validity of
my findings by corroborating the basic history and
analysis presented by the respondents with data from
both archival and documentary sources.
As I studied the transcripts of my interviews, I
attempted to identify individuals who appeared most
knowledgeable on a wide range of economic development
planning issues, critical in their reflections upon
these issues and accessible to me as an investigator.
I hoped to recruit three of these individuals to
serve as "key informants" for the later stages of my
research. Robert K. Yin discusses the benefits of
using such individuals in the following manner,
The procedure has been correctly identi- 
fied--but only rarely--as a way of 
corroborating the essential facts and 
evidence presented in the case report. The 
informants and participants may still 
disagree with an investigator’s conclusions 
and interpretations, but these reviewers 
should not disagree over the actual facts ofthe case.23
Subsequent to my final revisions of the Chicago case 
study, I mailed three individuals who agreed to serve
23Yin, p. 138.
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as "key informants" copies of my draft report. These 
individuals were drawn from a range of different 
interest groups reported on in my study, namely 
community activists, public officials and planning 
academicians. Professor Wim Weiwel, Director of the 
Center for Urban Economic Development at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago; Mr. Robert Giloth, 
former Deputy Commissioner of the Chicago Department 
of Economic Development; and Dr. Robert Mier, former 
Commisioner of the Department of Economic Development 
for the City of Chicago all agreed to provide me with 
feedback on my case study. Their comments were quite 
useful in revising certain sections of the case study 
report.
While waiting for written comments from these 
three reviewers, I traveled to Chicago and presented a 
research paper at the Annual Meeting of the Society 
for the Study of Social Problems in order to get 
additional feedback upon my work.24 The session at 
which I presented my paper was well attended by 
community activists, public officials and scholars 
involved in public policy issues in Chicago and I 
received many helpful comments upon my paper. This
2^Kenneth M. Reardon, "Economic Development 
Planning in Chicago; A Case Study of Progressive 
Local Government Policy," (Chicago, 1987).
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feedback resulted in numerous changes in my final case 
study report,
D. Discussion of the Limitations of the Research
This research was pursued as a single case study 
of local economic development planning in Chicago 
during the first term of Mayor Harold Washington, It 
was based upon a research design utilizing a variety 
of qualitative research methods. The primary data- 
gathering technique was in-depth personal interviews 
with those involved in economic development policy­
making and planning within the city of Chicago. This 
data collection method was augmented by an extensive 
review of documentary evidence and archival materials, 
the primary sources of which were the Chicago 
Tribune, Crain's Chicago Business, The Neighborhood 
Works and a variety of public plans, reports and 
studies issued by the Department of Planning, Housing 
and Economic Development within the City of Chicago.
These methods have enabled me to present a 
detailed summary of those Washington administration 
economic development policies which were seen as most 
central to the mayor's reform agenda by a cross- 
section of community activists, business leaders and 
civic officials involved in these events. These
methods have also enabled me to document how the
312
Washington administration sought to re-orient local 
economic development policies in order to better meet 
the needs of Chicago’s poor and working class 
neighborhoods. These techniques have assisted me in 
doing a preliminary analysis of the short-term effects 
of these policies and programs upon various 
constituencies within the city. Finally, they have 
enabled me to evaluate the extent to which Mayor 
Harold Washington succeeded during his relatively 
short time in office in institutionalizing a 
progressive approach to planning in this important 
policy area.
The research is primarily descriptive in nature; 
however, it does suggest certain tentative hypotheses 
regarding the nature of organizational change within 
public sector institutions which might be examined in 
future research. However, a thorough exploration of 
these propositions would require the execution of a 
multiple case study research project, which is beyond 
the resources of this investigator. Such a follow-up 
study might examine the reform efforts of six or eight 
big-city mayors in the economic development field 
using qualitative research methods. It might seek to 
examine those political conditions which appear to be 
most conducive to the election of populist-oriented
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mayors. Furthermore, it might seek to establish those
techniques which appear most critical to the
institutional reform efforts of these executives.
While this case study cannot answer these questions
with any degree of certitude, it can help generate a
number of tentative organizational propositions which
might be tested in the future. Thus, this research
serves the exploratory purposes which W. Richard Scott
describes in the following manner.
The exploratory study is one in which the 
primary purpose is to gain familiarity with 
some problem or to achieve insights that can 
guide future research.^5
Given the lack of empirical research on the activities 
and decisions of contemporary planning agencies, 
particularly those pursuing reform agendas, such an 
approach appears justified.
25Scott, p. 267.
Appendix B: Letter of Introduction
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July 16, 1986
Dear :
I recently began research on a dissertation 
focusing on the economic development activities of 
planners and planning agencies in the cities of Boston 
and Chicago. This work is being done to fulfill my 
final degree requirements for a Ph.D. in city and 
regional planning at Cornell University in Ithaca, New 
York.
This dissertation will explore how the economic 
development decision-making processes and policies 
have changed in these two cities under their new 
mayors. Among the issues I am examining are linkage 
policies, infrastructure proposals, first source 
hiring initiatives and new forms of public and private 
cooperation.
I am collecting data for my research from 
archival sources, and through personal interviews with 
a wide range of community leaders from each city. As 
an important observer of recent municipal initiatives 
in the economic development policy area, I would like 
to interview you on these topics. I will be in 
___________ from Monday, __________  through Friday, *I
I am very interested in including your
observations and opinions on ________________ urban
development efforts in my study, I will call your 
office next week to see if there is a convenient time 
and place for us to meet when I am in town.
I appreciate your time and interest in this 
matter. I look forward to having an opportunity to 
speak with you in the near future.
Sincerely,
Kenneth M. Reardon 
1125 Lorimer Street, 3G 
Brooklyn, New York 11222
Appendix C: List of Chicago Interviewees
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List of Chicago Interviewees
The organizational affiliations are provided for 
identification purposes only. This list was compiled 
in the spring of 1988. Many of these individuals have 
changed their affiliations since that time.
Robert Brehm
Bickerdike Community Development Corp.
Tom Carlson
Chicago Workshop on Economic Development 
Gary Chico
Chicago City Council Staff
Frank Cizon 
Trust Inc.
Tom Clark
The Neighborhood Works 
Tom Cokins
Central Area Committee 
Daniel Crowe
Chicago City Council Staff 
Joseph Crutchfied
Save Our Neighborhood/Save Our City Coalition 
Mary Decker
Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council 
Pat Dowell
Department of Planning
Eleanor Elam 
Chicago Jobs Coalition
Jim Ford
Northern Illinois Planning Services Agency 
Nelson Forrest
Greater North Michigan Avenue Committee
Charles Gardiner
The Greater State Street Council
Robert Giloth
Department of Economic Development 
Seamus Glenn
Save Our Neighborhood/ Save Our City Coalition
Timothy Harrington 
Department of Planning
Bill Higginson 
Chicago United
Lawrence Howe
Commercial Club of Chicago 
Donald Kane
Kane, McKenna and Associates, Inc.
Jim Ketchum 
Trust Inc.
Frankie Knibb 
Chicago 1992 Committee
John LaMont 
Perkins and Weil
June LaVelle
Industrial Council of Northwest Chicago 
Edward Lawrence
Urban Investment and Development Corporation 
James Lemonides
Greater North Pulaski Development Corporation
Richard C. Longworth 
Chicago Tribune
Richard Luecke 
Community Renewal Society
Louis Massotti 
Northwestern University
John C. Melaniphy Jr.
Melaniphy and Associates Inc.
Robert Mier
Department of Economic Development 
Samuel Mitchell
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry
David Mosena 
Department of Planning
Mary O'Connell
The Neighborhood Works
Augustino Olvero
18th Street Development Corporation
Elspeth Revere
The Woodstock Institute
Carla Robinson 
University of Illinois
Diane Robinson
Department of Economic Development
Miquel Santiago 
Alderman
Dan Sawislak
Save Our Neighborhood/ Save Our City Coalition 
Irene Sherr
Department of Economic Development 
Deborah Stone
Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council
Michael Thom
The Civic Federation
Chuck Thurow 
Department of Planning
Arturo Vazquez
Department of Economic Development 
Joel Werth
Department of Housing 
Wim Wiewel
Center For Urban Economic Development 
University of Illinois at Chicago
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Marc Weiss
University of Illinois at Chicago 
Luke Wicks
Department of Economic Development 
Jodi Wilson
Northern Illinois Planning Servies Agency 
Ted Wysocki
Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development 
Organizations
Appendix D: Interview Schedule
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Chicago Interview Schedule
Personal Background:
1. Could you give me the correct spelling of your 
name?
2. What is your present position with this organization?
3. How long have you been associated with this organization?
4. Is your involvement in local economic development 
policy-making and planning a function of a 
personal interest, job responbility or a 
combination of these two factors?
5. How many years have you been involved in this area 
of local government policy-making?
Introductory Questions;
1. What do you view as the major policy initatives of 
the Washington administration in the area of 
economic development?
2. What are the potential benefits and costs of each 
of these policies to the City of Chicago and its 
residents?
3. In what ways, are these policies and programs
extensions of the policies established by past 
Chicago mayors?
4. In what ways, are these policies and programs
substantively different than those of the past?
5. What impact do you feel these efforts are having 
upon the business climate and economic well-being 
of the City of Chicago?
Chicago Works Together: 1984 Development Plan:
1. Are you familiar with the recently completed 
economic development plan issued by the Chicago 
Department of Economic Development?
2. Have you received a copy of the plan and, if so, 
how did you get your copy?
3. Have you had a chance to review the plan and its 
major elements?
4. Are you in favor of the plan’s emphasis upon job 
creation and its five primary objectives?
5. If yes, why?
6. If not, why not?
7. If you feel the primary objectives of the CWT Plan 
are inappropriate what do feel should be the 
objectives for such a plan?
8. Given the overall objectives of the CWT Plan, how 
effective do you feel its main programs will be?
9. Which programs do you see as being most important 
to the economic well-being of the city?
10. Which programs do you feel will be least effective 
in promoting economic well-being?
11. What types of programs would you replace these 
efforts with?
12. What is your opinion of the process that was used 
by the mayor to formulate this plan?
13. How could this process have been strengthened?
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Linkage Proposals:
1. Currently, the city is exploring ways to promote a 
more balanced pattern of development within the 
city through the development of a "linkage 
program."
Do you feel the city has placed too much emphasis 
upon encouraging investment in the downtown?
2. Do you support the concept of taxing new 
development in the Loop in order to generate funds 
for affordable housing and community development 
activities in Chicago’s neighborhoods?
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3. If so, why?
4. If not, why not? What alternatives might there be 
to encourage investment in Chicago's poor and 
working class residential neighborhoods?
5. If a linkage program is developed, who should 
control the program? A. City Hall,B. Community- 
based non-profit, development corporations,C. 
Private Developers, D. Others, if so, whom?
General Obligation Bond:
1. Recently, the Washington administration issued a 
new General Obligation Bond to support a 
Neighborhood Improvement Program. Are you familiar 
with this initative?
2. Were you in support of this new revenue raising 
effort?
3. If so, why?
4. If not, why not?
5. Were you in agreement with the mayor's decision to 
focus the overwhelming major of the bonds dollars 
on neighborhood oriented projects?
6. If so, why?
7. If not, why not?
8. What do you feel will be the benefits of this 
program to the city?
Minority Purchasing Plan:
1. Recently, the mayor issued an executive order 
requiring the city and organizations receiving 
economic development assistance to direct a 
certain percentage of their contracts for goods 
and services to minority and women owned firms?
2. Are you in favor of such targetted assistance to 
minority and women-owned firms?
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3. If yes, why?
4. If no, why not?
5. Is there an alternative approach to achieving the 
goal of social equity that you feel the city 
should utilize?
Chicago First
1. Recently, the mayor signed an executive order 
requiring those developers receiving city 
assistance to utilize the Mayor's Employment and 
Training Office as a sole source of entry level 
job candidates for a period of two weeks. Are you 
in favor of such efforts by the mayor?
2. If yes, why?
3. If not, why not?
Citizen Participation:
1. How would you compare the opportunities which 
citizens have to participate in the local economic 
development planning process under the Washington 
administration as compared to past mayors?
2. In what specific ways has the process changed? .
3. What consequences hase these changes had upon 
local economic development planning decisions?
4. What further steps could the mayor take to 
strengthen citizen participation in local economic 
development planning?
Wrap-up; 1
1. Given the issues I am interested in, who else 
should I be speaking with?
2. Could you please look at my proposed list of 
interviewees and suggest additional individuals 
who I should speak with?
THANK YOU!!!
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